

MSS. and other Communications for the Editor, except those from America, should be addressed to Professor G. F. STOUT, The University, St. Andrews. All American Communications should be addressed to Professor E. B. TITCHENER, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.
No contribution reaching the Editor later than 10th March next can appear in the April Number of MIND.

In consequence of the continued increase in the cost of production it will be necessary to raise the subscription price of MIND from 12/- to 16/- a year, and of single numbers from 4/- to 4/6. The price to members of the Association will remain the same.

NEW SERIES. No. 109.

JANUARY, 1919.

GENERAL LIBRARY
FEB 23 1919
UNIV. OF MICH.

MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

EDITED BY

PROF. G. F. STOUT,

WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF PROFESSOR E. B. TITCHENER, AMERICAN EDITORIAL REPRESENTATIVE, AND OF PROFESSOR WARD, PROFESSOR PRINGLE-PATTISON, DAVID MORRISON, M.A., AND OTHER MEMBERS OF AN ADVISORY COMMITTEE.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
I.—The Idea of God: A Reply to some Criticisms: A. S. PRINGLE-PATTISON	I
II.—Mental Process: HUGH A. REYBURN	19
III.—Bergson and Absolute Idealism (I): S. RADHAKRISHNAN	41
IV.—On Certain Criticisms of Pluralism: C. A. RICHARDSON	54
V.—Discussions:	
Mr. Joachim's Criticism of 'Correspondence': A. K. ROGERS	66
The State and the Individual: B. BOSANQUET	75
The Test of Experience: J. L. STOCKS	79
VI.—Critical Notices:	
Goblott, E.: <i>Traité de Logique</i> : LEONARD J. RUSSELL	82
Rieber, C. H.: <i>Footnotes to Formal Logic</i> : ALFRED SIDGWICK	87
Bosanquet, B.: <i>Some Suggestions in Ethics</i> : J. S. MACKENZIE	92
VII.—New Books	96
VIII.—Philosophical Periodicals	111
IX.—Notes and News:	
Robinson, A.: M. Jules Lachelier	120
Jourdain, P. E. B.: Notes on Zeno's Arguments on Motion	123
Russell, B.: Note on C. D. Broad's Article in the July MIND	124
MIND ASSOCIATION: Full List of Officers and Members	125

PUBLISHED FOR THE MIND ASSOCIATION BY
MACMILLAN & CO., LIMITED,
ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON, W.C. 2.

NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.

Price Four Shillings and Sixpence. ——— All Rights Reserved.

Entered at the New York Post Office as second class matter.

WORKS BY DR. JAMES LINDSAY.

A PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM OF THEISTIC IDEALISM. 12s. 6d. net.

STUDIES IN EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY. 10s. 6d. net.

RECENT ADVANCES IN THEISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.
12s. 6d. net.

THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF METAPHYSICS. 4s. net.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BELIEF. 2s. 6d. net.

NEW ESSAYS: LITERARY AND PHILOSOPHICAL. 6s. net.

WM. BLACKWOOD & SONS, EDINBURGH and LONDON.

Contributions to the Founding of the Theory of Transfinite Numbers. By GEORG CANTOR. Translated, and provided with an Introduction and Notes, by PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN, M.A. Pages x, 212. Cloth, 3s. 6d. net. (Postage, 4d. extra.)

The Analysis of Sensations and the Relation of the Physical to the Psychical. By ERNST MACH. Translated from the first German edition by C. M. WILLIAMS; revised and supplemented from the fifth German edition by SYDNEY WATERLOW, M.A. Pages xvi, 380. Cloth, 6s. 6d. net. (Postage, 5d. extra.)

Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy. (Lowell Lectures of 1914.) By the Hon. BERTRAND RUSSELL, M.A., F.R.S. Pages x, 245. Cloth, 7s. 6d. net. (Postage, 5d. extra.)

"This brilliant, lucid, amusing book."—*The New Statesman*.

"The book of the year. . . . It is in every sense an epoch-making book."—*Cambridge Magazine*.

"This book, though intentionally somewhat popular in tone, contains some most important and interesting contributions to philosophy."—*Mind*.

History of Modern Philosophy in France. By LUCIEN LÉVY-BRUHL, Maître de Conférences in the Sorbonne, etc., etc. *With twenty-three Photogravure and Half-tone Portraits of French Philosophers.* 500 pages. 8vo, 12s. net. (Postage, 6d. extra.)

History and Root of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy. By ERNST MACH. Translated from the German, and annotated by PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN, M.A. (Cantab.). 116 pages. Cloth, 5s. net. (Postage, 4d. extra.)

CATALOGUE ON APPLICATION.

THE OPEN COURT COMPANY,

149 STRAND, LONDON, W.C. 2.

CONTENTS OF VOLUME XXVIII.

(NEW SERIES.)

ARTICLES.

	PAGE
JOURDAIN, P. E. B.—Causality, Induction, and Probability - - -	162
LAIRD, J.—Introspection - - -	385
LEON, P.—An Ambiguity and Misconception in Plato's Idea of Morality in the <i>Republic</i> - - -	436
MACKINTOSH, D. C.—A Sketch of the Philosophy of Religion, with Illustrations of Critical Monism - - -	129
PRICHARD, H. A.—Professor John Cook Wilson - - -	297
PRINGLE-PATTISON, A. S.—The Idea of God: A Reply to Some Criticisms - - -	1
RADHAKRISHNAN, S.—Bergson and Absolute Idealism (I.) - - -	41
" - - - Bergson and Absolute Idealism (II.) - - -	275
REYBURN, H. A.—Mental Process - - -	19
RICHARDSON, C. A.—On Certain Criticisms of Pluralism - - -	54
SELLARS, R. W.—The Epistemology of Evolutionary Naturalism - - -	407
SHELTON, H. S.—The Syllogism and Other Logical Forms - - -	180
WADIA, A. R.—Mr. Joachim's Coherence-Notion of Truth - - -	427
WARD, JAMES.—Sense-Knowledge (I.) - - -	257
" - - - Sense-Knowledge (II.) - - -	447
WRINCH, DOROTHY.—On the Nature of Judgment - - -	319

DISCUSSIONS.

BOSSAQUET, B.—The State and the Individual	-	-	-	-	-	75
"—" "The Basis of Bossaquet's Logic"	-	-	-	-	-	209
HARWARD, J.—What does Bergson Mean by Pure Perception?	-	-	-	-	-	463
JOACHIM, H. H.—The "Correspondence-Notion" of Truth	-	-	-	-	-	330
JOSEPH, H. W. B.—On Occupying Space	-	-	-	-	-	336
ROGERS, A. K.—Mr. Joachim's Criticism of Correspondence	-	-	-	-	-	66
SCHILLER, F. C. S.—Logic and Formalism	-	-	-	-	-	219
STOCKS, J. L.—The Test of Experience	-	-	-	-	-	79

CRITICAL NOTICES.

BARKER, ERNEST.— <i>Greek Political Theory: Plato and His Predecessors</i> (A. E. Taylor)	347
BOSANQUET, B.— <i>Some Suggestions in Ethics</i> (J. S. Mackenzie)	92
GOBLOT, E.— <i>Traité de Logique</i> (Leonard J. Russell)	82
HEALY, WILLIAM.— <i>The Individual Delinquent: a Text-book of Diagnosis and Prognosis for all Concerned in Understanding Offenders</i> (W. Leslie Mackenzie)	354

	PAGE
INGE, W. R.— <i>The Philosophy of Plotinus</i> (A. E. Taylor) - - -	238
JONES, ERNEST.— <i>Papers on Psycho Analysis</i> (C. D. Broad) - - -	340
MACKENZIE, J. S.— <i>Elements of Constructive Philosophy</i> (B. Bosanquet) - - -	229
RIEBER, C. H.— <i>Footnotes to Formal Logic</i> (Alfred Sidgwick) - - -	87
SMITH, NORMAN KEMP.— <i>A Commentary to Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason"</i> (G. Dawes Hicks) - - -	217
SORLEY, W. R.— <i>Moral Values and the Idea of God</i> (Gifford Lectures at Aberdeen, 1914-1915) (W. R. Inge) - - -	234
STRONG, C. A.— <i>The Origin of Consciousness: an Attempt to Conceive the Mind as a Product of Evolution</i> (L. J. Russell) - - -	471

NEW BOOKS.

ALEXANDER, F. MATTHIAS.— <i>Man's Supreme Inheritance, Conscious Guidance and Control in Relation to Human Evolution in Civilisation</i> - - -	370
BLISSARD, W.— <i>The Economic Anti-Christ: a Study of Social Polity</i> (H. Rashdall) - - -	102
BOND, F. B.— <i>The Gate of Remembrance: the Story of the Psychological Experiment which Resulted in the Discovery of the Edgar Chapel at Glastonbury</i> (F. C. S. Schiller) - - -	106
BOODIN, J. E.— <i>A Realistic Universe: an Introduction to Metaphysics</i> (F. C. S. Schiller) - - -	362
CALKINS, MARY WHITON.— <i>The Good Man and the Good: an Introduction to Ethics</i> (J. W. Scott) - - -	367
COLLINGWOOD, R. G.— <i>Religion and Philosophy</i> (G. Galloway) - - -	365
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY (Department of Philosophy).— <i>Studies in the History of Ideas</i> (A. E. Taylor) - - -	99
CONSTABLE, F. C.— <i>Myself and Dreams</i> - - -	491
DRUMMOND, MARGARET.— <i>The Dawn of Mind</i> (Beatrice Edgell) - - -	108
DURANT, WILL.— <i>Philosophy and the Social Problem</i> (F. C. S. Schiller) - - -	481
FOLLETT, M. P.— <i>The New State: Group Organisation the Solution of Popular Government</i> (B. Bosanquet) - - -	370
GREENSTREET, W. J.—(See Rignano, Eugenio.)	
HALDANE, J. S.— <i>The New Physiology, and Other Addresses</i> (D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson) - - -	359
HEFELBOWER, S. G.— <i>The Relation of John Locke to English Deism</i> (J. G.) - - -	490
JONES, SIR HENRY.— <i>The Principles of Citizenship</i> (C. C. J. W.) - - -	480
JOURDAIN, P. E. B. (edited by).— <i>The Philosophy of Mr. Bertrand Russell</i> (C. D. Broad) - - -	485
MCDOWALL, STEWART A.— <i>Evolution and the Doctrine of the Trinity</i> (G. G.) - - -	489
MORE, P. E.— <i>Platonism</i> (John Burnet) - - -	96
PERRY, R. B.— <i>The Present Conflict of Ideals. A Study of the Philosophical Background of the World-War</i> (C. T. Harley-Walker) - - -	488
PICAVET, A.— <i>Hypostases Plotiniennes et Trinité Chrétienne: (École Pratique des Hautes Études, Section des Sciences Religieuses)</i> (A. B. Taylor) - - -	109
RIGNANO, EUGENIO.— <i>Essays in Scientific Subjects</i> , trans. by W. J. Greenstreet (J.) - - -	108
SALTER, W. M.— <i>Nietzsche, the Thinker: a Study</i> (F. C. S. Schiller) - - -	107
SELLARS, ROY WOOD.— <i>The Next Step in Religion: an Essay towards the Coming Renaissance</i> (G. G.) - - -	369
<i>Studies in the History of Ideas</i> , edited by the Department of Philosophy of Columbia University (A. E. Taylor) - - -	99
WATSON, JOHN.— <i>The State in Peace and War</i> (C. C. J. W.) - - -	487
WHITTAKER, THOMAS.— <i>The Neoplatonists</i> (W. R. Inge) - - -	104
ZNANIECKI, FLORIAN.— <i>Cultural Reality</i> (F. C. S. Schiller) - - -	488

CONTENTS.


vii

PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.

	PAGE
<i>American Journal of Psychology</i> (vol. xxix., No. 1—vol. xxix., No. 4) - - - - -	112, 249, 495
<i>Archives de Psychologie</i> (tome xvi., No. 2—tome xvii., No. 1) - - - - -	378, 498
<i>British Journal of Psychology</i> (vol. ix., Part 1, Dec., 1917)	117
<i>International Journal of Ethics</i> (Jan., 1918, vol. xxviii., No. 2) - - - - -	116
<i>Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods</i> (vol. xv., 1—vol. xvi., 14) - - - - -	114, 250, 373, 496
<i>Philosophical Review</i> (vol. xxvii., No. 1—vol. xxviii., No. 4) - - - - -	111, 248, 372, 492
<i>Psychological Review</i> (vol. xxv., No. 1—vol. xxvi., No. 1)	112, 249, 373, 494
<i>Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale</i> (Sept., 1917, July-Aug., 1918) - - - - -	117, 252, 377
" <i>Scientia</i> " (<i>Rivista di Scienza</i>) (Series ii., vol. xxiii., April, 1918—vol. xxv., June, 1919) - - - - -	118, 255, 379, 500
<i>Zeitschrift f. Psychologie</i> (Bd. lxxvi., Heft 5—Bd. lxxx., Heft 3) - - - - -	499

NOTES AND CORRESPONDENCE.

BROAD, C. D.—The Notion of a General Will - - - - -	502
JOURDAIN, P. E. B.—Notes on Zeno's Arguments on Motion - - -	123
" " A Proof that any Aggregate can be Well-ordered - - -	382
MIND ASSOCIATION.—Full List of Officers and Members - - -	125
ROBINSON, ARTHUR.—M. Jules Lachelier - - - - -	120
RUSSELL, BERTRAND.—Note on C. D. Broad's Article in the July MIND - - -	124
TAYLOR, A. E.—Letter to the Editor on Mr. P. E. More's <i>Platonism</i> - -	256



MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

I.—THE IDEA OF GOD: A REPLY TO SOME
CRITICISMS.

BY A. S. PRINGLE-PATTISON.

SOME reply will be expected from me to Dr. Rashdall's criticisms of certain of my positions in the *Idea of God*.¹ As Dr. Rashdall says, there is much ground which we hold in common, yet there are some of his expressions to which I cannot easily reconcile myself, just as there are expressions of mine to which he pointedly objects. It will be impossible for me to cover all the ground traversed by him in his article, but if I take up the main points in the order in which he brings them forward, I may succeed in clearing away misconceptions or in re-defining my positions in such a way as to meet valid objections to the form in which they are stated in my book. In so doing I will take the liberty of referring at the same time to any other relevant criticisms on these points which have come to my notice.

The first point raised by Dr. Rashdall concerns my position in "the old controversy between Idealism and Realism". He is not inclined to accept the distinction I draw between "Idealism" in the broad historic sense of a spiritual theory of the universe and what I have called, for the sake of distinction, "subjective idealism" or "mentalism," and he thinks that I have over-emphasised the reality of the object. "After all," he says, my idealism is "not complete or thoroughgoing," inasmuch as I still talk about the "independent existence of the object". If I had "recognised as fully as Green or Mr.

¹ MIND, July, 1918.

Bradley or Prof. Bosanquet the impossibility of a thing possessing real existence independently of consciousness," it would have helped to guide my steps in the right way. Dr. Rashdall has, in several of his writings, expounded what he calls "the ordinary idealistic argument by which it is shown that all that we mean by a thing is unintelligible apart from Mind;" and in his British Academy paper on "The Metaphysic of Mr. F. H. Bradley," he extols Mr. Bradley as "the most thoroughly convinced and the most convincing, I venture to think the most irrefutable, of Idealists. In Mr. Bradley we have an Idealist who is not afraid or ashamed of Idealism. Mr. Bradley is not a 'soft Idealist' who, after disposing of Materialism by arguments borrowed from Berkeley or Kant, suddenly, when faced with the difficulties of his own position and its antagonism to so-called Common sense, turns round and condemns under the name of 'subjective Idealism' the inevitable inference 'if nature does not exist apart from Mind, then nothing really exists but Mind and what is *for* Mind'. Mr. Bradley is a genuine, hard, impenitent Idealist, who over and over again asserts as his fundamental formula 'There is but one Reality, and its being consists in experience'.¹ . . . It turns out then as the result of examination that matter, as we know it, can always be analysed away into a form of conscious experience" (pp. 3-4). "Its reality is that of actual or possible experience" (p. 15).

I am afraid that these passages—many of the phrases at all events—exemplify just that identification of Idealism with Berkeleyan Mentalism which I deprecate. I deprecate the binding up of the two positions because the mentalistic argument has for a long time appeared to me to be unconvincing, to be, in fact, as I have argued, essentially circular. And I was interested recently to find Green himself pressing the same criticism in a review of John Caird's *Philosophy of Religion*. Principal Caird had been arguing against materialism that "to constitute the existence of the outward world . . . you must needs presuppose a consciousness for which and in which all objective existence is. To go beyond, or to attempt to conceive of an existence which is prior to and outside of thought, a 'thing in itself' of which thought is only the mirror, is self-contradictory inasmuch as that very thing in itself is only conceivable by, exists only for, thought. But while it is true that the priority of thought, or the ulti-

¹ Or as he quotes later in the same paper: "Sentient experience is reality and what is not this is not real," "the real is nothing but experience," "everything is experience": "there we have the voice of the genuine Idealist" (p. 10).

mate unity of thought and being, is a principle to doubt which is impossible, seeing that, in doubting it, we are tacitly asserting the thing we doubt, yet it is not *my* thought in which I am shut up . . . for I have the power of transcending my own individuality and the world of objects opposed to it, and of entering into an idea which unites or embraces both. . . . The real presupposition of all knowledge, or the thought which is the *prius* of all things, is not the individual's consciousness of himself as an individual, but a thought or self-consciousness which is beyond all individual selves, which is the unity of all individual selves and their objects, of all thinkers and all objects of thought. . . . We might even say that, strictly speaking, it is not we that think, but the universal reason that thinks in us. . . . Our whole conscious life is based on a universal self-consciousness, an absolute spiritual life, which is not a mere subjective notion or conception, but which carries with it the proof of its necessary existence or reality." In view of this argument, so familiar to us in the writings both of the Principal and his brother, Green confesses to "an uneasy sense that it is little likely to carry conviction". It will seem to the reader, he says, that the author confuses essentially different propositions: "the proposition that a thing is only conceivable by thought—which he will say is an identical one, for by thought we mean the faculty that conceives—with the proposition that the thing only exists for thought; the proposition, again, that no object can be *conceived as existing* except in relation to a thinking subject, with the proposition that it cannot exist except in that relation".¹ What is this but the criticism of Berkeleyan idealism which the modern realist has condensed into the phrase "the egocentric predicament"? It is plain, therefore, that, whatever we may think of Green's own method of approaching the question, he is far from being satisfied with "the ordinary idealistic argument," which Dr. Rashdall finds so convincing.

Dr. Rashdall, to judge from the passages I have quoted above, appears to accept as the basis of his Idealism the Berkeley-Mill-Bain analysis of matter into forms of conscious

¹ *Works*, vol. iii., pp. 138-144. It is true that Green does not profess to endorse all the criticism which, in this context, he puts in the mouth of an unbiassed reader, but he subsequently adopts the gist of it as true, for he says explicitly, in contrasting Caird's method of argument with his own, "To assume, because all reality requires thought to conceive it, that therefore thought is the condition of its existence is, indeed, unwarrantable," and he expressly condemns the "jump" from "thought as a subjective process" to "an absolute spiritual life which, as God, must at the same time be or make the reality of the world".

process. Matter is "analysed away," into actual and possible experience. Hence as Berkeley expressed the position when it first dawned upon him "nothing properly but persons, *i.e.*, conscious things, doth exist; all other things are not so much existences as manners of the existence of persons". Or in a neat phrase of Prof. Taylor's at the stage when he wrote his *Elements of Metaphysics*, "reality is exclusively composed of psychical fact". Now there is nothing which I believe to be epistemologically more unsound than this identification of the knower's knowledge or experience with the reality of the object he knows. Knowledge, experience, consciousness—all such terms—contain in their very essence a reference beyond the subjective process to a reality known or experienced in that process. They all point beyond themselves to an object whose reality is not constituted by the knowing but presupposed by it, and in that sense independent of it. This is, I hold, the irreducible truth in Realism, and it will be found that the very language used by the Mentalists often betrays the confusion on which their position rests. When, for example, Dr. Rashdall says "Matter, *as we know it*, can always be analysed away into a form of conscious experience," a critic such as Green makes use of might easily retort that the proposition is in effect an identical one, for "matter, *as we know it*," is taken in it as equivalent to "our knowledge of matter". Or, again, we are told, in the present article, that if we think of matter in the sense of the Idealist, we must think of it as "existing only in and for Mind". But there is, or may be, a great difference between "in" and "for". An object, when sensed or in any way experienced, may intelligibly be said to exist *for* the mind in question or to be present *to* it; but it is contrary to philosophical and scientific analysis no less than to common sense to describe the object as *in* the mind. Such a form of expression really depends upon the unfounded (and, let us hope, now exploded) dogma that we cannot know a thing without actually *being* the thing, or unless the thing migrates over into us and becomes part of our own being. From this follows, in the first instance, the doctrine of Representative Perception, which in turn gives place to Subjective Idealism. But, if we refuse to yield to this initial prejudice at the outset, we shall not be tempted to sacrifice the reality of the object by reducing it to a process in the knowing mind. We shall be able to recognise that the reality of the fact known is everywhere the precondition of the fact of our knowing it and not *vice versa*.

This is so obvious in our own case that the second word

of the Mentalist is always the retraction of his first. He hastens to assure us that the identification of the object with the mental experience is of course not true in the case of any finite mind whose experiences come and go, have a beginning and an end. To make the theorem true we have to imagine the all-sustaining experience of a divine or cosmic consciousness. But if this transference of the issue appears at first sight to make the argument more plausible, that is only, as I have argued, because in our statement of the new case we have insensibly altered the conditions. Under one set of phrases or another, we attribute to such a cosmic consciousness a productive or creative activity which confers upon the objects of its thought just that stability and relative independence which we recognise in the object of our own knowledge, and in virtue of which these cosmic objects, as I may call them, are supposed to be capable of becoming common objects to any number of finite minds. But even so the theory immediately breaks down on closer examination, for, to give it the meaning which makes it persuasive, it implies, in the case of any so-called object, the identity, or at least the complete resemblance, of the divine and the human mode of experience. But how can we identify our own sense-experience of the external world with the mode in which Nature enters into a divine experience? Hence the theory tends to change its form. "The object and the sensation," are no longer taken, in Berkeley's phrase, as "the same thing"; the sense-experience of the finite consciousness is represented as the immediate result of the divine Will, the only true cause. So Dr. Rashdall speaks later in his article of God as "willing all the events of the world," and "causing the laws of nature," describing this view expressly as his own "way of thinking of God" (p. 274). Now, whatever we may think of this new version on its merits, it is at least a different theory from that with which we started. The reality and independence of the object is now placed in the permanent exciting cause of the experience; and with this acknowledgment of an extra-mental reality, we have abandoned the principle on which Mentalism stands. The weakness of the new version is, of course, that the reference to bare Will does not explain the particularity—the nature—of the occurrences. But, seeing that what is willed is supposed to be consciously willed, the character of the events and what may be called the scheme of operations as a whole must be somehow present to the divine Mind; and that raises once more the question of "how". When Berkeley grapples intermittently with this question in *Siris*, his reflexions seem to be leading him to a view not far removed from Platonic Realism.

It was accordingly the epistemological falsity, as it seemed to me, of the mentalistic argument in its original form and the ambiguity of all the attempts to re-state it in cosmic terms—as well as the exiguous nature of the result attainable by such a mode of reasoning, even if its validity were granted—that made me anxious to keep my own argument free from such entangling associations. But I did not on that account intend for a moment to assert the metaphysical self-existence, as I may term it, of material things. Modern Realists probably tend as a rule to do so, but the idea of the universe as a mere aggregate of independent existences, whether these existences be minds or things, is to me ultimately unthinkable; and, of course, the materialistic form of such an idea—as if the universe consisted of “bits of unrelated stuff lying about”—is the precise antithesis of everything I have ever taught. “Essential relatedness” is the conception which I oppose to the figment of the unrelated (and therefore ultimately unknowable) thing in itself, on which I have poured unmitigated scorn. Things exist as they are known by mind, and they may be said to exist in order to be so known and appreciated. In this sense all things exist *for* mind, but my point is that they do exist; a thing is not itself “a form of conscious experience,” a phrase, that is to say, of the being of the experiencing mind. Finite minds require an environment by which they are shaped and from which they receive their content, and it is nonsensical to seek to represent the environment as a state or process of the mind itself. We do not dream of doing so in the case of the social environment; no form of Subjective Idealism has been consistent enough to “analyse away” other selves into forms of the conscious experience of the subject by whom they are known and whom they influence. Why, then, should we so treat that other environment of external nature, which presents itself so obviously to unsophisticated people as an independent reality with which they are in relation? My natural realism—which Dr. Rashdall is at liberty to call naïve, if he likes—consists, first of all, in refusing to obliterate this manifest distinctness in existence, as the Mentalistic argument constantly tends to do, and, secondly, in declining to follow the seductive example of the Pan-psychists who, while accepting a real independence or distinctness, transmute the apparently unconscious system of nature into a multitude of infinitesimally conscious centres. I admit, as I have just said, a certain seductiveness in their procedure, because, when we try to conceive or think ourselves into the mode of being of anything to which we attribute concrete

existence, we inevitably do "think ourselves" into it; we construct it on the model of our own self-centred being, though it may be at many removes. But my difficulty with Pan-psychism is that if we are in earnest with the spiritual or psychic nature of the monads, we lose once more, as in Mentalism, the idea of environment in the sense in which it seems to be involved in the existence of a finite spirit. In a sense, doubtless, it may be contended that Pan-psychism does provide an environment for the individual, to wit, the social environment constituted by all the other co-existing monads. But the social environment is, in our experience, based upon the natural. Spirits, for their individuation, self-expression and intercommunication, appear to require bodies and the system of nature in which these bodies are rooted; and to resolve these bodies and the whole material world into little minds is the beginning of an infinite progress. These little minds in turn imply some medium in which they are shaped and through which they can act. If, on the other hand, the monads of the lower class are psychical merely in name, behaving otherwise exactly as we usually believe unconscious material particles to behave, the theory becomes superfluous and we might as well have accepted the *prima facie* distinction recognised by the common-sense view.

Dr. Rashdall is right, then, in saying that upon my view "it is clearly impossible that at any time it could have been said with truth, 'There is nothing in the world but matter, whatever there is going to be,' or, 'Matter exists in and by itself'". I could not say so, because, although I believe in the reality of process, I do not believe in a process which consists in successive spurts of something out of nothing. The philosopher must take the universe as a whole, if he is truly to describe its nature; and it was the fundamental contention of my book that, if we take it from the side of process, we must take the process as a whole and not substantiate the earlier stages in abstraction from the culmination in which they receive their meaning. If we contemplate the process thus, I insisted that the overpowering impression gained is that of man as organic to the world and of the world as organic to man, that is to say, to the self-conscious reason first revealed in man. In a universe so regarded there is no self-existent thing in itself apart from its function in the whole; and the external world in particular, I argued, cannot be severed from the sentient and intelligent lives of which it is the matrix and the nurse. In a world whose central business is conceived as the making of souls, unconscious nature assumes, I suggested, the character of means or intermediary

towards an end. It is, as it were, the medium of the divine creation of such conscious centres. This instrumental or mediating function of the material world, I concluded, was the larger idealistic truth which underlay the mentalistic form of Berkeley's argument, and it is a truth which may be held along with a frankly realistic attitude towards external nature. Just because I had so fully expounded the central position of Mind—building up that conclusion in my own way—I may in one or two instances have been rash in the phrases used to emphasise the trans-subjective reality of the perceived world. But I had assumed that statements made in the chapter in question as to the "independence" of the object would be understood in the particular reference in which they occur, namely, as denials of the Mentalistic theory and not as overriding or recanting the fundamental thesis of the volume. In the one or two cases in which critics have shown that such misconception is possible, I will take the first opportunity of amending the unguarded phraseology, while maintaining the doctrine of the chapter unaltered, as I have explained it afresh in the foregoing pages.

The second point with which Dr. Rashdall deals is the relation between finite centres of consciousness and the supreme Spirit. Although, as he suggests, the real difference between us here is probably slighter than appears, it was almost entirely in this reference that I cited Dr. Rashdall's statements and ventured to criticise his modes of expression. The question is a supremely difficult one, and as several of my most friendly critics have found difficulties and inconsistencies in my own statements, this opportunity of returning to the subject is not unwelcome.

Dr. Rashdall begins by referring to my failure to distinguish between God and the Absolute, and Prof. Bosanquet, from a different point of view, comments on the same fact. The fullest criticism of my terminology in this respect occurs in the course of a very sympathetic article by Prof. H. R. Mackintosh in the *Contemporary Review*.¹ He shows by a collation of passages that the two terms appear to be directly equated with one another and that, in a few cases, "the All" is introduced as a variant for the Absolute, and he urges that this sheer identification is inconsistent with the ethical Theism with which my argument concludes. The apparent equation leads another acute but less sympathetic reviewer² to attack my position as undiluted "Absolutism" and to

¹ December, 1917, "A Philosopher's Theology".

² Prof. Widgery in *The Indian Philosophical Review*, No. I.

refer with some heat to the intolerableness "of a God who is revealed in Cæsar Borgia as well as in Saint Francis". Yet, after all, it is perhaps more correct to say, as Dr. Rashdall says, that I use the terms indifferently than that I expressly identify them. When I speak, for example, "of a principle of explanation which we name the Absolute or God," or of "the conception of a *rerum natura* whether we call it Nature, the Absolute, or God," the "or" may fairly be taken as chronicling a variation in philosophical usage which is unessential for the point under discussion rather than as indicating a personal view of the precise equivalence of the terms. As a matter of fact, the two terms in question are plainly not precise equivalents in the sense that the one may be substituted for the other in any context, and an examination of the variations in my own usage would indicate, I think, a growing differentiation between the two as the argument proceeds. This is partly due to the progressive nature of my argument which Prof. Mackintosh rightly signalises, and on which I may be permitted for a moment to dwell. The whole of the first series of lectures is devoted to the establishment, as against Naturalism, of the general position of Idealism. The argument did not go beyond the world of finite experience: it was content to recognise in the process of that world an indwelling reason and purpose. "God as immanent," I said, in opening the second series, might be described as the text of the first year's lectures; but so far the further issue between an impersonal Absolutism and a Theism which should be at once ethical and religious remained undetermined. All the more distinctively speculative questions as to the meaning of creation, the degree of independence compatible with a derived existence, the possibility and nature of a divine experience—these and other cognate questions all remained to be dealt with in the second series. Inadequate as must be the treatment of problems whose perfect resolution must be pronounced impossible for human thought, the questions were at least faced and considered, and it seems to me on reflexion that the sifting of the difficulties helped to clarify my own thought, making distinctions clearer and more explicit, and thus insensibly superseding phrases which bore an intelligible meaning in the earlier context in which they occurred. Something of this kind happened, I think, with the terms "God" and "the Absolute" when the fact of the divine transcendence became as obvious as the doctrine of immanence dwelt on in the earlier series. But in spite of this differentiation the two terms will be found occasionally used as interchangeable even

to the end, and perhaps I may be able to show that the usage is defensible and need cause no real confusion of thought.

But why, it may be asked, retain at all a term like the Absolute, apparently so ambiguous in its import and so questionable in its antecedents? Dr. Rashdall would prefer to dispense with it altogether and to speak simply of "the Universe," which he would then describe as consisting of "God and the finite centres". There is an apparent simplification here which is attractive; but it is a simplification reached, it seems to me, by sacrificing altogether the conception of immanence, and reverting to a purely deistic view of the relation of God to the spirits whom He is said to create. "Universe" is too cold and threadbare a term to serve as the ultimate designation of the living Fact we mean to name. Etymologically, no doubt, it was intended to imply the unity and system of the whole as opposed to what Carlyle called a multiverse or chaos. But the implication hardly survives in ordinary usage. Moreover, the term is perhaps most commonly used not as an all-inclusive term but of the world as distinguished from God, and its primary suggestion is that of the immeasurable fields of space dotted with innumerable suns and planets. In any case, its associations are with the "bad" infinite, the endless progress: it lacks almost entirely the suggestion of a self-contained and internally organised whole, beyond which there is nothing. The latter is the true philosophical meaning of the Absolute, and it is well to have a term to express just this meaning. For an idealist or spiritual view, reality is a systematic whole of this description. Such a theory as I have tried to expound finds it impossible to take God and the world as two separate and independently existing facts. A deistically conceived God, existing in solitary state before the world was, and to whom the finite world bears only a contingent relation, as called into existence by the word of His power, is, I have insisted, a figment of the logical imagination. God exists only as a self-communicating Life: in theological language, creation is an eternal act or process—a process which must be ultimately understood not as the making of something out of nothing but as a self-revelation of the divine in and to finite spirits. Such, I said, is "the eternal fashion of the cosmic life. The infinite in and through the finite, the finite in and through the infinite—this mutual implication is the ultimate fact of the universe as we know it" (p. 315). This, then, is the true Absolute, a term which would be inapplicable to the transcendent God of an abstract monotheism, but which is not unfitly applied to the sweep of a Life which realises itself in

and through the process of the finite world, as consummated in the divine sonship of man. It is always, I think, of God as thus organic to the world that the term 'the Absolute' is used in my volume, and Prof. Ward's hyphenated phrase 'God-and-the-world'¹ would therefore exactly express the meaning I had intended to convey.

It is plain that the process involves a real otherness in the finite selves. If it were not so where would be the room for "joy in heaven" over the repentant sinner? The whole of religious experience involves such an otherness. "Religion," as Mr. Bradley himself reminds us, "is throughout a two-sided affair."² I have protested, accordingly, in the strongest possible terms (as Dr. Rashdall acknowledges) against the cheap and easy monism which treats the individual selves as merely the channels through which a single universal consciousness thinks and acts—masks, as it were, of the one actor who takes all the parts in the cosmic drama. This world of ours is not such a game of make-believe—a game which would be cynical if it were not childish. And I have protested equally (though Dr. Rashdall seems to be not quite so sure of this) against the opposite idea, which denies any divine self-consciousness except that which is realised in the finite individuals. My argument presupposes at every turn a comprehensive divine experience which is other than, and infinitely more than, that of any finite self or of all finite selves collectively, if their several contributions could be somehow pieced together.³ If the first view abolishes the reality of the finite selves, the second recognises them alone as real, reducing God to the status of an abstract universal. In opposition to these two extremes I maintain, as I have

¹ *Realm of Ends*, p. 241. The hyphens are also used in the table of Contents, p. xii. "A God that was not a creator, a God whose creatures had no independence would not himself be really a God. Herein theism differs from thoroughgoing singularism or absolutism. A theism that is reached through pluralism can never end in an Absolute in which God and the World alike were abolished and lost" (p. 241).

² *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 433 ("On God and the Absolute").

³ Dr. Rashdall refers to my statement that "the presence of the Ideal is the reality of God within us," and asks, "Does this mean that God is merely the Ideal in us?" It is enough to point out that the express contention of the chapter in which the statement occurs ("The Ideal and the Actual") is the validity of our moral and religious ideals as the revelation of an objective reality. "The ideal," I say, "is precisely the most real thing in the world," and, again, the presence of the Ideal in a human consciousness is "the actual presence within it, or to it, of the Perfection to which it aspires". What more could I say to emphasise transfinite reality? The presence of which I speak is no other than that of the Spirit whose function it is to guide us into all truth.

always maintained, the real individuality and ethical independence of the finite selves as the fundamental condition of the moral life, and I accept at the same time the reality of a divine or perfect consciousness, because the process of human experience and the possibility of progress in goodness and truth remain to me inexplicable, unless the finite creature is grounded in and illuminated by such a creative Spirit. I accept the relative otherness and independence involved as an ultimate mystery, covered but not explained by the word creation. I call it a mystery because, as I said in my book, to construct for ourselves the relation in question would be to transcend the very conditions of our individuality, to get, as it were, behind the conditions of finite existence and actually repeat the process of creation. Hence when we do try to schematise the fact for ourselves, we either eliminate the characteristics of selfhood by making the individual simply a vehicle of transmission, or, on the other hand, we lose hold of the creative unity altogether by treating the individuals as independent, self-subsistent units. But our failure to comprehend the compatibility of our ethical freedom with our ontological dependence is no valid reason, I suggested, for denying the freedom and responsibility which is our most intimate certainty. And the combination which seems a speculative impossibility presents no difficulties to the practical religious consciousness; it runs like a familiar paradox through the most characteristic utterances of devotion.

A real otherness, then, is fundamental to my argument. This otherness is, of course, most conspicuous when regarded from the side of will, but it must be admitted to hold good through the whole range of self-conscious experience. No mental experience of mine can, in the sense in which it is my experience, form part of the experience of any other mind. This is the "formal distinctness" of selves which Prof. Bosanquet so disparages, and which I have defended against him in a series of passages some of which Dr. Rashdall quotes. I reject the whole conception of the "confluence" and "overlapping" of selves as existents. A self may be largely identical in content with other selves, but to speak as if their common content affected in any way their existential distinctness is, I contend, to be the victim of a confusion. In a subsequent controversy Prof. Bosanquet sought to support the idea of confluence by "a simple analogy from knowledge": just as his philosophy, he said, might be improved (in the opinion of his critics) by incorporating elements of truth from other quarters, and might thus even become in the end a system of absolute truth, so

it is reasonable to think that "the perfection of the finite individual would imply a change in his identity and possibly an absorption into another's". But it is precisely the analogy from knowledge—the confusion between truth and existence—which is the *πρώτον ψεύδος*. There is no analogy between the piecing out of an impersonal system of thought and the development of a personality. Uniqueness belongs to the very notion of a self or consciousness. No one else can, literally or directly, see the world through my eyes. However sympathetically he may, as we say, "think himself into" my experience and point of view, his experience remains an effort of the constructive imagination, which may, with a large amount of success, reproduce my experience but can never be existentially identical with it. That being so, it follows—follows, I might say, *ex vi termini*—that it is meaningless, as Dr. Rashdall contends, to speak of one consciousness as "included in another," or to speak of "a Mind which includes all mind," and of man as, in that sense, "a part of God". What holds good as between finite consciousnesses would also be true of a divine experience, so far as that is conceived as a self-consciousness essentially similar in structure to our own. Dr. Rashdall in his whole way of speaking presses this essential similarity much more confidently than I feel inclined to do; but, setting that aside for the moment, I do not suppose that anyone would maintain that my sensations, perceptions, thoughts, and desires—my experience as I immediately experience it—is present, as such or in its immediacy, in the divine experience. Even those who, like Mr. Bradley, speak exclusively of the Absolute, do not suggest that the experiences of the finite centres form part, as such, of the absolute experience, but only as, in some fashion, supplemented, transmuted, harmonised.¹ They could only form part, as such, of a divine or absolute consciousness, if that consciousness is identified and equated with the collectivity of the finite centres in which it is said to realise itself; and in that case there would be no divine or absolute experience at all in the sense of the present discussion.

So far, then, as we think of God simply as self-consciousness, this element of otherness must remain: the experiences of finite selves do not form part of the divine experience in the same sense in which they are the experiences of the selves in question. This may be said to follow from the definition of the term, and the implication is, if possible, still more

¹ Cf. *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 413, "otherwise than in their several immediacies".

emphasised when we use the expression "centres of consciousness". I cannot but think, however, that in Dr. Rashdall's treatment there is something like a substantiation of the mere form of consciousness. As applied to God, this results in leaving out of account "the common content of the world," "the nature of the whole," which, as harmoniously present in a divine experience, may fitly be called the nature of God. God is treated merely as a "consciousness" or "centre of consciousness," and from that formal point of view, there is naturally no difference of status discernible between one centre of consciousness and another. But surely God means for us, not simply or primarily the existence of another self-conscious Being, but rather the infinite values of which His life is the eternal fruition and which are freely offered to all spirits for their appropriation and enjoyment. Truth, Beauty, Goodness, Love—these constitute the being of God—"the fulness of the Godhead," brokenly manifested in this world of time. *God is Love.*¹ "God Himself," said St. Bernard, "is manifested in His wisdom and His goodness, for God consists of these His attributes." Both God and man in fact become bare points of mere existence—impossible abstractions—if we try to separate them from one another and from the structural elements of their common life. Hence, as Dr. Rashdall has noticed, I am "somewhat chary" of using the word "Consciousness" at all in the course of my argument, and in speaking of God in his relation to the world the expressions I use by preference are rather such as "the containing Life" (p. 255), "the sustaining and containing Life of all the worlds" (p. 389), "the infinite experience" (293), "the ultimate Experience on which we depend" (364). I speak of "the creative and informing Spirit" (363), "the universal life" in which the finite individuals share (390), "the nature of the whole" on which they draw (383), "the fontal life of God" (294), and I describe that life—metaphorically, no doubt—in opposition to Prof. Bosanquet's analogy of a continuum, as "the focal unity of a world of self-conscious worlds to which it is not only their sustaining substance but the illumination of their lives" (297). Some of these expressions are doubtless open to criticism, and I do not put forward any of them as faultless, but what the phrases aim at is to keep in view at once the transcendent being of God for himself, which we inadequately figure to

¹ Similarly in the latter Neo-Platonic philosophy the supreme principle is called the Good not in the sense that good is a predicate of it: Good is it. Cf. Prof. Taylor's paper on "Proclus," in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. xviii., p. 613.

ourselves as a self-consciousness or personality on the model of our own, and the creative and illuminative activity of the same Spirit in the lives which live, and are sustained in life, only through its self-communicating presence.

I cannot, therefore, accept Dr. Rashdall's too complacent statement that "all the conclusions which are applicable to each particular self in his relation to another seem to be equally applicable to the relation between God and any other spirit".¹ I have drawn, indeed, the very opposite conclusion in my criticism of Prof. Howison's position : "The relation between the finite spirit and its inspiring source must be, in the end, incapable of statement in terms of the relation of one finite individual to another. To treat God as no more than *primus inter pares* is to lose touch both with speculation and religion." Dr. Rashdall will say that his position is different from Prof. Howison's, inasmuch as he makes God the creator of the finite selves, while Prof. Howison does not. This seems an all-important distinction, yet I cannot find that it makes any real difference to Dr. Rashdall's view of the relation between the finite spirits and their creative source. This is perhaps due to the way in which Dr. Rashdall appears to conceive creation. He insists that it must be conceived in terms of "efficient causality," which he further interprets as an act of will. The origination of a finite spirit is thus represented as the result of a divine fiat, and once called into being it seems to be there on its own account, cut loose, as it were, from the Author of its being and capable therefore of entering only into external relations with Him. But in that case the assertion of God as creator becomes little more than an empty acknowledgment, and, as I have argued in my chapter on the subject, the whole idea of efficient causation, as applied to the relation between God and the world, seems to carry us back to a realm of magic, and particularly so when it is applied to the creation of conscious or spiritual beings. "Spirits," I said, "cannot be regarded as things made, detached like products from their maker: they are more aptly described, in the Biblical phrase, as 'partakers of the divine nature' and admitted to the fellowship of a common life." A soul is not created once for all *ab extra* by a magical act. Surely we have to do here with a continuous process, in which the soul is given the opportunity to make itself. And, to begin with, the soul is not distinguishable from the bodily vehicle through which it is eventually realised. It is no paradox to say that the soul makes itself,

¹ *Personal Idealism*, p. 386.

but the process is only possible through the continual presence of the self-manifesting Life in which it is rooted. If we liken the process and its result to the addition of a child to a family, we must recognise that the relation involved is really more intimate still. "The Productive Reason remains at once the sustaining element of the dependent life and the living content, continually offering itself to the soul which it has awakened to the knowledge and quest of itself." I quote my own words because I do not know that I can find any others which would better suggest my view of the organic relation of the human and the divine.

What I miss in Dr. Rashdall's account is an intimate sense of the truth, with which as a theological doctrine he is of course familiar, that if God is creative His relation to the world must be conceived not as that of a *causa remota*, but as that of an ever-present sustaining ground. It is this ontological dependence which forbids our thinking of the relation between "God and the spirits," as entirely on all fours with that between individual finite selves; and to forgetfulness of this must be traced, I think, the singular form in which Dr. Rashdall sometimes expresses his position. "The ultimate Being," he says, "is a single Power, if we like we may even say a single Being, who is manifested in a plurality of consciousnesses, one consciousness which is omniscient and eternal, and many consciousnesses which are of limited knowledge, which have a beginning, and some of which, it is possible or probable, have an end." Hence, "we may regard all the separate 'centres of consciousness' as 'manifestations' of a single Being," or we may even say that "at bottom there is but one Substance in the universe . . . which reveals itself in many different consciousnesses".¹ We see Dr. Rashdall in such phrases driven to seek a ground for his God, as much as for the finite centres, in an ultimate principle behind both, and finding, naturally, no other mode of describing this principle than the blank designation of Being or Substance. But this necessity of falling back on inadequate and historically exploded categories arises, it seems to me, because both the omniscient and the limited consciousnesses have been emptied of the common content which alone gives both their meaning. When we take them as they really live and have their being, their life in one another is seen to be the single self-supporting and self-explaining Fact, in a word, the Absolute; and here "indwelling," and "participation" seem to me the natural metaphors to use. But the metaphors refer

¹ *Theory of Good and Evil*, vol. ii., p. 241; *Philosophy and Religion*, p. 105.

to communication and appropriation of content, not to any impossible fusion or interpenetration of personalities, which would obliterate both the Giver and the receiver.

It is impossible for me in the space at my disposal to refer to all Dr. Rashdall's criticisms, but something must be said of the difference between us on the question of efficient causality. I have already referred to the stress he lays on efficient causation as the proper expression of the relation of God to the world. Causality is identified by Dr. Rashdall with the activity of will, and, thinking of God as Will, we must think of Him, he says, as "willing all the events of the world" and as "causing the laws of nature" (p. 274). "What does He will, if He does not will the laws of nature and all that happens in consequence of them?" (p. 281). This conception of God as a Will immediately causing events in the natural world is familiar to us in Berkeley and the Occasionalists, and both Locke and Berkeley constantly refer to the laws of nature as due to "the arbitrary will and good pleasure of the wise Architect". Berkeley's theism is, indeed, essentially an attempt to spiritualise Nature by putting a divine volition behind every natural event, and a sustained act of will behind the systematic interconnexion of events which we call the laws of nature. But, attractively as Berkeley presents his thesis, the result is rather to reduce the divine activity to the level of a natural force—a spout behind the clouds, as Hegel wickedly says, playing upon the human sensibility. The divine will has no other content than just the facts of nature and their interrelations, and these facts are not in any way transformed by the theological baptism they have undergone. Dr. Rashdall's theory appears to move on the same lines and to be open to the same criticism. Efficient causality seems to me a category only applicable *within* the physical world. It is in strictness applicable only to the action of one material body upon another. Human actions fall within its scope only so far as human beings are spirits embodied, and, through their bodies, capable of mechanical action upon other bodies. It seems to me impossible to employ such a conception to describe the relation of God to the world; and a spiritual term like will would be, I think, better reserved for the spiritual sphere. Although we must certainly think of the stable conditions of the natural world as founded in that Will which is one with the divine Nature, it is only in a general sense, as an order on which the realisation of certain values depends—as a means, in short, to the supreme divine end—that we can profitably exhibit it in that relation. To speak

quite strictly, God's action may perhaps be said to be identical with his essence: He wills Goodness, Beauty, Truth, the Perfect Whole. In that case to talk of "God's volitions" in the plural, as directed to separate and individual ends, is in some sense an accommodation to our discursive intellect and to the dispersedness of our finite lives. Such a conception of the Perfect Will as I have indicated does not, however, exclude, but rather makes intelligible, the divine causality in relation to other spirits; for the action of spirit upon spirit has nothing in common with that of a force. It is an inward illumination, a drawing, the persuasion of reason and love. It is by the vision of Himself that God conquers the erring and rebellious will.

II.—MENTAL PROCESS.

BY HUGH A. REYBURN.

PHILOSOPHICAL views differ notoriously in their conceptions of the nature of mental processes, and these philosophic differences are reflected in psychology. Psychology cannot make any headway without using one or other of the conceptions or hypotheses concerning which metaphysicians disagree. The interpretation of the observed facts, the choice of emphatic points, and indeed the whole trend of psychological treatment depend on an underlying conception of mind. Sometimes the claim is made that psychology should be studied without presuppositions, and the claim is not without significance and justice. The conceptions or hypotheses used should be those which flow most naturally from the facts, they should be framed on the basis of extensive experience, and they must be judged by their power to make the subject-matter of the science coherent and intelligible. Nevertheless it is not possible to ascertain the facts of mind without using, at least tentatively, some hypothesis or assumption; and at later stages of the science assumptions are even more necessary—unless, of course, psychology develops into a criticism of first principles and becomes metaphysics. Holding this view, I do not dispute the right of a thinker to let metaphysical considerations enter into his psychological theories or dispute his claim to revise a psychological doctrine, however well established, on the ground that it is inconsistent with any coherent and intelligible view of mind. But at the same time, when a dispute on these lines arises between metaphysics and psychology, the latter has in turn the right to demand that any doctrine based on metaphysical considerations should be as fruitful, as closely in touch with the facts, as clearly explanatory, and as unforced, as the impugned doctrine of the psychologist. A hypothesis which claims to be true must be able to do all that a 'working-hypothesis' does, and more. If through lack of development it is unable to do this, it must await greater maturity before displacing its rival; if it is prevented by its inward nature from carrying

out the rational functions of the working hypothesis, it must reconsider its pretensions in metaphysics as well as in psychology.

From this point of view I wish to consider the conception of mental processes which Prof. Alexander has been recommending for the last ten years.¹ His theory of mind rests ultimately on metaphysical or epistemological considerations, but he has developed steadily and skilfully a method of psychological interpretation which, unlike many other psychological hypotheses, he regards as metaphysically sound. There may seem to be a conflict between this statement that Prof. Alexander's view is based on metaphysical considerations and his own account of his method as a plain unbiased description of facts.² But his desire is manifest throughout to avoid the evil of subjective Idealism; to this end he denies all representative theories of knowledge; and he interprets everything in the light of a fundamental distinction between subject and object, or mental and non-mental—a distinction which he himself admits to be metaphysical.³ I do not doubt that Prof. Alexander's method can with some justice be called one of description, but his descriptions emerge after a process of thinking, and the thinking has a metaphysical *Aufgabe*.

Space does not permit me to give anything like an adequate statement of Prof. Alexander's view as I understand it; in the main, acquaintance with his exposition must be taken for granted, and I shall indicate only those points in his view on which the subsequent discussion hinges. Throughout my

¹Prof. Alexander's views will no doubt appear shortly in a convenient form when his Gifford lectures are published. In the meantime I may mention the following writings. In the sequel these are referred to by the numbers prefixed to them here:—

1. 'The Nature of Mental Activity,' in *Proc. of Arist. Society*, 1907-1908.
 2. 'Mental Activity in Willing and in Ideas,' *Proc. of Arist. Society*, 1908-1909.
 3. 'On Sensations and Images,' *Proc. of Arist. Society*, 1909-1910.
 4. 'Self as Subject and Person,' *Proc. of Arist. Society*, 1910-1911.
 5. 'Foundations and Sketch Plan of a Conational Psychology,' in *British Journal of Psychology*, December, 1911.
 6. 'Imagery and Memory' (Discussion), in *Proc. Arist. Society*, 1911-1912.
 7. 'The Method of Metaphysics and the Categories,' in *MIND*, 1912.
 8. 'On Relations; and in Particular the Cognitive Relation,' in *MIND*, 1912.
 9. 'Collective Willing and Truth,' in *MIND*, 1913.
 10. 'Freedom,' in *Proc. Arist. Society*, 1913-1914.
 11. 'The Basis of Realism,' 1914, from *Proc. of Brit. Academy*.
- ²5, p. 240; 3, pp. 1-3; 2, pp. 1 and 23 f., etc.
- ³3, p. 35; cf. 2, pp. 23 f.

argument I shall have to express my disagreement with Prof. Alexander; but I do not wish to be misinterpreted. Prof. Alexander's theory is compactly wrought and very firmly maintained; and hostile as my contentions may be, I wish to express my sense of the clearness of his thought, and the great value it has for current philosophy. In order not to complicate the argument of this article unduly it is necessary to pass over some points which, it seems to me, would strengthen my case—the theory of the knowledge of other minds is an outstanding instance; and I am regretfully forced to omit all reference to many points in which Prof. Alexander seems to me clearly in the right.

The following are the salient points in Prof. Alexander's theory so far as we are concerned with it here:—

1. What is called experience is a compound of two factors, existentially distinct; *viz.*, a mental or subjective factor and a non-mental or objective factor. The mental factor is called consciousness, and the non-mental factor is called the object.

2. Both factors are experienced in every experience, but in different ways. The mental factor is 'enjoyed'; the non-mental is 'contemplated'.

3. The qualities of the non-mental factor—the object contemplated—are not in any sense qualities of the subjective one—*i.e.*, of the mind. This relation of exclusion is not reciprocal: contemplated objects may have mental qualities, but these qualities are not contemplated.

4. The mental factor is a fact in time; mental processes happen.

5. These mental events are all conations or acts of attention, and have only one quality—consciousness. Consciousness itself is described as colourless.¹

6. Consciousness exists in space, being a function of the higher nerve centres.

7. Its functions vary in feeling-tone, intensity, complexity, spatial direction (*i.e.*, along nerve paths), and volume.

8. At least in perception these functions or activities are the effects of, are evoked by, the object acting causally on the brain. They are unique and non-physical reactions of the brain, provoked by its environment.

9. To each variation in the object there is a corresponding though distinct variation in the conative activity of the brain. Each apprehended object involves an appropriate and peculiar pattern of conative process.

¹ Prof. Alexander's treatment of feeling is undecided. He appears to waver between two views: (a) that feeling is an independent quality of the mind, (b) that it is an attribute or mode of conation, and to prefer the second alternative.

10. The distinction of enjoyment and contemplation applies to all levels of experiencing, *e.g.*, to memory. A remembered object is 'brought back' with the mark of the past on it: a remembered mental state is 'renewed' and not brought back.

11. Psychology is the study of mental states or processes. It may be defined as the science of ordered mental propositions which can be enjoyed but not contemplated.

The discussion of these points may be brought under three heads. Among the special features of Prof. Alexander's view the most fundamental one is the distinction of subject and object; on that depends the distinction of enjoyment and contemplation. Less closely connected with these there is what is perhaps the greatest novelty of all, the conception of a spatial non-material mind. This last conception will be taken first, then the distinction of enjoyment and contemplation, and finally the distinction of subject and object. Logically considered each of these three conceptions is a hypothesis. Each is an interpretation and generalisation of certain facts, and must be judged in the end by its explanatory power. It is in this sense that they are to be considered throughout.

I. *Mind as a fact in space.*—Mind, or consciousness, according to Prof. Alexander, has volume and occupies space. The space in question, of course, is not that of the objects of consciousness. Mind is not extended because the image or percept or sensation which it apprehends is extended. It is not spread over the object but over the brain 'as greenness is spread over a leaf'.¹ 'Mind and body are not two things but one. They are in the same place, and every mental process issues in some bodily reaction because it is in one of its aspects itself a bodily process.'² Statements of this nature may be interpreted in two ways; one of these is commonplace, the other startling. Prof. Alexander intends the second interpretation to be taken. On the first interpretation the meaning is merely that the mind is believed to depend on the brain, and in that sense is located there—a true but trivial proposition according to Prof. Alexander; or the second, consciousness is itself spread out and is enjoyed as extended.³

Naturally one asks: what is the evidence for this view? Prof. Alexander's reply is that 'the appeal is to experience itself. Consciousness has . . . a clearly enjoyed voluminousness, particularly when the mind is engaged with many objects at once. It has a spread out character, exactly the

¹ 2, p. 7.

² 7, p. 9.

³ 4, p. 12.

same as that with which we are familiar in external objects. And that enjoyed voluminousness is located vaguely within the contemplated body.¹

In dealing with this position it is important to see clearly wherein it differs from Materialism. Consciousness is a spatial function of the nerve centres, but it is not itself physical: the physical world can only be contemplated by us and not enjoyed. *Qua* physical the body is not enjoyed but only contemplated; what is enjoyed is a 'new and remarkable property' of the body, 'an activity [which] does not cease to be mental because it is the activity of what in certain aspects is purely physical'.² There are thus two points to be distinguished. On the one hand mind is a unique and non-physical 'quality'. Considered as we know it by direct acquaintance, *i.e.*, by enjoyment, it is 'a specific thing, a complex of conscious processes'.³ On the other hand, 'the processes which are conscious are specific processes taking place in a material thing,' and are 'entirely expressible in physiological terms'. Of these two aspects of mind we are aware first of the unique mental or conscious quality of mind. The knowledge of its identity with physical processes comes afterwards, and is an inference based both on the primary enjoyment and on subsequent contemplation of the body. Now, what Prof. Alexander has to show is that by means of enjoyment as distinct from contemplation mind apprehends itself as having a spatial character. Accordingly every form of sensation must be set aside, for sensation is always an object; and this applies to organic and kinæsthetic sensations as well as to those of special sense. Prof. Alexander's contention is that in experience there is a spatial element not given through sensation. 'A change in the tenour of our thoughts,' he says, 'is felt literally as a change in local direction. And this differentiation of consciousness is distinguishable from the accompanying sensations in the scalp or from sensations of movement in the eyes, which with me nearly always accompany a change in the thoughts.'⁴ 'Even in localised sensations of touch, where the bodily object, the hand, intrudes into the felt pressure, it is possible to get a faintly accentuated experience of direction of the movement of consciousness as distinct from the sensum.'

It is difficult to accept this analysis. One freely admits vague undiscriminated spatial characters in normal experience, and these at times may be called experiences of direction.

¹ 4, p. 12.

³ 11, p. 12

² 4, p. 15.

⁴ 4, p. 13.

For example, if I touch an object with my finger without looking at it and give attention to the touch experience, there is often, as Prof. Alexander says, a faintly accentuated experience of direction of movement. But it seems resolvable into sensory experience. For one thing there is an adjustment of the relevant portions of the body to receive sensation from a special direction, not altogether unlike the adjustment made to receive sound. The various portions of this adjustment are spatially characterised, and in being referred to the single space continuum constitute an experience of direction. Moreover, when the adjustment is being made, the change from the previous direction of attention provides an experience of movement consisting of the numerous small movements made in producing the new adjustment and abandoning the old one; movements of the muscles of the neck, the back, forehead, arms, eyes, and so forth. All this, however, is sensory; in Prof. Alexander's terminology it is a matter of contemplated objects. Other theories may fuse (or confuse) contemplation and enjoyment, but Prof. Alexander holds them sharply apart. But if every sensory element is excluded by analysis, I confess that I find no spatial character left. Even when there is spatial experience vaguely referred within the head, as is common in mental fatigue, the localisation is on the ordinary 'contemplative' lines; the spatial aspect being due to organic sensation qualified by visual and tactual meanings. No one will deny the difficulty of detecting all the spatial elements of an experience and of referring them to their proper sources: it is always possible that when all sensation is excluded something more evasive may be left. But there seems no warrant for believing that this abstract possibility is an actual fact. It is difficult enough to discriminate reflectively all the organic and kinæsthetic sensations present; and the normal case of introspective¹ spatial discrimination is one in which we attend to certain more obvious features and leave unanalysed a vague background consisting chiefly of organic and kinæsthetic material. This elusive sensory background seems adequate to account for the experience of localised movement to which Prof. Alexander refers, without the hypothesis of a separate and non-sensory experience of space. I have an uneasy suspicion that if the physiology of the nervous system were not known, the enjoyed voluminousness and change of direction of which Prof. Alexander speaks would be enjoyed not only in the head but also largely in the trunk and limbs.

I submit, then, that Prof. Alexander's hypothesis is not

¹ In the ordinary sense of the term, though not in Prof. Alexander's.

needed by the facts, and is not verifiable. The 'felt' volume and direction are explicable by reference to the background of organic and kinæsthetic elements which accompany all our acts of attention, and on Prof. Alexander's view should be considered as objective, a property of objects contemplated and not of processes enjoyed. If Prof. Alexander replies that the experienced volume and movement is clearly experienced as our own and not as belonging to objects, I suggest that this throws doubt on the rigid distinction of subject and object on which his general theory rests.

The appeal to the facts, as I believe, fails: is there any other ground for the hypothesis? Does it make anything more intelligible? I submit that it does not; and indeed that it adds to our mystery. Consciousness, as Prof. Alexander takes it, is a hybrid between physical things and the unextended mind of more usual theories. At first sight, if we adopt the suggested hypothesis, we seem to avoid the old difficulty of understanding how mind and body come together at all; but farther scrutiny suggests doubts. Does it clear matters up in any way to say that consciousness is a function of the brain? The main difficulty of both parallelism and interaction is to offer something more than a bare statement of a temporal order of otherwise disconnected series of facts, to do more than say that neurosis and psychosis are found in such and such a relation of sequence or coexistence. But it does not improve matters to allot a spatial character to the mental term. Their common spatial qualification merely allows them to live in the same house, at best it gives not coherence but only more conjunction; not explanation but hard fact, with the added doubt that it may not be fact after all. The older theories conjoin in time two sets of facts, independently ascertained: Prof. Alexander conjoins them also in space. Are we any better off?

In one respect we are in a poorer situation. Consciousness is a new quality or function of the brain, and this quality moves. But the movement is non-physical: it is a process of a new order connected with a fresh form of cerebral activity. To deny this, and to assert that consciousness is this fresh form of cerebral activity, is to fall back into pure physiology and to abandon the inside point of view, the point of view of consciousness itself. And yet if consciousness is not physical how can it move? What is there to move? Surely the movement is a function of the brain *qua* physical, just as the motion of waves in water is a function of particles of water. Although the wave is not an identical mass of water moving along its path, it is a complex of

movements of actual physical particles and is itself physical. If consciousness is of a similar nature, mind is physical throughout and not merely in 'one of its aspects': if consciousness is not of a similar nature, the spatial movement seems unintelligible.¹

The guess may be hazarded that Prof. Alexander's conception of a spatial mind is closely connected with, and even motivated by, another unusual view, that the object (in perception at least) is the cause of consciousness. If we are to fit consciousness into the causal series of things it must be made, so the suggestion seems to be, if not physical then quasi-physical—a spatial function of a physical thing. To examine the general conception of causality contained in Prof. Alexander's theory would take us too far afield, but a comment on its psychological bearing may be possible within the present limits. 'I assume,' he says, 'and will afterwards justify the assumption, that the table provokes in the thing called my mind the action of perceiving, stirs my consciousness into activity, and that it does so by acting causally on my brain.'² In another place he says: 'In every causal relation, instead of saying that the cause exhibits itself in the patient by the effect which it produces, we must say rather that the cause is revealed to the patient as whatever object it is: and the patient is not aware of the effect, but is only in a state of enjoyment to which the cause is revealed or by which the patient becomes aware of the agent'.³ This applies primarily to perception, and the treatment of imagination and thought is far from clear. From the argument of 4 it seems that the causal relation of object to subject should be generalised, but in 8 vital differences appear. 'When a stimulation in a particular region of the brain makes us think of a friend, the imagination (not the image) is the effect of the internal stimulation which we do not contemplate and not of the friend which we do contemplate.'⁴ This seems to upset a previous statement that 'The causal relation is the one which more forcibly than any other demonstrates the relation of enjoyed and contemplated; and what is learned from it can be extended to all knowing'. This last quotation illustrates Prof. Alexander's general tendency to make perception the basis of his interpretation of knowing and to assimilate other forms to it as far as possible. But it does not seem possible to generalise

¹ Cf. the statement made in another connexion. 'Physical is what has physical properties. Mental is what has mental properties. One physical property is to be in space' (3, p. 16).

² 4, p. 7.

³ 8, p. 325.

⁴ 8, p. 326.

the position here. It is not plausible to say that as I think of Julius Caesar my brain is affected causally by him, except in an extraordinarily remote sense in which it is also affected by all the rest of the universe. On the other hand, if we do not generalise, knowledge is split into two kinds; one where the object is the cause of knowing, the other where something very far separate from the object is the cause of knowing. But whether or not the analysis is generalised, it is more than doubtful. When I perceive a coloured object, the cause of my brain state is not the visible colour, but rather the stimulation of the cerebral centre by the optic nerve, which again is affected by the vibrations acting on the nerve endings in the retina. Surely this is ascertained fact, and is inconsistent with the hypothesis suggested. The stimulation of the nerve is the important thing, whether at its ending or higher up its course; and the external object—not to speak of the colour—is a farther consideration. Causally, the central processes connected with mental states are of one type: stimulation of a cortical area by a nervous impulse from the periphery does not differ in kind from stimulation by an impulse from some other and more central point. In neither case is the object apprehended the immediate cause either of the brain state or of the mental act. Of course there is a causal connexion between object perceived and brain state; but, so far as I know, it is never direct. There are always intermediate links. But if we hold Prof. Alexander's doctrine that 'in every causal relation . . . the cause is revealed to the patient as whatever object it is,' the cause in question should be the immediate one and not something further back in the endless and infinitely complex causal network. If not, then our procedure is arbitrary; and we may single out as *the* cause any term which suits our fancy or our theory.

II. *Enjoyment and contemplation.*—We come now to the second of the three main conceptions or hypotheses which we have to consider. Mental processes, we are told, are enjoyed: objects are contemplated. Mental processes thus have a two-fold awareness; they are aware of objects by contemplating them, and at the same time they are aware of themselves by enjoying themselves. What, then, is the difference in the process of experiencing, *i.e.*, in the awareness itself, indicated by the distinction of the terms enjoyment and contemplation?

The natural tendency is to answer this question by reference to differences in what is apprehended in the two cases. For surely, it will be said, there is a vast obvious difference between apprehending one's *self* and apprehending an *object*. But for the moment we may postpone consideration of the

differences in what is apprehended. Other theories have admitted great differences between selves and objects, and have not drawn a distinction of the kind in question between the modes of apprehending them. It is well to satisfy ourselves whether or not there is a well-marked distinction between the two forms of awareness considered by themselves.

Taken abstractly in this way, the distinction seems impossible to draw. Prof. Alexander's points of distinction all contain a reference to that which is apprehended. The numerical identity of enjoying with what is enjoyed is in contrast with the numerical distinction of object and contemplative act; but this obviously goes beyond our present abstract inquiry. So also do such contentions as that in memory of the self the past mental state is renewed, whereas in memory of an object the object is brought back. Apart from this reference to what is apprehended no distinction between enjoyment and contemplation is made clear by Prof. Alexander. This does not prove that there is no such distinction; but it generates a suspicion that the distinction between the modes of apprehending is merely the reflexion of a distinction between different apprehended materials.

We may now consider the distinction in a more concrete form, including a reference to the material apprehended. Mental processes apprehend themselves and objects simultaneously. But their apprehension of themselves is in no wise distinct from their existence. 'I can know my mind,' Prof. Alexander says, 'for I am my mind, which is an experienced experiencing, not an experienced object. To know my mind means as all knowledge means, the existence of my mind, and nothing more.'¹ The distinction between knowing an object and knowing oneself is like that between striking a ball and striking a stroke. The argument thus stated is fundamental, and other modes of distinguishing contemplation and enjoyment run back into it.

The position is not easy to understand. One element in it is that the mind is awareness. Awareness is not to be regarded as a property belonging to a subject farther in the background; it is itself the essence and substance of the subject. Generally we call it a subject when we take it not in its isolation but in continuity with other acts of awareness; but we may ignore this complication at present. An act of mind is an awareness; and what we mean when we say that the mind exists is that awareness exists. So far one may go with Prof. Alexander. But he goes farther. This awareness is necessarily an awareness both of itself and of an object.

¹4, p. 19.

We may grant that awareness must be awareness of something, and for the sake of simplicity, we may say, without prejudice, that an 'object' is essential to awareness; but how do we reach the position that it must be aware of itself? There seem to be two possibilities. There may be no distinction whatever between 'being aware' and 'being aware of self'; or there may be a difference. We may take the alternatives in turn.

The first one is encouraged by the analogy we used above; to be aware of oneself is like striking a stroke.¹ Striking a stroke is a longer way of saying striking. Awareness of self, then, merely means awareness, and the words 'of self' are a waste of breath, or at best an elegance of expression. But if this is so, why does Prof. Alexander persist in using the phrase 'experienced experiencing,' doubling the terms and distinguishing their endings? Moreover, if we chose this alternative, it is difficult to reject the conclusion that the only thing of which we are aware is an object. To add that we are aware also of ourselves though not in the same way is to add nothing but words; for *ex hypothesi* to be aware of ourselves means only to be aware. This line of thought, if adopted, would effectually cut the ground from under psychological criticism, by removing the possibility of psychology. But in return it would also remove itself. We might be aware of objects, but we could never be aware of that fact—for awareness of ourselves would be meaningless.

Accordingly we must admit some distinction and difference between being aware and being aware of self. This, of course, does not involve (directly, at least) that there is an existential difference between self as apprehending and self as apprehended: there is no obvious *a priori* reason for denying that the self may apprehend itself as it stands, or for asserting that what is apprehended is always a past phase of the self. Prof. Alexander seems at times to be apprehensive lest the self should act on itself, thus involving, as it were, that the self is in two places at once and is both cause and effect of itself. 'I cannot have knowledge of my mind,' he says, 'in the sense of making it an object of contemplation, for that would mean that the mind could act on itself.'² But it is not necessary to adopt Prof. Alexander's special view of the causal relation of the object to the subject,³ and the question remains open for further argument. But

¹ Cf. what is said about non-conscious life as enjoyment in 7, p. 4; and the explicit statement in 8 that 'enjoyment is not a relation at all, but a state of the self' (8, p. 315).

² 4, p. 19.

³ V. above, p. 26.

whether or not the self can act on itself we must draw a distinction between its knowing or enjoying and what is known or enjoyed in and through that act; and we must be prepared to face the consequences. Prof. Alexander seems at times to realise this. The problem of memory presents special difficulties to him, and one of his statements runs thus: 'It is clear enough that to remember a past event is also to remember my own mental state as it was in the past, the difference being one of interest. In general I am occupied with the object. But I may be interested in myself, and then the remembered conation itself stands out in prominence as contrasted with the object.'¹ There are difficulties here, and the statement seems subversive of Prof. Alexander's main position. Is interest not the obverse side of attention, and is attention not conation? How can the mind be interested in itself without directing conation upon itself, *i.e.*, contemplating itself as an object? It is at least significant that one can be interested in a mental state, and it suggests that there is a palpable difference between enjoying and what is enjoyed. It does not seem open to reply that what we are interested in is merely our being interested.²

There is a difference between our awareness and the self of which we are aware; consequently there is also a difference, in meaning at least, between being aware of an object and being aware of ourselves as well as of an object. The question may therefore be asked, Is it true in fact that these distinct things always coincide? In being conscious, are we always also self-conscious?

In attempting to answer this question it is desirable to notice a possible ambiguity. We may take experience from within, *i.e.*, from the point of view of the mind which is having the experience; or we may take it from without, *i.e.*, from the point of another mental act which is aware of the first experience, and this second act may belong to the same or to another mind. Theory may bring the two points of view together again, but *prima facie* they are distinct. Taking first the internal point of view, the facts seem to require a negative answer to the question. A man may be so absorbed in an object that he ignores himself entirely. He may feel and think intensely, it is true, and conation may

¹ 5, p. 260.

² Cf. the following statement: 'In certain desires the remembered desire does tend to turn into an actual one, but, so far as it does, it ceases to be a memory. The case of desire is particularly difficult to handle, because to remember a desire is, if I am right, to desire a desire' (6, p. 210).

be prominent and strong. But he need not be aware at the moment that these feelings are *his* and that *he* is active. Indeed, I doubt if he need be aware of the activity *as such* at all. That he is keenly conscious is granted, but is he aware of anything so definite (and complex, I would add) as activity? If I am told that although he does not think of the activity, nevertheless it is obscurely felt or is subconsciously apprehended; it is open to me to grant the obscurity and to insist that whether it is felt or thought or enjoyed the agent is not aware of it as activity. It is activity only from the external point of view. From the internal point of view the facts require only one answer, *viz.*, that consciousness and self-consciousness do not always coincide.

From the external point of view the matter is more difficult. For here we have to take account of the self as it is, and cannot simply follow the analysis of experience from within. If feeling is always and essentially a mental fact or mode, then in being aware of feeling I am aware of my mind. Just as I may experience an external object without knowing accurately what it is, so I may experience myself without being aware that it is myself that I apprehend. Thus, theoretically at least, it is possible to be self-conscious from the external point of view when one is not self-conscious from the internal point of view. But it still remains an open question whether or not self-consciousness in this sense always accompanies consciousness. We shall return to the point at a later stage of the argument.

In the light of the results which we have reached we may revert to Prof. Alexander's distinction of enjoyment and contemplation, in order, if possible, to discover a clear line of demarcation between them. We have already failed to discover one when we abstracted from the nature of what is apprehended, and we are now considering the matter more concretely, allowing a reference to the apprehended object in the two cases.

The obvious statement is that in spite of the duality necessary to enjoyment, enjoying and enjoyed are existentially or numerically one, whereas contemplation and its object are numerically distinct. But there are difficulties. Certain components of what is apprehended are both enjoyed and contemplated. If I understand him rightly, Prof. Alexander tries to prevent this kind of thing from going too far. For example, although consciousness is a neural function, he will not allow anyone to contemplate it: it can only be enjoyed. Conversely, what is enjoyed is not the physical or neural process, but the new and remarkable function of

the brain. But at the same time, as we have seen, we are told that the spatial character of the mind is enjoyed. Space may be both contemplated and enjoyed; and presumably the same space may be concerned in both cases. Similarly with time. In memory of an object, we are told, the object is contemplated with the mark of the past upon it; and in memory of a mental state we renew it or enjoy it also as past. The mark of the past is both enjoyed and contemplated. The same thing is true of the future in expectation. Again, in my memory the remembered state or object is characterised for my consciousness as mine; so that whatever is meant by the term 'mine' is also both enjoyed and contemplated: unless Prof. Alexander has been using the term 'mine' in two utterly different senses.

If space, time, and mine can be both enjoyed and contemplated, the distinction between the two forms of awareness is not so clean cut as we thought at first.

We may pass to a second difficulty. In spite of the reiterated statement that they are different, enjoyment and contemplation seem to have their fundamental modes of operation in common. Prof. Alexander has discussed the case of memory more fully than that of most other mental functions, and we may take it as an example. He states his doctrine as follows: 'Remembering the object and remembering oneself are parallel and indeed numerically identical processes. But there are two differences arising from the fact that I contemplate the object but enjoy myself. First, the past object is presented to me in the only way in which it can, as an image or an ideal object, with the mark of the past. But now we have no image of our past mental state in the same form as we have an image of the past object. For we do not contemplate ourselves. We only have or enjoy the renewed mental process corresponding to the past object, though not renewed in the precise form in which it occurred, but in the form appropriate to the image of the past object. . . . Second, it may happen that the same object happens to be present also in perception, as when I say to a man, you are the man I remember meeting yesterday. . . . But this need not happen. . . . But what need not happen as regards the object always happens as regards the self. I am perceptually enjoyed, and, though I need not be perceiving the old object, I at any rate am here. But allowing for these superficial differences, the remembering of myself and the object are the same.'¹ In both cases the

¹ 5, pp. 260-261.

essence is awareness of self or object as past and as mine. Memory is not representative knowledge, but direct acquaintance with what is remembered qualified as past and as mine.

There remain for consideration only the two differences mentioned in the quotation; and in dealing with them it is important to keep the object of our inquiry clearly before us. We are looking for the distinction between enjoying and contemplating. We have been led to believe that it consists in some way in the fact that what is enjoyed is numerically one with the enjoying, whereas what is contemplated is numerically distinct from the contemplation. But we desire to know what difference this makes in enjoyment and contemplation. We shall have failed in our search if we discover *only* a distinction in things apprehended, and not an actual result or reflexion of it in the apprehending itself. For the purposes of argument we are assuming the distinction of subject and object, and are considering another, though no doubt a dependent, distinction alleged to exist between the modes of apprehending subject and object. But in the first of the two points offered by Prof. Alexander it is clear that the argument, for our present purpose, is circular. Objects in being remembered are presented as images or ideal objects. We have no images of ourselves. But consider the next sentence. 'For we do not contemplate ourselves.' That is to say the distinction between image and renewed mental process is a verbal repetition of the distinction between contemplation and enjoyment; not at all an expansion or explanation of it. The image, for Prof. Alexander, is not a present copy or representation of the past object; it is the object itself back again, the worse for wear perhaps, but itself and not another. So too the renewed mental process is not a representation but the actual past state, though bereft of some of its fulness and shorn of its glory. The distinction is really between subject and object, and only nominally between enjoying and contemplating.

The second of Prof. Alexander's points may be true—from the external point of view at least—but it seems irrelevant. It might help to distinguish memory of a mental state from the perceptual enjoyment of it; but it does not indicate any radical difference between the enjoyment which is memory and the corresponding contemplation. If we are perceptually aware of ourselves, we are *ex hypothesi* also perceptually aware of objects; and the distinction amounts only to this, that the numerically identical self is enjoyed as past and present, whereas the object perceived may differ from the

object remembered. As Prof. Alexander says, this is a superficial difference and not to the point here.

To sum up this part of the argument, we have failed to find in Prof. Alexander's view any satisfactory mark of distinction between enjoying and contemplating. It appears to be a verbal repetition of the distinction between subject and object, and not an independent line of demarkation. Prof. Alexander has split experiencing into two parts with a metaphysical chopper, because there *ought* to be a distinction in it corresponding to the difference between subject and object. I think it is not unfair to suggest that Prof. Alexander's distinctions of psychical material prove to be largely of this kind, when they are traced home. The elementary distinctions of conations are obtained indirectly and not directly; they are reflected into experience rather than found there.¹ After they have been thus indirectly introduced they remain little more than names for the unknown differences said to correspond to obvious ones in what is apprehended. This is hardly the mark of a good hypothesis.

III. *Subject and object.*—We have now to consider the distinction of subject and object which provides the basis for the chief novelties in Prof. Alexander's view. That there is a legitimate and necessary distinction between subject and object is nowhere in dispute. What is not so clear is the precise nature and extent of the distinction. On Prof. Alexander's view it is to be regarded as a distinction between different facts which interact but are entirely separate in point of existence. Subject and object consist of different material, and the qualities of the one are not in any genuine sense qualities of the other. Moreover, the distinction runs through all experience from top to bottom; it can be traced in or inserted into the lowest and most confused experience as well as the highest and most integrated.

In examining this hypothesis we shall have to answer, at least partly, a question we left open at a previous stage of the argument. We saw that from the internal point of view mind is not always self-conscious: we have now to consider whether it is always self-conscious from the external point of view. That is to say, we have to consider the relation of the two points of view. It is clear that there cannot be a complete separation between them. It is only from the internal point of view that we become aware of anything in the first instance, and the external point of view cannot be one from which we discover what is necessarily and utterly invisible from the internal point of view. For, external with

¹ For an almost explicit recognition of this, see 5, § 6A.

regard to a former experience, it is an internal point of view with respect of present experience. Farther, we are not concerned here with factors or elements which do not come into experience in their own proper person. The point in question is the actual structure of experience and not the factors outside it which may be said to produce it. Reflexion may find other names for the phases of experience than the experiencing subject itself does; between phases of experience it may discover connexions which are only partly apprehended or are not apprehended at all in the act itself. As I write I may be conscious of various contents (or objects) to which I do not attend, and which I do not connect together; and later reflexion may take them in their relationships and judge that I was tired or prepossessed or prejudiced, and so forth. But reflexion—the external point of view—is not entitled to ignore the structure that is given in experience and to substitute noumenal subjects and objects for it, or to insert factors which are not actually present.

From these considerations certain results emerge. In the first place, from within, the distinction of subject and object is derivative. Objectivity implies reference to an orderly context in a determinate world. It is not a quality to be cognised at one stroke, but a meaning resting on prior experience and involving a contrast between the course of objective things and the course of mental processes. That is not a datum, but a conception—and one of great intricacy—as the history of philosophic thought shows all too clearly. In the same way subjectivity involves reference to a developed system of mental activities, and comes to consciousness only in and through a course of experience. It also is a meaning which has to be developed by the mind and is not presented as a gift at the dawn of experience.

But how does the matter appear from the external point of view? We may take the objective aspect first. Prof. Alexander, if I do not mistake his meaning, holds that however rudimentary the distinctions and recognitions of mind are we must always divide feelings and cognitions from the rest of the content of experience and call this remainder objective.¹ It is not objective for the experiencing mind in any valid sense; but on Prof. Alexander's view the actual things of the real world appear in experience, and however much the content may seem to lack objectivity for the apprehending mind it really is objective. Is this not an illegitimate interpretation

¹ I am aware of Prof. Alexander's objection to the use of the word content. But it is used here of experience, which is not the same thing as mind on his premises.

of the external point of view? It does not supplement the experience it examines by bringing to light features which are admittedly present though unnoted. It insists rather that the content of the experience in question is objective although to all appearance it lacks the marks of objectivity, and it makes the statement because the same content considered in another way altogether and apart from the experience in question has those marks. That is, it judges the content to be objective in primitive experience because the same content, when apprehended under very different conditions by a much more mature mind, is placed in an objective context and called an object. Is this not a case of the psychologist's fallacy? If we are to read objectivity into primitive experience, must we not also read into it everything else that has come or can come out of it?

If we turn now to the subjective side we find that it is more complicated. Experience always involves mind. Even at its earliest stages it has order and unity; for it is shot through with instinct and controlled by habit. In a sense therefore it is conative from the beginning, and thus may rightly be said to involve mind. The conative unities are there, though for the most part they are unnoted at first and are not referred to a definite subject. They are part of the experience and are not added to it from later experience in the way in which objectivity was. But on the other hand, it does not seem true that there is always in experience an organised part which can be called subjective at the expense of the rest. The organisation of experience, represented by the phrase 'the direction of the mind upon a content (or object),' does not seem a necessary element of early experience. The experience, it is true, is always partly organised, and it is always directed in some degree; but the organisation is of the whole, and the trend is a movement and direction of the entire mass. It seems untrue to suggest that one part of primitive experience sits back and looks at the rest, or has the rest 'presented' to it. This notion applies, if at all, only to a later stage when the distinction between objective and subjective has grown up as an acquired meaning. If conation is the right word to use, then experience as a whole is at first conative, and the organised self within experience—as a mere factor of the whole—is a subsequent development. But it is only in this limited sense of a factor within the whole experience that Prof. Alexander admits mind or conation. Hence I suggest again that he is reading into all experience factors which belong, if at all, only to particular stages or levels of it.

There seem to be only two ways in which this criticism can be met. The first is to disregard the genetic account of mind wholly or in part, declining to accept experience as the guide to the analysis of itself. The second is to reduce the meaning of subject and object to such low terms that it may be brought into the compass of primitive experience. I doubt if Prof. Alexander will take either alternative. It is not likely that he will contend that the features of developed experience are actually present in the dim early stages; nor will he accept the reproach of having sought novelty by means of a strained terminology. But must he not, then, revise his hypothesis as inadequate to the material to be explained. Is it so certain that the analysis of the experience given in the perception of a tree¹ (or a table) by a consciousness which has developed a knowledge of what trees are, and has organised a system of subjective facts within experience, is the best clue to the nature of experience as a whole?

The criticism which has been urged from a consideration of experience at more primitive stages than those which Prof. Alexander has taken as his point of departure might also be urged from a consideration of many other levels, notably the higher ones in which the antithesis of subject-object, having once arisen, has been subordinated and transcended. But I have not space to develop it here. Instead, we may press another difficulty. We are told that subject and object are existentially distinct, and nothing which is a constitutive part of the one is also a part of the other. Ignoring the special difficulties already suggested concerning the penetration of both sides by space, time, and mind, we may ask, has Prof. Alexander carried out his own hypothesis? Mind, for him, consists of conation, and conation is an activity directed upon an object. But mind, existentially considered, does not contain the object. We must take Prof. Alexander literally when he divides cognition into two parts; cognising which is merely conation, and a cognitum which is an object. Are we not entitled to borrow Prof. Alexander's metaphysical hatchet and cut off the reference to the object? What exists as a mental fact is mere conation, it is merely moving awareness. The phrase 'of an object' denotes nothing existing in consciousness, no part of consciousness; it signifies only that consciousness comes into being when a stimulus or object acts on the brain. This statement, I may be told, is unfair: consciousness is a reaction on the object. Indeed the activity provoked by the object operating on the brain is the process of apprehending

¹ *V.* 3, p. 3; 4, p. 7; 6, p. 5; 7, p. 2; etc.

the object. This is Prof. Alexander's doctrine, but it seems either incompatible with his main position or irrelevant here. The object is not at all part of the apprehending, and one may doubt whether the statement that consciousness is the 'apprehension of an object' means any more than that there is a quality called consciousness on the occasion when the object¹ acts on the brain. What is denoted by the words 'of an object' is nothing in the awareness itself. Conation is awareness *per se*, and is not awareness of anything. This criticism seems to be supported by the interpretation given to cognition as 'togetherness' in 8, § 4. Knowing is there reduced to mere togetherness in the same universe, and the relation of 'knowing' is said to hold 'between any two finite things within one world'. The reference to the object is no more part of mind than the reference to one tuning fork is part of another which the first one stimulates.² Other theories may regard reference to an object as part of a mental process, though they sometimes have difficulty in explaining what the 'reference' means. But these other theories do not draw the sharp line between the process of knowing and the object known which we find in Prof. Alexander's view; and this dualism seems to preclude him from following their example.

Mind on this view becomes a very attenuated existent. It is in incessant movement, passing from one state to another. But the terms of the movement are nowhere discoverable, and there is no hint of what it is that is in motion. As we have already seen, we are not helped by the contention that mind is spatial; for that merely adds another field which mind has to fill, without adding to its power of doing so, without giving it any more body and substance. We may fairly grant that mind is inseparable from its movement, and is not a compound of static substance plus movement. But on the other hand, mere movement is nothing actual; and mind has come perilously close to that nonentity. Mind is a moving colourless quality—a restless ghost; and the brain is the place it haunts. It is not easy to believe that this ghost has substance and strength enough to jostle its way into existence and take a place in the temporal (and spatial) order as a real fact. It is extraordinarily like a hypostatised abstraction.

This result reinforces the previous criticism that Prof. Alexander tends to indicate and describe elementary psychical differences only indirectly. If the objective reference is cut

¹ Or something else, as in imagination, etc.

² *V. loc. cit.*, p. 318.

away from mental states, being actually no part of them, the indirect explanation becomes even less adequate, and mind becomes even more inscrutable and unintelligible. Prof. Alexander claims strongly that his view will not rob psychology of any of its present subject-matter;¹ if this be so, psychology will be unique among sciences in that its knowledge will be about things other than its own proper object. It will be in possession of a great abundance of clues to the nature of mind, but know virtually nothing of the mind itself.

Conclusion.—With great force and skill Prof. Alexander has clung to his initial assumption that mind is only a factor in experience and not the whole of experience itself. But is it not more natural to suppose that *experience* is what happens when a mental fact is said to occur? Experience for Prof. Alexander is a compound of a very ambiguous nature. It consists of a mind, which on examination is difficult to detect; plus objects which are said to be present to the mind or compresent with it, but only in the sense that they are in the same universe with it, temporal presence not being implied.² This makes its locus and nature very difficult to determine. Is it not better to reject Prof. Alexander's hypothesis and to accept what seems the simpler and clearer one, namely, that experience is the temporal fact, the real mind of which we are in search? If we take this view the difficulties which arise from Prof. Alexander's dualism fall away. No legitimate distinction in experience need be ignored, and no illegitimate ones inserted. Mind is concrete and subject to observation from first to last. At any rate it is no ghost.

Difficulties will be found in this view, and the chief of these will doubtless be metaphysical. I shall be told that the suggestion I have made amounts to Idealism, and Idealism has been exploded. Perhaps it does involve Idealism in the end, though I would point to some of the American Realists³ and perhaps even—though more doubtfully—to Avenarius. But it becomes Idealism only when carried out to the end, and it is not necessary to go so far unless one wishes.⁴ Nor is it clear that the damage to Idealism is at all proportionate to the noise of the bombardment it has sustained. But to discuss this would take us too far aside at present. Prof. Alexander's motive, if I understand him rightly, is to avoid every shade and suspicion of a representative theory of knowledge.

¹ *V.* 5, p. 249.

² *V.* 7, p. 3, note.

³ If they are Realists.

⁴ Apart from Realism there are various conceptions of 'presentation' which may afford a resting place.

In that I agree with him. But it is not clear that the end is best attained by means of his central dualism. He is left with grave metaphysical problems on his hands; one of which is how the appearances of things—the abstracted or selected aspects which alone get into experience—are connected together in one thing¹. It is true that these aspects are not separate temporal facts; it is also true that their characteristics can not be attributed *simpliciter* to the whole of experience within which they fall. But on the other hand, they have some kind of being in experience, and they function there in ways unknown to stolid objective things considered apart from experience. Nothing is gained by trying to ignore this. In the interests of tidiness and the partition of things into neat parcels, it may be regarded as scandalous that the objective world should not stay at home respectably, but should come into experience and assist in a riotous life of appearances. But its escapades are notorious and cannot be hushed up.

¹ This problem concerns all dualistic forms of Realism.

III.—BERGSON AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM.

BY S. RADHAKRISHNAN.

I.

THE current democratic trend of ideas has taken in its direction even the narrow circle of thinking men. The philosopher's impulse of knowledge for the sake of knowledge has yielded to the practical man's knowledge for the fruits it bears, the consequences it results in. At the present day systems of philosophy have in view the business of life which is everybody's and try to do justice to the sense and values of the average man. He takes for granted certain things which he feels to be certain through immediate experience, the reality of the time process, of the individual, of his fight for freedom. He has no faith in absolutistic systems of philosophy which give him timeless absolutes and unmeaning evolutions. Bergson, solicitous about the claims of the average man, takes his stand on life and experience. He knows that his philosophy is so popular because of his attitude to experience. "Allow me then to say, that the spread of what men agree to call Bergsonism is due simply to this; the initiated see, and the uninitiated divine that they have here to do with a metaphysic moulded on experience (whether exterior or interior); with an unpretentious philosophy determined to base itself on solid ground, with a doctrine that is in no sense systematic, that is not provided with an answer to every question, and that distinguishes different problems to examine them one by one, a philosophy, in short, capable like science of indefinite progress and advance towards perfection" (Bergson, *His Life and Philosophy*: Ruhe and Paul). So Bergson rejects absolutism which runs counter to experience and intellectualism which seeks to solve all problems of life. Anti-absolutism and anti-intellectualism are the characteristic marks of Bergson's philosophy and have helped to make it so popular. But on closer examination, we shall see that Bergson's philosophy is more absolutist than it is generally known to be. If it is rid of its inconsistencies and interpreted logically, it will become identical with

absolutism of the concrete variety. We here propose to consider Bergson's account of the problems of the relation of life to matter, mechanism and teleology, intellect and intuition, the individual self, freedom and God, with a view to finding out whether his solutions of these problems are so far away from those associated with absolutism as he or his interpreters make us believe.

II. LIFE AND MATTER.

What is the absolutist theory of the relation of life to matter and both to the whole? In idealistic systems of philosophy, the play of the universe is looked upon as the manifestation of the creative joy of the one spirit. Activity is the essence of mind, and in its process of self-realisation the absolute mind goes forth into the forms of finitude and difference. The universe is the realisation of the nature of the Absolute. The Infinite life has to limit itself to become manifest. All forms are brought forth by his nature to manifest himself. This self-limiting power of the Absolute is called in Indian philosophy *maya*. His life appears as spirit and his *maya* as matter and these two are never disjoined during the manifestation. The supreme spirit is thus both force and matter, active and passive, male and female (*Purusha* and *Prakriti*). The supreme one in relation to the universe breaks into the inseparable two, self and not-self, subject and object, being and non-being. The formless, spaceless, timeless something which would remain if the Absolute should completely annihilate itself is what we call nothing. Being and nothing depend on each other. Subject and object are correlative functions. In all our experience we have this subject-object relation. These imply each other, are broken up out of the whole and attain their reality in the whole of becoming. When the two tendencies are postulated the rest of the work of the universe is only a struggle for one of them to dominate the other. In the lowest stage we have the pure externality of things to things, matter, where self is at its lowest and not-self at its highest. But still the purpose of matter is to serve the ends of spirit. It is the object of a subject. We discover a gradual spiritual ascent in plant and animal. This joy of spirit and life never comes to self-consciousness till we come to man. In man, the spirit has come to itself. The growth is thenceforward due to development from within and not pressure from without. Thus the whole universe is seeking more life and fuller. We have in the world the struggle of life against the lower tendency to

attain self-realisation. But throughout the universe we have the one principle of spirit manifesting itself in a series of forms which have the power of representing the whole in a greater or less degree. The history of the world has been a process of the return of the Absolute into itself, in the fulness of its self-consciousness. The evolutionary process of the world would be unintelligible without an immanent spiritual teleology involving a continual ascent from God's minute beginnings to ever higher forms of existence, up at last to man and superman. There is an underlying spiritual reality which is the source of evolution, and our consciousness is one expression thereof. The dissociation of the Absolute into the two, self and its other, constitutes the beginning of creation, and the work of the world is only an attempt to get back to the original wholeness through growth. The universe is just the way through which the abstract unity becomes a concrete totality. The world process is the becoming of the whole.

So matter, according to absolute idealism, is the lowest manifestation of spirit. It does not reduce matter to spirit, but points out that matter is there for the sake of spirit. It is there merely to pass over and return into spirit. That by which an organism develops cannot be external to it. Man is harnessing nature and adapting her processes to his ends. The external world is there for being used by man. It enables him to attain his freedom. Through conflict with it and conquest over it, man reaches his individuality and so nature is the home of the spirit, and Hegel is right when he says that mind is the truth of nature. Quite as much as Bergson or any other vitalist, absolute idealism holds that though life is evolved from the womb of mechanism and is dependent upon it, it cannot be looked upon as the product of mechanism. Thus absolute idealism distinguishes (1) the origin of the universe which is due to the dissociation of the whole into Being and Non-being, (2) the process of the universe which is the warfare of these two tendencies, where (3) the progress is measured by the supremacy of being over non-being, and (4) the goal or the destiny of the universe which is the complete supremacy of being over non-being, spirit over matter, when the Absolute comes to its own. But the end and the beginning are only ideal, and what we have is the pathway between the two called the universe where we are all pilgrims.

Let us ask whether Bergson admits the reality of a whole which becomes differentiated into the two, being and non-being, through the conflict and interaction of which the

process of the universe continues. He admits the reality of a whole which breaks up in twain. The nature of that whole is psychical. The absolute is a spirit. "The whole is of the same nature as the self" (*C.E.*). Bergson postulates a spiritual whole of which matter, etc., are forms. For in the historical evolution of the world, first comes inert matter, then life, etc. So whether Bergson calls matter the relaxation of spirit or the negative effect thereof, matter presupposes spirit. Only in matter spirit has not come to itself. In other words, matter is a low grade of spirit. The primordial spirit or consciousness falls asunder and breaks into two. On the one side we have spirit which is looked upon by Bergson as the creative tendency ever making for full and fuller freedom; on the other, it lapses into matter, absolute determination, mechanical adjustment and space. Creative life is the active determining element (*Purusha*); Matter is the passive and determined element (*Prakriti*). But there are no objects in the world which are purely spatial or purely spiritual. "Neither is space so foreign to our nature as we imagine, nor is matter as completely extended in space as our senses and intellect represent it" (*C.E.*, p. 214). "Although matter stretches itself out in the direction of space, it does not completely attain it . . ." (p. 219). Matter does "not wholly coincide with pure homogeneous space" (p. 230). There is neither spirit which is completely active nor matter that is completely passive. Matter and life we come across are both active and passive, struggling against each other. Both of them are kinds of order or activity, one vital, the other automatic. We cannot say that Bergson conceives matter as pure passivity, for matter is not nothing, as life has to take up forms forced by matter. Becoming alone is the true reality. Bergson does not view the world as dualistic. He does not consider that the world is broken up into two disparate portions. Life and matter are not two movements separate from each other, but are only two different tendencies or articulations which we discover in the one real. Reality is one though we can describe it as a struggle of two tendencies. It is a current which we call upward when the creative spiritual tendency is conquering, and downward when the non-creative tendency is conquering. Becoming alone which is the union of the two principles of being and non-being, is real. As Hegel would put it, being or life has an impulse to complete itself and so relates itself to non-being or matter and passes with it into the higher category of becoming. While becoming is the sole reality, conceptual thought discovers in it being and absolute nought, which is

its other. Reality is change, activity, or becoming. The history of evolution is the continuous becoming of the being by overcoming its other. The succession of living forms is just the attempts of being to overcome non-being. All the objects of the universe are mixtures of these two tendencies. The relative grades of the objects are determined by the more or less of the creative or the spiritual tendency. The hierarchy of values is determined by the more or less of spirit. The universe from its beginnings in crude matter to its heights in human persons is struggling towards the attainment of the whole. The life tendency is to create endless forms which advance in the direction of and beyond, man. When man gives up his subordination to matter, then spirit comes back to its own. But this goal is never reached in the universe. Here the struggle between the two goes on. For if it stops the universe comes to a stop. Neither of them can cease to operate. Creative evolution is a continuous becoming where we have the action of being conquering non-being, or non-being conquering being. Were the conquest ever complete, *i.e.*, were being without non-being to conquer, or *vice versa*, we should have then either pure being or pure non-being which are both abstractions. The very essence of creation is the strife of being and not-being. We see how what Bergson says about the classical systems of philosophy applies to his case also. He requires something negative or zero to be added to the original being before we can have the world of change. Bergson's conception of space corresponds to the "Platonic non-being, the Aristotelian matter—a metaphysical zero which joined to the idea, like the arithmetical zero to unity, multiplies it in space and time" (*C.E.*, p. 334).

When our attention is confined to the universe we see in the universe a struggle between the two tendencies. Bergson seems to conceive the possibility of real duration, pure and spiritual, without any taint of matter or non-being. Here we see a difference between the absolute idealist and Bergson. If we open our eyes and mind, and see the world of experience, we find it to be of the nature of becoming. The absolute idealists have no quarrel with Bergson on this point. In this becoming we shall soon be able to perceive that there are two tendencies of spirit and matter which both seem to regard themselves as equally real and fundamental and existing of their own right. This is the most natural attitude to take up for the unreflecting mind. But absolute dualism will not do as reality is of the nature of becoming. The two mix and coalesce into one whole. So we call them

tendencies upward and downward. They are the articulations which conceptual analysis reveals to us in the nature of the reality or in the process of becoming. As we find progress in the world or the strife of opposites, as they seem to be negatively related while sober second thought tells us they contribute to the ends of the whole, we say that the whole broke up into the two which are tending to come back to their original union. In this description which is given by Bergson and the absolutists, they are employing concepts, Bergson as much as absolutists. If this theory is true, then the two tendencies should have been present from the very beginning. There cannot be a stage where only one tendency is present. The two are correlative like subject and object. When here and there Bergson suggests that the two are accidentally related, we cannot follow him. For in Bergson the two must be fundamentally related. Everywhere Bergson admits spirit acts upon matter. It cannot put one step to the front or move out of its circle were there not matter everywhere confronting it, pulling it out as it were. If this is the relation of spirit to matter, then it cannot be an accidental relation but an essential one. But Bergson seems to admit the exclusive reality of pure or absolute duration. This seems inconceivable. Perfect duration would mean perfect activity. But perfect activity without something to resist, is a contradiction in terms. For according to Bergson we cannot conceive of activity or force unless there is something against which it can force itself. The life force is unintelligible without something to push itself against or exert force upon. Bergson is very severe against the absolutistic conception of being. Whatever the absolutists might say about its dynamic spiritual energy, he persists in calling it motionless being which we are taught to take for nothing. But we ask what about the spiritual current which has nothing to push itself against? Is it not to be viewed as a static blank? Our point is that the upward current of life would have nothing to push itself against, if there was no matter. It would not have been a current or activity at all. Matter is the resisting obstacle and as such the necessary means of the spiritual activity. But Bergson seems to admit the possibility of one of these tendencies existing apart from the other, for he says matter is spirit relaxed, pure activity condensed, duration precipitated. If matter is the arrest or interruption of spirit, what causes the interruption. If the inhibition of spirit is due to the collision with matter, we are begging the question. Bergson cannot explain matter as due to the alteration of the upward spiritual current in the

inverse direction. That it alters and *that* in the inverse direction are purely assumptions. If these assumptions are accepted, then it follows that till the particular point where the upward current altered its course was reached, there was no matter at all. But this contradicts Bergson's view that spirit, whichever way it turns, meets with matter, collides with it. Bergson is not able to give any satisfactory explanation of the interruption or fall. No reason is given. It is there. It is the downward movement potential in the upward. We have the capacity for detension in our consciousness. This means that spirit contains within it the potentiality of matter. With spirit there is matter. Surely we do not have first spirit, then matter, and then resistance between the two. Matter is a primal tendency of life and not an interruption of it. Bergson is truly absolutist when he holds that the dualism is not absolute. The two opposite tendencies are unthinkable except in relation to each other. They are the two aspects of the one effort. They are recognised in and through the struggle with the other. We do not know what each is apart from the other. Bergson is not consistent with his better and more logical self when he suggests that what exists first is the unhindered movement of spirit, and later comes its arrest; from that point onwards the struggle commences. He is logical when he says that from the beginning spirit collides with matter, that matter is contained in spirit as consciousness contains its detension. The two tendencies are present from the start opposing each other, and making for richness and variety in the one life-process of the world.

The becoming of the world is constituted by the two tendencies of life and matter. From the *elan vital* the whole universe develops by divergent evolution. The *elan vital* and the force that opposes it have also a common origin, and so the life and matter of Bergson correspond to the self and not-self of the absolutists. One is the spiritual tendency which by overcoming the other material tendency makes for progress. In the lowest stages, the material tendency has in a sense conquered the spiritual; and we have there neither indetermination, nor choice, nor freedom. The not-self is in the ascendant and all the changes of the material universe are purely repetitory. Simply because it has not the characteristics of spirit we cannot say, it has nothing to do with it. Reality to Bergson as to the absolutists is spiritual, but this spirit lapses in the lowest stages where the automatic tendency is relatively supreme. That even matter is not pure non-being Bergson admits, when he says that intellect

does not give us a true picture of the material world, for it exaggerates its material character. Were matter completely material, intellect would be able to show us reality as it is. Then intellect would become intuition, for it is the nature of intuition to give us things as they are. From this lowest stage, spirit is slowly progressing. We have life, and as this life takes on more freedom and indetermination characteristic of spirit, consciousness appears and life becomes elevated to the next higher stage of animal life. Soon the animal consciousness becomes associated with reasoning, etc., and gets transformed into the human mind, and this human mind is also a stage to be surpassed.

That all these may well be looked upon as the higher and lower forms of spirit, whose nature is activity or becoming Bergson admits when he says that all reality is a becoming or an unfolding. Reality is throughout psychical, and one of its indispensable characteristics is embodied in matter, in the pure externality of things to each other. The nature of a psychical content is to change, and this change is present everywhere, and in some cases where consciousness is needed it makes its appearance. The ultimate nature of reality is that of our inner life which is mind, spirit, freedom. All other reality differs from this only in degree and not in kind. According to Bergson, between matter and perception of matter it is only a difference of degree. Reality is a whole, concrete and universal, holding together in indissoluble unity aspects which in abstraction from one another and from their unity in the whole are contradictory, absolutely exclusive and even destructive of one another. Life and matter appear diametrically opposed in their nature and properties and the ends they have in view. One seems to be working against the other. But they are so only when they are abstracted from the whole to which they belong. In the whole they are found to live in a harmony; apart from it, they say 'kill me' or 'I shall kill you'. The opposites are opposed to one another and not to the unity. As Hegel would put it, the only reality is the concrete universal. The opposite aspects are mutually dependent, though antagonistic moments of the universal. The pulse-beat of the universe is constituted by their unending strife. This is Hegel. This is Bergson. Only Bergson seems to consider the strife to be the end of things, the ultimate expression of the universe, while Hegel holds that their negativity is cancelled in the whole viewed from a broader standpoint than that of narrow individual existence or experience. Reality ceases to be a strife of opposites and becomes a whole where the parts are mutually indispensable.

Their seeming negation expresses the aspect of strife in the real. Reality is neither pure being nor pure becoming, neither one nor many, but a being in becoming, a one in the many. We shall revert to this topic at a later stage. There are passages where Bergson views the universe of change as the progressive realisation of the ideal of the one in the many. What Bergson speaks of as life and its evolution, is really spirit and its evolution. . . . "As the smallest grain of dust is bound up with our entire solar system, drawn along with it in that undivided movement of descent which is materiality itself, so all organised beings from the humblest to the highest, from the first origins of life to the time in which we are and in all places as in all times, do but evidence a single impulsion, the inverse of the movement of matter, in itself indivisible . . ." (*C.E.*, p. 285). The evolution of the spirit into the universe is the everlasting realisation of the ideal of the one in the many. Throwing itself into endless species and individuals it appears as many different lives. This is difference or plurality; but there is also sameness or unity. There is one and the same life-force at work. One life has assumed infinite diversity of forms. Individual lives are but the forms of the over-individual universal life. "Charged from the outset with the infinity of the diverse psychic potentialities of the species and individuals which were yet to be, life realised all its latent possibilities by branching in many different directions without sacrificing the unity of its original concentrated form." Life-process is the progressive realisation of the one through the many. It is the supreme instance of the highest form of the universal which we call 'concrete identity'. Though Bergson is not clearly conscious of it, still the logic of his argument compels him to consent to the reality of a whole in which strife is.

While the absolutist considers the two tendencies to be those of self and not-self, Bergson calls them life and matter. Here Bergson is wrong. For if mechanical explanations cannot account for vital phenomena, as the properties possessed by organisms are different from those of crystals, then we may well ask whether purely biological explanations will account for conscious phenomena, and psychological explanations for moral values. In the process of evolution, we have gaps not only between the organic and the inorganic, but also between the physiological and the organic, the conscious and the physiological, the moral and the conscious. It is an arbitrary procedure to say that life and matter should be distinguished, as physico-chemical explanations will not suffice for vital phenomena, but content

oneself with saying that consciousness and morality are only stages of life. If consciousness and memory, logic and morality can be looked upon as two grades of life, in spite of the fact that the laws of organic growth are inadequate to account for the conscious and moral phenomena, in exactly the same manner as mechanical explanations cannot account for organic objects, why can we not look upon matter also as a phase of life, lower than organisms? Either we should consider all these, men, animals, plants and minerals as stages of the one essence, or the world must be looked upon, not as the warfare of two tendencies, life and matter, but four principles, matter, life, consciousness and reason. Bergson with the absolutists is willing to reject the latter alternative. He is anxious to establish a monism, notwithstanding the struggle of the world. If so, is it not better to use a term which is not so closely associated with one of these stages as life? It will not do to call them all stages of life as this term is closely associated with biological phenomena. We shall have to say then, that all these are higher and lower forms of the one essential spirit. The whole manifests itself at one stage as matter, at another as life, at the third as animal consciousness, at the fourth as human intelligence. They are all forms of spirit at different stages. Instead of saying they are types of organisation due to life, we should say they are grades of spirit. As a matter of fact, Bergson is not very careful in his use of the word Life. Life and consciousness are sometimes used synonymously. Life sometimes refers to the vital phenomena. We can distinguish broadly three different usages, (1) *the supra-conscious whole* which breaks into the two. Or (2) *the upward current* which comes into conflict with the downward: "Life as a whole, from the initial impulsion that thrust it into the world, will appear as a wave which rises, and which is opposed by the descending movement of matter" (*C.E.*, p. 284). Life is "essentially a current sent through matter, drawing from it what it can" (p. 280). Or (3) *the process of becoming* which is due to the interaction of the two, consciousness and space, being and non-being. "Life is consciousness launched into matter." "Consciousness is distinct from the organism it animates, although it must undergo its vicissitudes" (*C.E.*, p. 284).

Bergson bases his extreme opposition of life and matter on the ground that while in the physical world, changes are external, being merely displacement of parts, in the world of vital phenomena, change is internal, being genuine creation of novelty. In the physical world time does not enter, and

the present is determined by the past according to necessary relations which science may discover; in the world of vital phenomena time is very real, and the future is undetermined by the present. Predictability is possible in the world of physical phenomena as all is given at the outset and everything is mechanically determined. In the vital world, which is free and spontaneous, predictability is impossible. Bergson again and again emphasises the creative character of life and compares it to the ripening of a process, while the movement of the physical world consists in a mere reshuffling of the old elements. Bergson emphasises the discontinuous and contingent nature of life. But a closer examination reveals to us that life is not so full of surprises as we are led to believe. Even Bergson insists on the continuity of life. Its future is not discontinuous with its past. Unless there be something common he would have no right to say that the life-process is one continuous whole. Emphasis on the continuity of living processes means connexion between the past and the present. To that extent contingency is excluded. The only difference between the two lies in the kind of action. While mechanical acts are determined externally, vital acts are determined internally. But from this, to infer that the activities of the one are rigid while those of the other are free, is wrong and untrue to facts. Organisms are determined from within, by their own nature, while crystals are determined from the outside. When Bergson has an eye on facts, he sees clearly that life is not a series of takings by storm or leaps from one thing to another, but a continuous evolution. As for novelty it is not the property of vital phenomena only.

All that Bergson has established is that organisation is not manufacture, nor is an organism a machine. We cannot submit life-process to mathematical treatment. "Astronomy, physics and chemistry cannot account for life phenomena. Calculation touches at most certain phenomena of organic destruction. Organic creation . . . we cannot submit to a mathematical treatment" (*C.E.*, p. 21). Life cannot be resolved into matter and motion. Mechanical categories are not an adequate explanation of life-process which resembles more the life of mind than that of the mineral. But this does not mean complete discontinuity between the two. . . . "We do not question the fundamental identity of inert matter and organised matter." "That life is a kind of mechanism I cordially agree" (*C.E.*, p. 32). The vitalists and the absolutists have an eye on both the continuity and discontinuity of life and matter. They

agree with Bergson in thinking that pure mechanism is insufficient for accounting for the life-phenomena; but they do not rush to the conclusion that therefore life is in every way opposed to matter. Bergson starts with an absolute opposition between the organic and the inorganic. But he has no right to do so, as there is as much opposition between the organic and the conscious, and the conscious and the intellectual. If life is a fight against matter, consciousness is a fight against life. But if there is continuity between life and consciousness, then there is continuity between life and matter. Bergson cannot have much objection to the idealist solution of life and matter. In life matter is not destroyed but only transmuted. Life is not the destruction of matter; but only its transfiguration. The properties of matter are caught up in a higher synthesis. The idealist as much as Bergson emphasises the uniqueness of life. He knows that it cannot be reduced to an aspect of matter. Life is more than mechanism, but is still born in it. To him life and matter are higher and lower aspects of a single reality.

That the two, matter and life, are not absolute opposites but relative differences in a whole promoting the one unity of spirit comes out from Bergson's writings. "Life must be something which avails itself of a certain elasticity in matter" (*Life and Consciousness*). "Life seems to have succeeded in this (overcoming the resistance of matter) by dint of humility, by making itself very small and very insinuating bending to physical and chemical forces, consenting even to go part of the way with them. . . . Of phenomena in the simplest forms of life, it is hard to say whether they are still physical and chemical, or whether they are already vital. Life had to enter thus into habits of inert matter, in order to draw it little by little, magnetised as it were, to another track" (*C.E.*, pp. 103-104). Bergson's other point that matter is only the relaxation of spirit suggests the idealist contention that mind has only to reveal the mind in matter. Matter, according to Bergson, is congealed mind, or mind come to rest. Materiality is what life itself assumes. Life is only the truth of matter, as in Hegel mind is the truth of nature. In Bergson while both matter and mind are looked upon as movement, they are different because matter is self-repeating movement, while mind is creative movement. Consciousness and memory distinguish mind from matter. Memory is just the way in which the past persists in the present. The persistence of the past in the present is common to both matter and mind. But as mind

is essentially creative, it retains the past not by way of simple repetition or mere unaltered reproduction, but in a different way which is called memory. So memory is only the special form which the common feature of the persistence of the past in the present has assumed in the case of mind which is creative movement and not self-repeating movement. Consciousness again does not distinguish matter from mind absolutely, for to Bergson matter consists of images, which we would perceive, were our perception pure, *i.e.*, unadulterated with memory and sensation. These images can exist without being perceived. They generally so exist in matter, for as there is no indetermination in it, it has no consciousness. But when it enters the living body the movement is held up for a time in the zone of indetermination provided by the nervous system. This arrest makes it become a conscious perception. Matter is thus, only mind which through losing its indetermination no longer has need of either consciousness or memory. Consciousness and memory, then, are not points in which mind differs from matter absolutely, but rather the consequences of what according to Bergson is the fundamental difference, namely, the disappearance of novelty. Whether it is so fundamental, is, as we already stated, open to debate. It is strange that while absolutist thinkers make mind and matter differ in essential respects but still view them as phases of one whole, Bergson, while minimising the distinction, is not willing to consider them as belonging to one whole. But this absolutist conclusion is the logical implication of Bergson's argument. When he says that the nature of the whole reality is psychical, it follows that life and matter are means to each other. They are parts of one whole, to be regarded as higher and lower phases of it.

(To be continued.)

IV.—ON CERTAIN CRITICISMS OF PLURALISM.

BY C. A. RICHARDSON.

I.—INTRODUCTION.

IT is incumbent on anyone who attempts to establish and develop a pluralistic view of the universe, to consider, and, if possible, to meet certain vital criticisms which have been urged against such a view. The answers to these criticisms must be prefaced by a brief indication of the standpoint from which they are approached.

The present writer regards a spiritualistic pluralism (essentially such, for example, as that maintained by Dr. James Ward) as the most satisfactory hypothesis on which to base a system of philosophy. It is satisfactory, in the first place, on account of the fundamental conceptions from which it starts. These are perfectly definite and easily realised. Secondly, it affords a most promising method of attacking and of partially or completely solving some of the outstanding problems of philosophy.

In the course of the development of this hypothesis, however, it becomes clear that alone it is incomplete. This is to be expected, for the history of philosophy shows that no system can hope to approach within measurable distance of its object which lays undue stress on either of the dual aspects of the universe (its oneness and its manyness) to the neglect or exclusion of the other.

We find, accordingly, that criticisms of pluralism fall mainly into two classes, those which demonstrate its incompleteness as a final answer to the questions which it seeks to resolve, and those which are aimed at supposed flaws radically inherent in the hypothesis itself. As has been indicated, the former may be regarded as justified, but the latter call for an answer, and it is with certain of them that we are here concerned.

Of the great philosophic systems of the past, the Monadology of Leibniz is perhaps the most remarkable for the logical skill with which it is sustained, and for the keen insight manifested in the fundamental principles on which it is based.

From it all modern pluralisms derive their central theme. But two centuries of criticism have ensured the evolution of systems in which the more prominent weaknesses of the original monadology find no place. These later systems drew inspiration afresh from the great biological advances of the last century, advances made in the light of the doctrine of the evolution of species, a doctrine already foreshadowed in Leibniz' celebrated Principle of Continuity.¹

Yet there remained in pluralism certain vulnerable points which its opponents were not slow to attack. With all the criticisms thus put forth it is both impossible and unnecessary to deal at length. The most important of them are to be found in the writings of two men: Prof. Pringle-Pattison² and Dr. Bosanquet.³ If the objections there urged can be successfully countered, the chief difficulties which block the path of the modern pluralist (not necessarily as regards philosophy in general, but as regards pluralism in particular) will be swept away. Accordingly, it is with the criticisms put forward by Prof. Pringle-Pattison and by Dr. Bosanquet that we are called upon to deal.

II.—EXTERNALITY.

For the pluralist, the environment of the self or subject of experience consists in other selves or subjects whose mentality differs from his only in degree. This belief is attacked by Dr. Bosanquet in a criticism which may be summed up essentially somewhat as follows: "[Selves] as inward centres in the popular sense [cannot] form the circumferences for each other,"⁴ and again, "Even if there were, *de facto*, a psychical something underlying matter, yet it is only as definite externality that it plays a part in our life. We have no use for it *as inwardness*."⁵

Now the true implication of these sentences is by no means evident if we inspect them as they stand. The spatial metaphor involved in the use of such words as "centre," "circumference," "inwardness," "externality," tends rather to obscure the issue, though the introduction of that metaphor may be very convenient and to a certain extent necessary.

¹ The doctrine of pre-established harmony shows, however, that evolution, as we now understand it, did not enter into Leibniz' conception of the universe.

In *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy*.

In *The Principle of Individuality and Value*.

⁴ See, *e.g.*, *op. cit.*, p. 75 ff.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 194, note. These quotations summarise the idea involved and explained at length.

But what does this distinction between "inwardness," and "externality" really imply? Evidently "inwardness" is something which essentially characterises the individual subject, at least *for* that subject, whereas "externality" is something which characterises (for him) the not-self. Hence the distinction between "inward" and "external" refers ultimately to the fundamental distinction within each individual experience of subject from object. Consequently, if the pluralist asserts that the object of experience of one subject consists of other subjects, Dr. Bosanquet's criticism becomes in effect, "How can a subject of experience be, in any circumstances, an object of experience?"

In this form the criticism is justified, and the pluralist is wrong *if* he asserts that to any subject other subjects are presented as objects of experience. Before considering the latter point, however, it should be noticed that in any case the criticism only applies to pluralism incidentally. At the root of it is the fact that no existent entity can be an object of experience. No entity other than myself can be given to me as an object of knowledge in such a way that I realise what it is in its actual essence.¹ We cannot in experience *know* anything else as it really is in itself.

What, then, of the sense-data which form for each individual his object of experience? They are objects of acquaintance-knowledge. Are we to say that they do not exist? Strictly, it is neither true nor false to say that they exist. It is meaningless. There is no significant sense in which existence can be asserted of the immediate data of perception. *There they are*, and that is all that can be said of the matter. Accordingly we must regard the object of experience not as one or more existent entities, but as the "appearance" to the subject of existent entities other than himself. This fact of "appearance" or "presentation," being ultimate in nature, defies satisfactory definition. It might be provisionally indicated somewhat as follows: Given a percipient subject and certain other existent entities, under suitable conditions, of which the existence of these other entities is the most necessary and important, the given subject will perceive an object which may be defined as the "appearance" to him of the other entities. It is important to notice that this "appearance" is neither the given subject nor the other entities, though its being is dependent on the existence both of the subject and of the other entities.

¹ I do not mean to imply here that even the self is given as an *object of immediate knowledge* in experience. I have dealt with this point more fully in an article in the *Philosophical Review*, vol. xxvii., 3 (May, 1918), p. 240 ff.

Prof. Pringle-Pattison¹ also makes a brief reference to the point under consideration. He remarks that "internality is impossible without externality". This, as we have seen, is equivalent to saying that a subject of experience is inconceivable apart from a presented object of experience. But the latter is simply the appearance to the subject of other existent entities. It is not itself to be classed as an existent entity, though it has *being* in the sense that *it is there*. A subject, however, to whom no appearance is presented is just as inconceivable as an appearance presented to nobody.

It follows, then, that Dr. Bosanquet's criticism does not apply in any special way to pluralism, but is really an expression of the fact that an existent entity cannot be an object of knowledge. In particular, an experiencing subject cannot be an object of knowledge. But pluralism is in no way bound to assert this impossibility. For pluralism, the living experience of the subject consists actually in his interaction with other subjects. This interaction is manifested in the ever-increasing differentiation of a presented indivisible whole or object of experience, namely, the *appearance* to the subject of other subjects. We are not acquainted in sense-experience with other individuals in their actuality. Selves cannot be reduced to sense-data. The latter are but what we have termed the "appearance" to us of other selves.

We may conclude our reply to this type of criticism by briefly considering another quotation from Dr. Bosanquet. In pan-psychism, he asks, "what becomes of the material incidents of our life? . . . Is it not obvious that our relation to these things is essential to finite being, and that if they are in addition subjective psychological centres their subjective psychological quality is one which so far as realised would destroy their function and character for us?"²

Now the nerve of this criticism is destroyed, as before, when it is realised that for a given subject the object of experience does not consist in a number of other "subjective psychological centres," but in the *appearance* to the given subject of these other subjects. Moreover, the function of material incidents in our life consists in the determination and limitation of our purposive activity. It is simply the manifestation of our interaction with other subjects. In fact, it is here that the fundamental ambiguity of Dr. Bosanquet's term "inwardness" as a characterisation of subjective centres becomes completely evident. For the activity of the subject is essentially "outgoing" as it were. It is not

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 178 ff.

² *Ibid.*, Lect. X., p. 363.

directed in upon itself (if that could have any definite meaning), but out towards others. How, then, is it possible that the development of this psychical quality can destroy the function of the subject with regard to other subjects? The growth of experience, in the pluralistic view, does not and cannot consist in a gradual withdrawal into itself of the subject, culminating in a complete isolation, but in continuous interaction with other subjects which, so far from leading to individual isolation, aims rather at mutual co-operation in ensuring the interests of the society as a whole

III.—CONSCIOUSNESS.

Dr. Bosanquet's conception of consciousness is in entire conflict with the position which pluralism takes up. But his view is largely vitiated by the fact that he adopts on this point an attitude which appears to tend very strongly to that Cartesian dualism of mind and matter, which for so long clogged the progress of philosophic thought. This tendency is particularly evident in his treatment of the relation of body and mind. The pluralist, on the other hand, recognises that the fundamental fact from which the start must be made, is not a dualism of matter and mind, but the unity of the individual experience, which comprises a duality of subject and object. For the pluralist "mind" is a generic term denoting the class of subjects of experience.

According to Dr. Bosanquet "organic regulation is natural and immanent, but independent of consciousness".¹ Consciousness is a "perfection" granted by the Absolute in certain circumstances.² Such statements imply that matter is given as prior, while mind only supervenes at a certain stage of the development of matter. This seems to approach perilously near to the epiphenomenal view. Moreover, even if we grant with Dr. Bosanquet that organic regulation is "natural and immanent," what evidence have we that it is "independent of consciousness"? Apparently the reference here is to the fact that the behaviour of an organism (especially of a lower type) consists largely in reflex action. The question is then whether the establishment of reflex action presupposes mind or not.³ Now we have an abundance of

¹ *Op. cit.*, Lect. V., p. 195.

² *Ibid.*, p. 189.

³ Of course it is a well-known fact that established reflexes occur without the intervention of the *dominant* consciousness of the organism, but it by no means follows that the latter played no part in the original establishment of the reflex, nor that, even when established, the reflex is independent of any consciousness. On all these points see also J. Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, 2nd ed., p. 462 ff.

examples of such presuppositions—a simple case being a man learning to ride a bicycle. In fact the formation of habits is a fundamental characteristic of mind. On the other hand, there are no cases in which we observe the establishment of a reflex action where we can infallibly assert the absence of mind.

It is the essence of the pluralistic position to recognise that the start must be made from individual experience, which implies mind. It is the task of the pluralist to interpret matter from this standpoint. On the other hand, if we start from matter, how can we interpret mind? There is nothing in what Dr. Bosanquet says on the subject which provides a satisfactory answer to that question. But from the standpoint of mind there is no such difficulty in interpreting organisms, at least. The striking feature of an organism is the fact that it exhibits "behaviour" analogous in every way to our own. Hence, what the subject distinguishes within its objective experience as organisms are, for the pluralist, the appearance to the subject of other subjects differing from himself only in degree or in kind of mental development.

Speaking again of consciousness, Dr. Bosanquet says that "conscious process is meaning (or appreciation) not effect, of physical process"¹—and in another place: "Mind is the meaning of externality, which under certain conditions concentrates in a new focus of meaning, which is a new finite mind"². It is not easy to assign a definite significance to these assertions. In the first place "meaning" and "appreciation" are by no means synonymous terms. They apply respectively to the objective and the subjective aspects of the process which consists in the interpretation of an object by an individual subject. In other words, we regard the subject as "appreciating" the "meaning" of the object. It is difficult to see in what sense, if any, consciousness may be considered as "meaning". For the latter term implies both an object and a subject *for* whom the object has meaning. We cannot regard the subject as being a "meaning". If we attempt to do so, we are bound to imply a further subject,³ and are thus led into a continuous regress. Moreover, Dr. Bosanquet fails apparently to distinguish clearly between sensations and the mind of which they are the sensations. It is not clear whether the mind or the sensations constitute

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 196 ff., margin.

² *Ibid.*, App. II. to Lect. V., p. 220.

³ Even here there is a difficulty. For, as we have seen, a subject cannot be an object of knowledge, and anything which has "meaning" for anybody must in some sense be an object of knowledge.

the meaning of physical process.¹ But, at all events, we cannot suppose mind to be simply the "meaning" of something else. "Meaning," though it implies a subject, is not itself that subject. Nor does it help us to adopt the term "appreciation" instead. For the subject is not the appreciation, but the individual who appreciates.

The conception of a mind as a "focus" of externality also appears to have no valid significance. As we have seen, the only legitimate meaning that can be given to the term "externality" is "the objective side of experience". But we cannot possibly conceive the subject as consisting in the "concentration" of sense-data into a "focus". To use Dr. Bosanquet's terminology, internality can in no way be constructed out of externality. The term implies the fundamental distinction in experience between subject and object. We might perhaps speak (very loosely) of the subject as concentrating externality, by his unifying activity, into a focus. But externality thus focussed would be the product of the subject's activity and not the subject himself.

IV.—THE EVOLUTION OF LAW.

In the type of pluralism advocated by Dr. James Ward, the laws of inorganic matter, commonly called the "Laws of Nature," are regarded as having evolved in time, only reaching their present fixed and stable form after a long process of development. Prof. Pringle-Pattison raises objections to this view. According to him we cannot suppose the possibility of action without environment, nor can we conceive the interaction of monads, even in the beginning, apart from laws in accordance with which that interaction takes place.² And again: "A system of unvarying natural order is demanded, it may be pointed out, in the service of the higher conscious life itself, as the condition of reasonable action".³

Now, in the first place, it may be admitted that action is impossible without environment. But pluralism does not deny this. The environment of a monad is constituted by the other monads, with which it interacts. And, coming to the further point, Prof. Pringle-Pattison is evidently right in so far as he asserts that the monads must always have had *some* nature. But by the evolution of natural laws, the pluralist simply means that the laws of nature did not always exist in their *present* relatively fixed form. It must be remembered that such laws are not, as it were, *imposed* upon

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 197.

² *Ibid.*, p. 183 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 187.

things from without, but are merely descriptions of the way in which things behave. Consequently, if the behaviour is modified, the descriptions or laws are correspondingly modified also; though in certain cases behaviour may tend to a comparatively fixed system of habitual reactions, in which cases we may speak of a fixed law.

The attitude of pluralism on this point may, perhaps, be made clearer by an illustration. In the first place it must be noted that, for the pluralist, there is no absolute gap between organic and inorganic matter. Now if we survey the realm of organic matter, past and present, we find that whereas some species continue to develop into more and more complex types, others have, after a long period of development, eventually approached a stationary condition in which their actions have become practically entirely habitual and relatively fixed in nature. Inorganic matter may be regarded as an extreme form of such stationary species. Hence there is no difficulty in supposing that inorganic matter has evolved into its present condition, and it is in this process that the evolution of the so-called "laws" of matter consists. There is obviously no reason to suppose that a limit must be placed on the number of these laws. Hence we may consider that originally each monad, while displaying the general characteristics of mind in a low degree, was yet, in its particularity, a law unto itself. Only as interaction proceeds is there a tendency for individuals *en masse* to behave in similar ways. This tendency proceeds from the characteristic, which must be present in some degree in each individual, of learning by experience.

As to what Prof. Pringle-Pattison says of the necessity for a system of unvarying law as the condition of reasonable action in higher conscious life, it certainly seems probable that the tendency of the individuals composing inorganic matter to develop a system of habitual reactions has greatly aided the process of evolution of other individuals to higher and more complex types. Yet it must not be forgotten that each of us has to deal not only with material objects but also with persons. Although the behaviour of the latter does not admit of description to a degree of precision in any way comparable with such principles as the law of gravitation, for example, yet we do not find it impossible to live a rational social life on that account. In dealing with individuals whose behaviour is subject to continuous modification and development, the only necessary conditions of success are that the process of development should not be too rapid, and that we should have a knowledge at least of the general trend.

of that process. Such knowledge would itself be embodied in a law, but of a different type from those we consider in general under the conception of the evolution of law. For it would be the description of a dynamic process and not of a static form of behaviour.

It is evident, then, that the notion of the laws of nature as evolving gradually into their present stable form is not a contradictory one. For the evolution of law means nothing more nor less than the gradual modification of behaviour. We have examples in plenty of such modifications, and we find that in many cases the process tends asymptotically, as it were, to a limit, and we have species, which, after developing through countless ages, become relatively fixed. *Relatively*, we say, for there is no guarantee that even the laws of inorganic matter will, after the lapse of future vast periods of time, remain in their present form without sensible alteration.

V.—THE 'BARE' MONAD.

All mental life of which we appear to have clear evidence, is associated in every case with an organism. The pluralist conceives the organism as a system of monads in association with a dominant monad, the latter constituting the self of which the organism is the body. But if we press the pluralistic hypothesis far enough, we seem bound to postulate, somewhere or somewhen, the existence of 'bare' monads, *i.e.*, monads unassociated with any body or organism. Prof. Pringle-Pattison points out objections to this view.¹

Leibniz endeavoured to avoid the difficulty by assuming that *every* monad was associated with an organism composed of relatively inferior monads. For him, a piece of inorganic matter was a mere collection of organisms. In this way he piled infinity on infinity. We cannot be satisfied with such an endless regress. Nor does it really clear away the obstacles in any very definite manner, for it is difficult to see how, in considering the relations of organisms external to one another, we can entirely avoid the notion of the interaction of bare monads.

But, in any case, there seems to be no intrinsic difficulty in the conception of a bare monad. There is apparently no inevitable reason why that peculiar complex of presentations² which constitutes what we call 'the body' should enter as an element in every experience. A bare monad

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 188.

² Not only of sight and touch, but also that mass of organic sensations which constitutes what is called "general sensibility".

would simply be a subject from whose object of experience this element was absent, and there is no way of showing that its absence is an impossibility. No doubt there is a difficulty of another kind, if we try to hark back to the monads as they originally were. For there is bound to be a difficulty here, but it lies, not in the notion of a bare monad, but in the inherent incompleteness of the pluralistic hypothesis. We are faced, in short, with the problem of Creation, which pluralism alone is powerless to solve. Yet one word of warning is necessary. Prof. Pringle-Pattison seems, in one place, to identify the bare monad with what lies behind the atom, or whatever the ultimate physical particle may be.¹ This is quite unjustifiable. Physical objects, whether they be common-sense objects such as chairs and tables, or entities such as atoms and electrons, are conceptual constructions based on sense-experience, and therefore have a purely formal existence.²

If the truth be told, the bare monad is not the real root of the trouble at all; the latter must be sought rather in the conception of interaction between the monads—and this applies just as much when the monads are members of one organism as when they are not. We need some concrete ground of this interaction, which shall serve as a principle of unification whereby the existence of selves forming a plurality, and yet entering into relations with one another, may be rendered intelligible. Although the start must be made from a plurality, and although the pluralistic hypothesis will carry us a long way in the understanding of the world, we must take account at the latter end of that other aspect of the world—its unity. With the further consideration of this question we are not here concerned. Suffice it to say, as in the introduction above, that such limitations of pluralism as are implied in this matter may be freely admitted.

VI.—SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.

It would appear, then, that the most important criticisms recently directed against pluralism fail of justification. We saw, in the first place, that there is no more difficulty in accounting on the pluralistic hypothesis for what Dr. Bosanquet calls "externality," than on any other hypothesis,

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 180.

² "This table" and "an atom" are alike capable of being exhibited as logical constructions of sense-data, though the latter is a more complex construction than the former. See B. Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, Lects. III. and IV.

provided that we interpret that term correctly. It can only mean the object as distinguished from the subject of experience. For pluralism, the object of experience does not consist of other subjects (as Dr. Bosanquet's criticism implies), but of the appearance of these other subjects to the individual subject considered, where "appearance" is defined in some such way as we have indicated. These "appearances" cannot be said to *exist*, for no existent thing can in itself be an object of knowledge, though they have being in the sense that they are there.

Secondly, Dr. Bosanquet's account of consciousness does not agree with the facts. We have no reason whatever to assert that organic regulation is independent of all and every kind of consciousness. On the contrary, wherever we can observe the formation of a habit culminating in reflex action, it is associated with mind. Thus, whereas we have instances of reflex action presupposing the existence of mind, we have no instances of such action where mind can be certainly asserted to be absent.

We cannot construe consciousness merely as the *meaning* of externality. Such an interpretation is inherently contradictory. For, using the term legitimately, we speak of the "meaning" of an object *for* a conscious subject. We cannot significantly regard the meaning of objects as *actually consisting in* conscious subjects. Nor can we look upon externality as gathering itself up into foci which we call conscious subjects. No such attempts to get the subjective out of what is essentially objective can possibly succeed. Externality is not the less externality because it is concentrated into a focus, if for the moment we allow such a loose and metaphorical phrase. By no manipulation in this way can we make "externality" pass over into "internality" or mind, though we may perhaps look upon the latter as the *agent which focalises* externality, provided we interpret our terms properly.

Proceeding to Prof. Pringle-Pattison's criticisms, we saw that one mistake lay in the misinterpretation of the word "laws". We cannot suppose that in Nature there existed laws and individuals as separate entities, and that these laws were then imposed on the individuals. By a natural law we can only mean the description of certain modes of behaviour. Consequently the evolution of law is nothing but the modification of behaviour, a matter of everyday occurrence. Occasionally a species becomes relatively fixed, in which case "the law" has evolved into a stable state. Inorganic matter may be regarded as providing extreme

examples of such fixed species. No doubt we must postulate that even in the beginning the behaviour of each monad conformed to very general laws, though the behaviour of each would contain unique characteristics; but that is no reason why behaviour should not be modified, with the corresponding modification of descriptive laws. In short, no one wishes to deny the subsistence of laws, but merely to assert that laws may, and do, change. We do not start with fixed species. They are the result of long periods of development. Consequently there is no difficulty in supposing that the laws of inorganic matter have arrived at their present form after a lengthy process of evolution.

Finally there remains the question of the bare monad. This brings us very close to the limits of pluralism, and hence exhibits its incompleteness. For while there seems to be no inherent contradiction in the notion of a bare monad, it leaves us unsatisfied, since it directly involves the problem of the interaction of monads. We seek further for the concrete ground of this interaction, and are thus led to realise that some all-pervading principle, if it may be so called, is necessary to explain the unity of what in another aspect is a manifest plurality. There we must leave the matter for the present. If we are to achieve anything we must start from the given plurality of individuals, and this pluralism will carry us far. As we have seen, the difficulties supposed to lie in its way are by no means so real as they seem. But when the pluralistic hypothesis has done its utmost, we are bound to supplement it by a further principle, wherein we take account of that bond, whatever it may be, which makes reality a Universe.

V.—DISCUSSIONS.

MR. JOACHIM'S CRITICISM OF 'CORRESPONDENCE'.

ALTHOUGH signs are not wanting that the tide has already begun to turn a little, the theory of correspondence has suffered in recent times a pretty general obloquy. Even those who were at heart its friends have frequently seen fit to abandon the word at least, by identifying it with some peculiarly obnoxious form of theory which they could then join in abusing; while the reigning schools have for once agreed with one another, and unanimously ruled it out of court as no longer a philosophically respectable point of view. This persuasion renders it more or less difficult for one who is inclined to be sympathetic toward the notion. Criticism he might meet, or try to meet; but the assumption that a thing is so obviously not so that it no longer needs even to be criticised, leaves him rather at a loss. The more usual procedure has for some time been to pass by the issue as one that now by common consent may be regarded as disposed of, with a casual reference, perhaps, as if it were decisive, to one difficulty in particular that correspondence has to meet—the difficulty of showing how we can obtain assurance that reality corresponds to our ideas of it when reality by definition lies outside immediate experience as such. That an important problem exists here I have no wish to deny; and it is one to which the theory will need to find an answer. But unless it takes the form of self-contradiction—and this is not asserted—the existence of a difficulty is hardly a final refutation of a philosophic claim, or else where is the philosophy that would be safe? and the disposition to accept it as final is sufficiently met by what the logic books have to say about the 'fallacy of objections'.

It does happen exceptionally, however, that the notion of correspondence is treated to a more serious examination; and what I shall undertake to do here is to consider one such critical attack in some detail. It is to be understood that I am not attempting a positive defence of the doctrine. But it may be taken, I suppose, as an elementary principle of debate that before a proposition can either be proved or disproved effectively, it needs to be understood; and it is therefore worth asking to what extent criticisms do actually touch the real point at issue. This need becomes particularly manifest in connexion with the attack I propose to examine. Mr. Joachim, with commendable frankness, grants before he is through that his own alternative programme has its troubles, which even, here,

take the form of self-contradiction. More than this, the nature of the chief difficulty is one that springs from the necessity after all of recognising an element of 'correspondence' in the situation.¹ And the only reason given for the rather desperate expedient of subordinating the relative truth of a formula which, it is confessed, is, from the human point of view, the natural description of the facts, to one which, confessedly also, contradicts itself, is the supposed prior proof that the correspondence formula is incapable of being thought intelligibly. In such a case it is well to make sure that no possibilities have been overlooked.

What then is the essence of the 'correspondence theory'? As I shall interpret it, it presupposes two main theses. The first is, that in 'truth' there is always a duality involved; on the one hand 'ideas,' and on the other a reality which is existentially different from the ideas, and known only through them as a medium. And in the second place, it holds that if we are to know the nature of this reality 'truly,' it must in so far correspond to our ideas of it. If for example I know my neighbour's motives for an act of his, the motives as they exist as causal facts in his own consciousness, and my knowledge of these motives, are existentially two, not one; and also the true character of the motives must somehow be reproduced or duplicated in my ideas about them. The details of such a doctrine are indeed capable of a fuller analysis; but for my present purpose I can take the above account as practically sufficient. What then are the difficulties that to Mr. Joachim render it untenable?

Mr. Joachim starts out by attempting to make the notion of correspondence more precise; and on the result at which he arrives here his subsequent argument wholly depends. Briefly the result is, that correspondence is unintelligible except as it involves a point to point relationship of elements in two systems which exemplify the same idea or 'purpose'. Thus if we compare the map of a country with the country which it represents, each element on the map corresponds to an actual locality. This necessitates, first, a system whose underlying unity of plan or structure is capable of being repeated in different materials, and, second, the existence of functional parts which bear in the two expressions of this plan the same relationship to the whole to which they belong.²

As a preliminary to inquiring whether this is an exhaustive account of correspondence, it will be necessary to consider a certain ambiguity in Mr. Joachim's discussion which he apparently has not attempted to remove. Mr. Joachim speaks on occasion of two forms of correspondence here—between the wholes as such, and between the corresponding parts of the wholes; and the definitions in the two cases are not identical. Correspondence when attributed to wholes is simply a name for their identity of purpose; applied to the parts, it means that two elements perform with reference to this purpose the same *function*.³ It does not follow that there

¹ *Nature of Truth*, pp. 175 seq.

² P. 12.

³ P. 10.

must be a contradiction here. But one definition is supposedly more ultimate than the other; which are we to take as our starting-point in theory?

Now it seems to me plausible to hold that, *if we are to make system essential* to the notion of correspondence, the idea of function is the fundamental one; and that wholes may be said to correspond only *because* they already have corresponding parts. In order that the parts may correspond functionally there must, it is true, be a plan; but it is in the first instance the parts which correspond by reason of their similar relations to this plan, rather than the wholes because of their identity of structure. For otherwise it might be asked why correspondence should hold between two identical expressions of purpose, any more than between two simple elements—why the same *qualitative* content might not give rise to it as well as the same teleological structure. Now what I am going on to argue is precisely this, that while two things may resemble one another—and Mr. Joachim uses correspondence and resemblance interchangeably—because they show the same purpose, they may equally well do it on account of an identity of character other than teleological; and resemblance is all that the ‘correspondence theory’ requires. If therefore the word ‘correspondence’ implies something in addition, it is well to get the ambiguity out of the way before we start. Now I am not sure but that the word *does* tend, perhaps properly so, to suggest a reference to similarity of function. We do not hesitate to speak of a map as corresponding to a geographical area, meaning that the *points* on the map correspond in detail; but do we naturally say that two cases of red, as such, in two objects, ‘correspond’? If we do not—and only then should we be justified in limiting correspondence to ‘system’—it apparently is because the word has as its special connotation that relational character which an element may on occasion have as a part of a whole, which then would in a secondary way justify us in speaking of the wholes themselves as corresponding.

For convenience’ sake, however, I shall ignore this refinement of meaning, and make no difference between correspondence and resemblance; and this is justifiable since, as will appear, it is resemblance that really is relevant to the problem of truth. And now of course the important point is not that correspondence can be illustrated by such examples as Mr. Joachim chooses, but that these are the *only* kind of things that can be said to correspond. But Mr. Joachim’s own illustrations, though some more obviously than others, will suggest a further possibility. Suppose we take the instance of a portrait. Not only do the features correspond in their relative significance for the face as a whole, but, in a measure, they also correspond, or resemble one another, as parts. It may be true that, from the standpoint of the painter’s purpose and the artistic ‘truth’ of the picture, this literal resemblance is relatively unimportant; that is immaterial so long as there is *any*

standpoint from which the claim possesses meaning. And that it has such a meaning is, I think, quite clear. The popular and unenlightened judgment about pictures may not be aesthetically adequate, but it is perfectly easy to understand; and the disposition of the public to judge the truth of a portrait in terms of literal reproduction applies just as well to the separate parts as to the parts in their organic relation to the whole. It asserts, that is, that these correspond not merely or primarily in the sense that they add their contribution to the significance of an artistic whole, but in their own qualitative characters as well. And for this sort of correspondence it is not even necessary that things belong to wholes at all. Correspondence, then, means simply similarity of character. A portrait corresponds to the original when it *looks like* the original, the nose corresponds when it *looks like* the real nose; and it would still have a resemblance even if it were taken out of the picture and stood by itself. Even a single spot of colour 'corresponds' to another spot when they make the same impression on the sense organs. Naturally if we select examples where the similarity is in terms of relationship to a whole, and not of intrinsic qualitative character, we may succeed in obscuring this sort of judgment. "A simple point," Mr. Joachim writes, "on the surface of a mirror, *qua* simple point, can suggest nothing other than itself. . . . As a point on the surface, *i.e.*, as one in a scheme of related points, it may under certain conditions 'suggest,' 'resemble,' 'correspond to,' a different point in another system of related points whose structural scheme is the same as that of the scheme in the mirror."¹ Now a point, I suppose, is definable only through its relationships to other points; and so here it is true that we cannot have correspondence except as wholes are involved. But colour *has* a meaning by itself. And if we were to say that a patch of colour can suggest, *resemble*, or correspond to another patch only as they both enter into a similar scheme of related colours, we should at least be pronouncing no self-evident judgment, but one that would need to be defended against a pretty general belief to the contrary. A colour may be incapable of *existing* except as it is the colour *of* something; but in order to say that it resembles another colour we not only can, but do, ignore its connexions, with their concomitant properties, and compare just the 'simple' colours by themselves.

And the point is emphasised, I should say, when we turn again to the correspondence between 'wholes' of Mr. Joachim's illustrations. Why is a resemblance judged to exist between a portrait and its original?—because the two possess something in common, or because of the *specific nature* of this something? I should answer without hesitation that the former is the case. If we are allowed to say that resemblance consists in the possession of *any* common character, we not only can explain the instance in hand—where the identity is that of plan or purpose,—but also the innumerable other cases of resemblance, since the basis of similarity

¹ P. 11.

can be anything you please. But if, with Mr. Joachim, it is not abstract identity, but only the concrete case of *teleological* identity, which constitutes resemblance, a great mass of common judgments are left unaccounted for, except through a highly forced and artificial exegesis.

How does it happen, then, that Mr. Joachim ignores so obvious a meaning of correspondence as the 'presence of identical characters'. The reason seems to me this, that he insists on approaching the problem on the basis of his own philosophical presuppositions, although the theory which he is criticising starts out by repudiating these; and by thus ignoring the primary matter in dispute, he naturally fails to make sense of the opposing doctrine. And this in particular affects his conception of the part that the 'mind' is supposed to play in the theory, and so causes his discussion of the point of chief significance—the relationship of correspondence to *knowledge*—to be not only extraordinarily vague, but almost totally irrelevant.

I may start first with Mr. Joachim's more explicit argument against the notion of resemblance as I am using it. The argument is, that a simple entity cannot *as such*, and considered *as such*, be related to anything. So far as A and B are related, they are *eo ipso* interdependent features of something other than either of them singly; and on the other hand, if A and B really are each absolutely simple and independent, it is nonsense to say that they also are really related.¹ Now of course, if, when we talk of the resemblance of simple elements, we mean that a simple element is one that has no relationships, it would naturally follow that they cannot be related even by way of correspondence. It is a self-evident proposition that things cannot have relations and be without them at the same time. But I am not aware that anyone wants to maintain simplicity in this sense. Doubtless there is a question of logic here that deserves the attention of the philosopher; but for the present purpose we can afford to stop somewhat short of fundamental theory. I am quite ready to admit both that any element must, in the real world, be part of a larger context, and that it cannot become a part of our *thought* world without getting entangled in a network of relations to other content. But I cannot see that this settles the immediate issue, which is, simply, whether, in order to give meaning to the notion of resemblance as a particular notion, you have to take account of a totality of conditions, interpreted as a teleological whole. Of course I cannot pronounce the judgment that A resembles B without getting a 'knowledge system'—'A's resemblance to B'. But this is not enough for Mr. Joachim; what he wants is some sort of 'concrete universal' to which A and B alike must be recognised as belonging *before* they can be judged to be similar. And I do not find, empirically, a need for anything of the sort. I do not mean that we do not, in our developed life at least, always in the act of comparing bring to bear a mental back-

¹ Pp. 11-12.

ground. But because I use my knowledge of Latin to translate a line of Vergil, it does not follow that the meaning of the sentence is a compendium of Latin grammar. It may be said indeed that the 'apperceptive mass' works not only to provide the conditions for the discovery of meaning, but also to interpret the significance of the thing discovered; and that in this last way it is vitally implicated in the nature of correspondence itself. But the 'significance' of correspondence is quite different from, and already presupposes, the fact and nature of correspondence; whereas the significance of the 'facts which correspond,' which is a part of the mental background, serves again as a condition for recognising correspondence, and does not constitute its nature as such. Also it is true that both A and B are parts of a real universe, and that I do not know the whole truth about either till I know the universe to which they belong; but this too is beside the point. I am not trying to know *all about* A and B, but only to give an intelligible sense to the statement that A and B are in certain assignable respects similar; and if I could not tell what this meant till I knew everything, I should naturally be unable to say at all. The question is not, What is the complete nature of reality? but, What do I intend when I use the particular word 'resemblance'?

And this last remark suggests one source of Mr. Joachim's difficulty with the notion of correspondence; it is due to the conception of truth which he always presupposes. The point comes very plainly to the surface in his judgment that, whatever the relative significance it may turn out to have, correspondence is at any rate a subordinate factor in the genuine definition of truth as 'coherence'.¹ Thus the truth of a portrait, we are told, is only very inadequately attained by the mere faithful copyist; what genuinely constitutes its truth is in terms of fulness of meaning, or inner significance and suggestiveness. Now it seems to me very evident that we are in danger here of falling into a fatal confusion of terms. Mr. Joachim clearly wants truth to be identified with *reality*. The truth of the portrait is the 'true' character of the person portrayed; and so the question, What is truth? comes to this: What is the most adequate possible account of the reality concerned?—in the end, that is, of the universe. But this is a problem quite other than the one which furnishes a starting-point for the 'correspondence theory'. When the advocate of this asks, What is truth? he means, not, What is the concrete nature of that which is 'true,' or real? but, What do we mean by its *being true*? And he answers, as indeed Mr. Joachim at a later point concedes that he has a right to answer, that 'being true' is not being real, or actual, or existent, but, in the human sense, it means the passing of a judgment, or the reference of an idea, that is adequate to the reality intended. But now it becomes possible again to distinguish two questions: Does my present judgment cover *all* the truth about the reality? (which no single judgment, of course,

¹ P. 16.

pretends to do or can do), and, Does the limited portion of character or content in which alone the judgment is interested actually belong to the real world to which it is assigned? And this last is the specific problem which gives rise to the emphasis on 'correspondence'; and in the light of this problem it is correspondence, not coherence, that is fundamental. So in the portrait illustration, and even where full artistic 'truth' is concerned, the relevant question is not, What is the true character of the sitter? but, Does the portrait really 'represent' his inner character—assuming this to be already known or discoverable—and not stop with mere externalities? The finer shades of character, however, are still things that take physical form in the person portrayed, to be represented in determinate ways on the canvas. Now I do not say that Mr. Joachim's conception of 'truth' may not be infinitely higher and more noble than the other. I only say that if you set out to understand another man, you have got to take words as he means them, in the context which he has in mind; and you ought not to be surprised if, having substituted for this another set of concepts which leave out or deny what for him is the thing in which he happens to be interested, you fail then to make sense of his claims. And in particular, to return to my starting-point, it now appears why, when we define truth as the system of reality itself, we are unable to understand 'the truth of correspondence' except in terms of system.

There is one variant on the last-mentioned interpretation of Mr. Joachim's meaning which should perhaps be noted. It is, namely, this, that two things cannot be called similar unless along with the element of identical character there is also something to distinguish them, and so that the point of similarity has always to be abstracted from a concreter whole. But to this the reply has already been indicated. If the point were that a simple element cannot *exist* as such, apart from a context, we should have a pertinent objection. But we are asking, instead, what aspect of reality it is that gives meaning to 'resemblance'; and then the relevant thing is not the context—though a context needs to be presupposed—but the identity of character itself as it holds of two cases of existent fact which for *this* reason, and not because of the attendant differences, are noted as similar. That the recognition of similarity always involves a process of abstraction, is no hindrance to the fact that it is on the particular elements abstracted, not the wholes *from* which they are abstracted, that similarity is based. And in any case there is nothing here to make it in the least necessary that the context should, in addition, possess also an identity of *teleological* structure.

So far we have, following Mr. Joachim, talked about correspondence without any reference at all to 'knowledge'. Correspondence as such is simply a particular sort of relationship in a world of relationships, no more to be identified with truth than are relationships of quantity or causality. The existence of a resem-

blance between a portrait and the original does not make 'truth' in the epistemological sense; the truth is *that* the two resemble. This, as Mr. Joachim recognises, somehow brings the 'mind' into the situation. And here, it is to be noticed, we have a further and sounder reason why correspondence, as a 'theory of truth,' cannot be reduced to mere similarity between simple entities, or, for that matter, between two 'systems'. The bare existence of similar facts, even though one of these be an idea or a mind, is not sufficient to constitute truth. It is not enough that somewhere in the universe there should happen to be an object resembling my idea; it must be the particular object that I mean. Accordingly correspondence, as a knowledge term, needs to convey, over and above the notion of resemblance, some account of the 'mental' factor; Mr. Joachim is justified in demanding this. And it is not enough to put this account in terms of a resemblance between two elements that are present to a contemplative consciousness as a third factor.¹ The only sense of truth that the correspondence theory recognises is the truth of an idea present to the mind of the person judging. The 'truth' of the portrait does not become an epistemological fact simply through adding to the situation the mind of a critic or observer; truth here means only 'completeness' or 'adequacy' of correspondence. The 'epistemological' truth is, again, *that* the critic's judgment is true of the total fact 'portrait in relation to original'; and so an internal function of mind is necessarily involved.

And this difference both in the problem, and in the sense attached to the terms used in common, render it unnecessary to follow Mr. Joachim's discussion in detail, since the particular interpretations to which he enters objections are ones that no present-day form of the correspondence theory that I am acquainted with would think for a moment of adopting. I shall content myself, therefore, with pointing out the main presupposition which, because it is his own, he wrongly assumes that his opponents also must intend to hold to; and then, without stopping further to justify it, state more exactly what it is that the theory of correspondence *does* imply.

And the original source of Mr. Joachim's difficulty is this, that he calmly sets aside the fundamental notion of a reality *beyond* experience to which the mental factor corresponds, and tries to restate the hypothesis in terms of a correspondence of factors *within* experience. Now I grant again that a distinction between experience, and extra-experiential existences, and the definition of knowledge in terms of a transitive or mediate way of getting at the latter, may prove untenable; but the *conception* is certainly, as a conception, not so totally devoid of sense that an opponent cannot even get it in mind sufficiently to criticise it. But what then are we to say of an attempt to show its intrinsic unreasonableness by first replacing it with the very thing it wants chiefly to repudiate—an immanent or experiential situation—and then arguing that for *this* situation correspondence retains no intelligible meaning? But this is what

¹ Cf. pp. 12-13.

Mr. Joachim does. For the relation between ideas which are functions of human experience, and a real object conceived as having an existence, but as never entering bodily into the experience that knows it, he substitutes a 'whole of experience at the level of feeling,' and a 'whole of experience at the level of reflective thought'.¹ I quite agree that an attempt to state correspondence in this way is hopelessly obscure and doomed to failure; but just why should it be considered fatal to a theory for which the identification of the 'real' or 'objective' world with 'vague unmediated feeling' is absolutely the last thing that it would consent to consider?

What then is the part that the mind plays in correspondence? Let me state again briefly what I conceive the theory to maintain. First, it presupposes that real things exist, having certain definite characteristics, or a determinate nature. Second, it supposes that this nature or essence of the object can be *thought*; that more or less adequate ideas of what it is like can also form a part of our mental furniture. This is the first way in which the 'mind' enters in—as a fugitive 'ideal' content professing to grasp descriptively the objective characteristics of a real world. Between the two sets of facts—objects and ideas—there is, so far as we know empirically, no experienced connexion; it is the very point of the theory that they do not exist together for a mind—in a unity of experience, that is, constituting a concrete conscious whole. For, thirdly, the part which the mind plays, in a further and more ultimate sense, is, not to know itself, or its ideas even, along with the object in a single whole of experience into which both enter bodily; it is to *refer* its ideas—the characteristics, that is, that constitute the ideal or thought content—to the object, in a unique relationship which one does not understand by substituting for it another relationship of compresence, but only by looking at the specific act of knowing, and recognising it for what it claims to be. Correspondence, accordingly, is not a relation which we are conscious of when we 'know the object'; we are not thinking then about our ideas *as* similar, or indeed *about* our ideas at all, but only about the object as having a certain ideal character. But later on we may note that our ideas actually were involved at the time; and then first, by making a comparison in a new act of knowledge which now has as its object the thing *plus* the former idea of it, we discover between the two the same relationship of correspondence that we may equally get in other cases that do not involve ideas at all. Here indeed at last the *ideas* of the two—of object and thought of object—are present in a unity of consciousness, or otherwise we could not compare them. But the 'mind' which now makes the comparison, with its act of reference, and the actual things which are compared *in idea* (not in their actual existence, which is still extra-experiential), are no more elements in a single experience than before. I shall make no further effort here to defend this analysis. I only claim that it is perfectly intelligible in itself, and that it avoids all the ambiguities of Mr. Joachim's account.

¹ P. 26.

THE STATE AND THE INDIVIDUAL.

MR. BROAD writes in the July MIND, p. 370, (1) that my contention that the will of any particular citizen is abstract and fragmentary compared with the will of his state, is simply unintelligible to him; (2) that it seems to him inconsistent with my other view, which he approves, that it is absurd to judge a state by the same moral criterion as a private citizen, since it has different tasks and acts in a different medium; and (3) he makes an assertion about the means by which all actual states are worked, *viz.*, "by inertia, fear, and various tribal illusions on the part of the governed, and ambition, interest, and occasionally a genuine desire for the general welfare on the part of the governing classes".

May I try to explain?

1. The starting-point of my view on this point, which I derived mainly from Plato's *Republic*, is the insight that in a social community all the private minds, especially those which serve as organs for public functions, supplement each other, the same needs and capacities being present in each, but developed in very various proportions. Thus a man who is not an artist feels up to a certain point with the artists, and if he wants to do or know or enjoy anything in the way of art, he goes to the artists to teach him how to will it. You cannot will a thing in which you are ignorant and untrained. So about health, education, and all public interests. Minds borrow from one another what they lack in order to be able to will effectively. They borrow both knowledge and spirit. Most of us at home to-day are doing our work, however trivial, better and more resolutely, by catching something of the spirit of our army abroad.

It is difficult, just for this reason, to say what is a man's private will. But most theorists would agree that he is already willing when he begins to "take steps" to carry out some wish or plan. Now in everything but his own special vocation, the moment he begins to "take steps"—in order to buy a coat, to educate his son, to spray his potatoes—he appeals to some trade or profession or public organ to teach him how to will completely what he has begun to will in the abstract. (I have grown some Dutch beans to use for food; I did not know exactly how to use them, and appealed to the Royal Horticultural Society; and this morning I have their leaflets. Now my volition is complete and concrete.) Every mind and will is in this way, I urge, supplemented, reinforced, and controlled by the co-operation of minds and wills which

is the community. If one is a rebel, it makes no difference. The rebel draws his matter and suggestion from the co-operating minds.

2. Now, what is the will of the state? You can distinguish it in principle from the will of private persons, and of the social community, though of course it cannot exist apart from them. It consists of these wills in a certain aspect and attitude, that in which they co-operate by certain formal processes in dealing with public or general interests.

The difference lies, surely, then, in its object and method; and with these, though the will is still the will of persons, its attitude and the conditions of its rightness, are profoundly modified. We are now not simply living our own lives with the help, however essential, of others. We are prescribing the conditions under which multitudes are to live, so that we may *all* shape our own lives for the best. In both cases the best life is the end; but when your object is not merely to live your own life, but to lay down general conditions under which others are to live theirs, you must act very differently. Every one knows this, who has to make general arrangements to facilitate classes of actions. A simple case is that you must not enforce your own religion; you must give all their chance, though you may think that some are sending their votaries to hell. To follow out your private conscience here is the Inquisition straight away, or perhaps civil war. We have experience of this problem in India.

Well, then, the conditions of right willing are much modified when private wills become the will of the state. But the relation asserted in (1) remains. I am resolved that justice shall be done to women about their votes, and to France about Alsace. But I cannot will either concretely, because I am not master of the details. I could not draft either the bill or the treaty. I must learn my own will, in the concrete, from those whose business it is to master these matters. But will they teach me right? Of course I may be taken in. The main principle, however, is one with what I said at starting. I can learn, from contact and experience, that I may, or may not, safely take minds of a certain type as trustworthy for me, and if persons of a certain sort say the bill or the peace is just, I shall be satisfied. 'But I ought to inform myself'? Yes, up to a point, for obviously I cannot know and judge of everything. But informing myself is only possible on this same principle. I must know what minds I can trust as reliable in fact and in criticism, and this can only come from experience of co-operation with them.

3. I am speaking sincerely and not ironically when I say that I feel it a very serious difficulty in arguing these semi-philosophical questions, that one does not know what experience the other side has at command. If I believed that Mr. Broad had before him the same experience and information which I have, I should either not attempt to argue at all, or should argue quite differently, by weighing and analysing points in our common information. And

obviously, the language I am using may be retorted from the other side. The only thing to do, as matters stand, seems to me to be to compare our information. But the pages of *MIND* are perhaps hardly the right place for discussion of that kind. I will ask permission, however, to conclude with a somewhat prolonged quotation, illustrative of the type of experience in harmony with which my attitude is formed. I preface it with two observations. First, I accept it as a typical study of the relation between the private and the public will, and of the forces by which "an actual state" is mainly worked. Secondly, in quantity, it is the merest drop in the ocean. Anyone familiar with public affairs, whether local or national, may study and encounter similar experiences on all sides of life from morning till night his whole life long. The quotation is as follows (Carter, *Control of the Drink Trade*, Longmans, 1918, p. 225 ff.): "The extent to which detailed and intimate control can be carried, under the direct administration of the State, acting in conjunction with a local committee, is one of the clearest advantages [of State Purchase and Direct Control, as at Gretna Green and Carlisle]. The numerous examples given above of control measures—applying either generally throughout the district, or to a few houses to meet special local conditions—demonstrate the value of calling in the aid and service of representative citizens.

"From the mere fact that the State assumes direct responsibility for the control of the traffic, it follows automatically that criticism becomes far keener, and that a much higher standard is demanded. The representatives of local authorities find themselves able to secure reforms which they may have long desired, but were powerless to effect. The whole locality becomes actively interested in the problem of eradicating the drunkenness within its borders; and this interest is in itself a long step towards the removal of the reproach." Such a description of fact as this seems to me absolutely incompatible with Mr. Broad's statement quoted above.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

In the July *MIND*, p. 270, footnote, Canon Rashdall challenges me "to indicate where Green has recognised that the Absolute is Will". His statement in the text is "Green reduces God to a purely knowing consciousness. He thinks of God in terms of Mind but never of Will." In the footnote he changes the term God to the Absolute. I do not think Green habitually employs this term; but a passage referring to God seems to meet Canon Rashdall's challenge. I cite *Prolegomena*, section 302, end: "He (man) must think of the infinite spirit as better than the best he can himself attain to, but (just for that reason), as having an essential community with his own best. And, as his own best rests upon a self-devoted will, so it must be as a will, good not under the limitation of opposing tendencies but in some more excellent though not by us positively conceivable way, that he will set before himself

the infinite spirit." The passage is quoted at length in Nettleship's biography, p. 220, and followed by very just observations on the reason of Green's reserve in the *Prolegomena* as contrasted with the confidence of the religious addresses which express the doctrine that God is love on nearly every page. One is tempted to think that Canon Rashdall can hardly be acquainted with these latter, the little volume of which is to some of us among our most precious possessions. Of course, if he is asking for Schopenhauer's doctrine, he will not find it in Green. But its absence is very far from justifying such language as that about "a purely knowing consciousness".

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

THE TEST OF EXPERIENCE.

It is seldom that the opportunity comes to a philosopher to test the theories that he has been in the habit of teaching in any crucial or decisive fashion. Yet in this present cataclysm of war many philosophers must have had just this opportunity with regard to the virtue of courage. How have their theories stood the test? Have they, like the writer, found occasion to modify or withdraw the confident assertions of the lecture-room? To the writer it seems clearly proved by his experience in action that Aristotle's account of courage is very much nearer the truth than it was generally thought to be by himself and others, discussing it with their pupils and among themselves at Oxford in the days before the war.

Courage to Aristotle is a moral virtue, *i.e.*, an acquired strength of character, attained by the exercise of a twofold control in which also it manifests itself. The control is twofold because it is partly internal, over self, and partly external, over things; and the self which is controlled is of course the emotional self. These emotions, it is implied, are not in themselves either good or bad. They are the material of virtue as of vice, and are thus required in their due measure as constituents of the virtuous act. Above or below the due measure they go to make the act and character which exhibit them bad. Courage is thus a mastery of dangerous situations made possible by a mastery of the emotions which in the normal man dangerous situations arouse.

Now the emotions aroused by danger are, according to Aristotle, two: fear and an opposite which we take leave to call 'cheer'. Danger, so far as nothing can be done to avert or mitigate it, excites pure fear; but so far as there is promise of personal effort availing something, cheer rises to meet it. Where effort plainly avails nothing, as with men left to drown in the open sea, it is something different from courage that is demanded, since there is no glimmer of ground for cheer. Experience of any particular type of danger teaches men that there are many ways of escape to the resourceful. Hence, for example, a bad storm at sea, which overwhelms a landsman with pure fear, may be the occasion to the sailor of nothing more than ordinary courage. Cheer, as well as fear, may be allowed to exceed its measure, with bad results on conduct and character. For foolhardiness is a vice as truly as cowardice, though men are less prone to it, and its cause and manifestation is excessive indulgence in the emotion of cheer.

Such, stated briefly, and with some of the niceties of exposition slightly blurred, is Aristotle's account of the virtue of courage. The feature to which exception was generally taken was this odd emotion, opposed to fear, which we have called 'cheer'. It was commonly asserted that no such emotion exists, and suggested that Aristotle invented it for the sake of symmetry. But it was a curious symmetry; for a pair of opposed emotions is not a general feature of the Aristotelian analysis of the virtues of character.

Having myself been guilty in the past of just such criticisms, I think it both honest and useful publicly to avow that experience of active service leads me to the firm conviction that they are thoroughly erroneous. The emotion of cheer—I will take a better name if some one will give me one—is a real thing, not an invention of the Schools; an important fact of human nature, without which the behaviour of our citizen armies in the highly dangerous situations which prevail at this time in Flanders and elsewhere would be very much less admirable than it is. Like any other emotion it is seen most clearly in the young. In my Company I had a youth of 19 or 20, a Lance-Corporal in charge of a Lewis gun. He was a very quiet boy, always particularly smart in his turn-out and very correct in his behaviour, silent and sober and in a general way anything rather than a dare-devil. For a long time, living as we did in a quiet part of the line, we never found him out. Suddenly things became hotter, and he was transformed. As soon as the enemy put down a heavy barrage on our trench he was a different man. He bubbled with energy and impudence. Keeping up a sustained flow of vigorous language he stood on the fire-step, head and shoulders above the parapet, popping away with his gun, having to all appearance the 'time of his life'. I saw him in action many times after that before he was killed, and he was always the same. Whether in attack or defence, danger invigorated and transfigured him. It was not fear he had to conquer and control, but the exhilaration produced by the sight of such splendid opportunities for the use of his darling weapon.

This is only one instance; and it is difficult to describe it on paper so that it will carry the same conviction to others as to myself. Of course I could quote other instances, but none so clear. I have even myself, in a measure, felt the same invigoration, especially when advancing or attacking. Nearly every one I have met who has been in an even moderately successful attack has told me that he felt a great excitement, and even a kind of enjoyment, which happily blinded him to the suffering and destruction surrounding him. We attacked once, short of food and after a sleepless night, at 7.30 a.m. on a November morning. Things went well; and in the middle another officer shouted to me, 'Who says the men want breakfast when there is fun like this about?' In all these cases, I think, we may trace the operation of that powerful and most blessed emotion, rising to oppose fear in the face of danger, cheer.

Let us therefore make amends to Aristotle for a wrong done, and

admit, however tardily, the justice of his analysis. Of these two, fear and cheer, duly measured and mastered by will, courage is made, a strength of character fortunately not rare in British soldiers, in whom the natural force of cheer is strong. Probably, at first or second hand, Aristotle had more experience of war than we have had, till lately, in our day.

Here is a Postscript. I have met in England quite a number of good people who appear to think that the normal man enjoys service at the front, just as I have met others in whose eyes the life is one of unrelieved hardship and misery. Those who fall into the latter error may be to some extent encouraged by the analysis attempted above. The former I would recommend, following Aristotle's hint, to work the matter out for themselves. Let them remember that a man takes with him into the presence of the enemy his individual stock of fearfulness and cheerfulness, with whatever force of will he can command. Let them calculate what proportion of his time he spends in serious danger, and in what proportion of that danger all a man's skill and strength can avail him anything at all. They will then be in a position to reckon the chances of cheer overbalancing fear, and the strain upon the soldier's strength of will. Against rifle bullets a man may feel that strength and skill avail something; but against shells it is only too plain that they avail nothing at all. That is what makes modern warfare so exacting in its demands upon human nature.

J. L. STOCKS.

VI.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

Traité de Logique. Par E. GOBLOT, Correspondant de l'Institut. Professeur d'histoire de la Philosophie et des Sciences à l'Université de Lyon. Préface de M. Boutroux. Paris: Armand Colin, 1918. Pp. xxiii, 412. Price 8 fr. + 20 per cent.

THE central problem of this book inevitably recalls Kant's problem of the possibility of *a priori* synthetic judgments in Mathematics. But Kant, M. Goblot remarks, did not question the value of the traditional Logic as the main instrument of reasoning. He assumed that the essence of reasoning is to bring out what is implicitly contained in the premisses on which the reasoning is based; and was in consequence content to show that among the premisses of Mathematics there were *a priori* synthetic propositions. It is not our purpose here to ask whether this is a correct interpretation of Kant. M. Goblot uses it merely as an illustration. It is enough to note that M. Goblot is not satisfied with Kant's answer as he understands it. M. Goblot insists that even if a science contains synthetic propositions among its premisses, the fundamental problem still remains, *viz.*, how is it possible, on the traditional theories of reasoning, for a pure science to contain anything but its premisses? That the conclusion of a proof in pure science does arrive at a new result, is, he insists, clear; that the new result necessarily follows from the premisses, is equally clear: how then is the newness compatible with the necessity?

M. Goblot's solution of this problem is, says M. Boutroux, "une doctrine lucide, cohérente, complète, qui marquera un moment dans le progrès de la logique"; and it is worked out in detail, in its bearings on all the problems of Logic.

The solution is in essence this, that both the newness and the necessity spring from the intellect. To the objection that, if intellect adds anything to the premisses, then the conclusion cannot be true, M. Goblot replies by relating truth, not to objects existing independently of the intellect, but to intellect itself. "Les raisons ne sont autre chose que des idées capables de convaincre, c'est-à-dire de contraindre à admettre d'autres idées, et cette force de la preuve ne se conçoit pas en dehors d'un esprit en qui elle réside et sur qui elle agit, puisque la preuve, l'assertion prouvée et la détermination de l'assertion prouvée par la preuve sont des opérations de l'intelligence" (p. 20). Since propositions or judg-

ments have no being apart from the act of judging, hence all the properties which judgments may have must be connected with the act of judging. Inferential connexions are, on this view, essentially connexions for intellect. At the same time they are not extrinsic to the propositions themselves. They are not, however, completely intrinsic, in the sense that the conclusion implied by a set of premisses is contained in the premisses. Precisely in what sense inferential connexions between propositions are intrinsic to the propositions themselves and in what sense they are not—in what sense a conclusion is something new—is brought out by M. Goblot's account of the nature of reasoning.

The author sums up his view in four propositions, of which we shall deal only with the first three. "(1) que le raisonnement déductif doit sa fécondité à des opérations constructives; (2) qu'il doit sa nécessité à ce que toutes ces opérations sont exécutées en vertu de règles; (3) que ces règles ne sont pas les règles de la logique, mais les propositions antérieurement admises; (4) que le rôle de syllogisme se borne à l'application de ces règles au cas considéré" (xxi.). Elsewhere, he sums up his account in the statement that deductive reasoning is a construction of the conclusion by means of the premisses ("opération logique") followed by a "constatation logique" of the constructed result. This account finds its best examples in Geometry and Algebra. In intuitive Euclidean Geometry, constructions are a preliminary to almost every proof. For M. Goblot they are more: they are constitutive and essential elements in the proof itself. He instances the proposition that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles; where the proof, he says, consists essentially in constructing the sum of the angles, and then in seeing, by a "constatation logique," that this sum is two right angles. So in Algebra, the material of the science is algebraic forms. Proof consists in constructing new forms, starting with given forms. "La démonstration consiste à *construire* la nouvelle forme en partant de la première. . . . L'opération constructive fait apparaître un résultat nouveau" (268-269).

Constructive operations are operations carried out mentally. The operations whose mental performance makes them logical are essentially "external actions, *e.g.*, movements". As examples are cited the groupings of small stones in primitive arithmetic, operations of natural agents, such as the raising of a column of mercury by pressure of a gas, operations of intelligent agents, as when the motives of a crime are being understood, and reasonings, *e.g.*, in the case of the interpretation of a philosopher's views. Mental operations are thus "toujours des représentations d'actions *objectives*, exécutables soit dans le monde réel, soit dans un monde abstraite-ment simplifié, ou même tout à fait fictif, mais toujours distinctes des opérations de l'esprit qui se les représente" (273-274).

The result of the construction is new, M. Goblot insists. It is necessary because it has been constructed according to rules. These rules are (a) "les définitions générales et les hypothèses spéciales

qui déterminent la question, c'est-à-dire les conventions que l'esprit a faites avec lui-même, et par lesquelles il s'est lié," and (b) propositions already established, which are primarily indicative, but are transformable into imperatives or rules for the purpose of gaining new results (264).

A word must be said as to what M. Goblot calls "constatation logique". It seems to have two meanings, a narrower and a wider. On page 165 it is introduced by the example of addition in arithmetic, where the various columns are added separately. After the addition, I do not yet know the sum. "Je ne puis la connaître qu'en constatant le résultat par une lecture" (165). Constatation is here distinguished from the perception of necessity. "Certes je ne constate pas, je *juge* que ce résultat est nécessaire, parce que je suis persuadé que j'ai opéré correctement. Mais ce résultat que je sais être nécessaire, je ne le connais que par constatation." This is its narrow meaning. But its wider meaning is given on the same page. "Constatation logique" is essential to reasoning, because without it, thought would be completely discontinuous. Thought might operate, but would not know its own operations; for "agir et connaître sont deux". "Constatation logique" is, in short, identical with reflexion. "L'esprit observe ses propres opérations." It is difficult to see how this can exclude the perception of the necessity of the transition from premisses to constructed result. And indeed it is the wider of the two meanings which M. Goblot uses in his account of reasoning, where he has only two factors, an operation and the constatation of the result obtained (263 ff.).

We have insisted on the two meanings of the word "constatation logique" because they seem to have misled M. Goblot in his account of the construction involved in reasoning. On the narrower meaning, "constater par une lecture," the essence of reasoning must fall elsewhere. Simply to note your result is not to reason. But the important question is, whether the essence of reasoning does not fall within "constatation logique" in its wider sense. An operation, M. Goblot says, is a representation of an objective action, made logical by being performed mentally. But the same objection applies here as to Bradley's account of reasoning as an ideal experiment. It is not the fact that the operation is performed in the mind that makes it logical; but that it is performed with a consciousness of the logical relations involved. It is in this consciousness of the logical necessity involved in the construction that the essence of reasoning lies, rather than in the mere operation itself.

M. Goblot bases his account on the actual nature of reasoning as it is performed, in a series of successive steps. And he considers exclusively the fact that when the final operation is performed, the result arrived at is simply noted. But there is more than this. The result is foreseen. What does this involve? On his own showing, propositions are fundamentally indicative. Science is positive. But as used in construction they are imperatives. Now the important point—and it is insisted on by M. Goblot himself—

is, that their use as imperatives rests on their nature as indicative. You know that the diameter of a circle bisects the circle. Hence if you want to bisect a circle, you can do it by drawing a diameter. The result, however, is necessary, not because of your construction but because of the fact. But the same holds of the operations themselves. M. Goblot sees only two kinds of operations: objective operations, of which we have given examples above, and the mental performance of these operations. But there is a third kind, *viz.*, operations which form part of the subject-matter of some science. Addition is fundamentally neither a physical operation, nor an operation performed mentally, but a numerical operation. The possibility of adding two numbers mentally rests on the fact that numbers are themselves capable of being added. "To get c , add a and b ," rests on the proposition that $a + b = c$. So with inference. The bringing together of premisses so as to "construct" therefrom a new result rests on the fact that the premisses themselves imply the result. And the judgment that the conclusion is necessary, which M. Goblot refers to the perception that the mental operation was performed according to a rule, is really dependent on insight into the logical relations of implication holding between the propositions themselves.

M. Goblot can only avoid this criticism by being more thorough-going, and treating propositions as fundamentally rules rather than truths. He notes (264) that a generalisation is sterile so long as it is taken simply as a truth, and becomes useful only when taken as a rule directing an operation. But if it is a truth at all, then it has the relations to other propositions which are brought out by operating under its guidance. It is only if propositions are nothing but rules that M. Goblot's account of reasoning holds.

Certain implications of M. Goblot's view may be noted. Accepting as he does the view that reasoning is necessarily hypothetical, and that there is a definite order of priority and posteriority in propositions, he is compelled to conclude that there are indemonstrable propositions, which, however, cannot be true, just because they are indemonstrable. The principle of non-contradiction is one of these, and it is placed by M. Goblot on exactly the same level as the postulates of Euclidean Geometry. It is accepted, because otherwise thought cannot get to work. But that is no reason for holding it true. It is convenient (327-328).

So far we have been dealing with truths of reason, which are all hypothetical. Inductive reasoning is treated in exactly the same way. It consists in starting with observed facts and chosen hypotheses, and then by means of them constructing other facts, which are then verified by observation. Proof would only be complete if all conceivable alternative hypotheses were cut out. The question of fundamental interest, then, is that of the justification for truths of fact. And here M. Goblot's treatment appears to be open to grave difficulties. On the one hand he argues that genuine truths of fact cannot receive justification from other propositions;

otherwise they become truths of reason, and are hypothetical. They must then constrain the intellect in some other way. "Pour que le jugement empirique soit logiquement valable, il faut que les causes qui le déterminent soient purement intellectuelles. . . . Or, si cette cause déterminante purement intellectuelle ne doit pas être cherchée dans un autre jugement, car alors on aurait un jugement de raisonnement, si d'autre part il n'y a pas d'autre faits intellectuelles que les jugements, il faut qu'elle se trouve dans le jugement empirique lui-même. *Un jugement d'expérience est logiquement valable quand il est entièrement et exclusivement déterminé par la représentation qui en fait la matière*" (46). In short, there must be knowledge by acquaintance. But on the other hand, M. Goblot's view of the social source of truth makes it difficult to see how there can be such knowledge. Man living in society is driven to desire to make judgments which all men will accept; and rationalism is the view that by cutting off all non-intellectual determinants of belief, this object will be attained. This is the fundamental meaning of truth—a belief that all men must accept. But if so, a proposition is true only so far as it is communicable. M. Goblot regards this as involving that sensible qualities cannot be the subject matter of objectively true empirical judgments. "This book is red" he interprets in subjective fashion as meaning that I have the sensation of red; and it is clear that no one else can know whether his sensation is the same as mine. The only empirical judgments he allows as objectively true are judgments of relation, and of these, only the more elementary, *viz.*, judgments of difference, identity, and of quantitative comparison. And he interprets these judgments in subjective manner, as not referring to qualities of objects, but to capacities in me. "This is different from that" means, "I can distinguish between them". If my judgment is to be true, all must have the same experience. But is not this judgment in the same case as the judgment "This is red"? If judgments regarding sensible qualities are subjective for the reason given, then all judgments of comparison are subjective for precisely the same reason; for, if subjective experiences are in question, it is impossible for anyone else to know that the experience which I describe as "finding a difference" or "finding no difference" is the same as the experience he describes in this way. There can be no knowledge by acquaintance, on this view. But for M. Goblot equally, as we have seen, there can be no knowledge of matter of fact unless there is knowledge by acquaintance.

We have necessarily omitted much of the greatest interest in this work: the conception of Logic as the positive science of the pure intellect; the use of virtual judgments in relation to concepts, especially in relation to connotation and denotation; the treatment of finality; and, what is perhaps the best feature of the book, the excellent analyses of the concrete processes of scientific thinking. In all, we should have much to criticise; but more important than any criticism is the fact that M. Goblot makes the critic's path smooth by his careful and lucid treatment of his problems.

We have found most difficulty in M. Goblot's endeavour to show how the results of reasoning apply in the interpretation of given fact. His two main arguments seem to be, first, that the operations in pure reasoning are always the mental performance of some possible objective operation, and secondly, that although the ultimate principles of pure reasoning are merely postulates, yet since these postulates are necessary if we are to think at all, hence no experiences could be given which contradict these postulates. We have no space for a discussion of these points; we merely note that the first seems to imply that we know how a certain physical operation is performed, and hence understand the real already, and is therefore apparently a "hysteron proteron"; and the second seems to contradict M. Goblot's own proof that the indemonstrable propositions are merely postulates.

The book is a valuable and suggestive treatment of the various problems of Logic from an independent standpoint, by one who has had a thoroughly competent scientific training. Written and printed in 1914, its publication was delayed by the outbreak of the war. In the preface M. Boutroux, in a way possible only for a Frenchman and with a charm attainable only by such a master of language as M. Boutroux himself, outlines M. Goblot's problem and discusses with great insight certain possible developments of M. Goblot's views.

LEONARD J. RUSSELL.

Footnotes to Formal Logic. By CHARLES H. RIEBER. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1918. Pp. 177.

THERE are points of interest in this book for all logicians whether formal or not. Its position is somewhere between the traditional logic and the most recent developments. Mr. Rieber has turned the light of his own thinking not only upon the older logic but also upon the anti-Mill movement which began, in England, towards the end of last century, and if he had done the same for the later critical innovations his book would have been still more interesting than it is. Regarded as a defence of the traditional logic against pragmatism it provides no more than a spectacle of good intentions gone astray. A few examples will suffice to show this weak point in Mr. Rieber's results.

One of the recent complaints, for instance, that have been made is that formal logic, through its excessive attention to a certain small group of sentence-forms (the AEIO 'propositions') tends to overlook the difficulty of correctly translating actual statements into these forms. The answer which Mr. Rieber suggests (p. 17) is, first, that there are 'thought-forms' which differ from language-forms, and secondly, that the translation from the latter into the former need not concern the logician because "it is the work of the

grammarians and the philologist". There could hardly be a more complete failure to understand the objection that is made. He is right indeed in saying that pragmatists do not distinguish between thought-forms and language-forms; for if the thought-forms are not to be expressed in language how are they to be expressed? But the essence of our objection is that we do distinguish between the two kinds of language-forms, and we claim (1) that the small selected group is insufficiently representative of thought in general, and (2) that, whether it be so or not, the logician who is content to leave to others the difficulty of translation thereby reduces logic to impotence against the chief sources of error in thought. Certain little slips, no doubt, are possible in drawing formal conclusions from premisses, just as in adding up a row of figures. But such errors are trivial in comparison with the real difficulties encountered in reasoning. We have nothing worse to say against a logic which is content with guarding against these slips in formal deduction than that it is content with very little.

On the next page we find an equally strange misunderstanding. Mr. Rieber claims as "a concession of the greatest importance" our recognition of the fact that the old syllogistic reasoning about class-relations is not entirely without value. His remark that "If there can be found a single instance where the form of thought does not have to wait upon the matter, controversy is at an end and the formal logicians have won the debate" shows that he totally misunderstands the issue that has been raised. If he were right in saying, as he does, that formal logic's only claim is that a single instance can be found in which its method is harmless, then no one would have raised an objection. What we quarrel with is not this modest claim but the extension of it—an extension which Mr. Rieber himself at once proceeds to make. One would have thought that even a formal logician might have hesitated to argue that because a principle may be harmlessly applied over a limited field "there is nothing to prevent" an unlimited application of it. What sort of logic can it be that sees nothing to prevent our forming a universal rule from a single instance which happens not to contradict it? Anyhow, it is precisely the value of this *extension* which is the point at issue.

His defence of the modal adverbs, again (p. 60) seems to be that they express some differences between the kind of evidence relied upon by their users. This no one would deny. The objection raised against them is that we cannot make either a true or a false belief any truer than it is by merely *claiming* that there is no room for error in it; that even the most self-satisfied modal adverbs express no more than the fallible satisfaction of their users.

When we turn to chapter vii., which is called "The Case against the Syllogism," we find that the only two objections which Mr. Rieber seems to have met with are (1) that the Syllogism begs the question, and (2) that it is not universally applicable. Neither of these objections has any weight with critics such as Dr. Schiller,

Prof. Dewey, or myself. We should admit that any syllogism may, but need not, be used for begging a question; and, while holding that many arguments cannot effectively be reduced to the form of a single syllogism, we should maintain that no argument ever existed which did not use throughout its texture the application of rules to cases, and which was not therefore *to that extent* syllogistic. So far, apparently, Mr. Rieber agrees with us. But, taking the syllogistic process as consisting entirely in the application of rules to cases, the special fault we find with it is that in so far as it is kept formal it ignores the difficulty of providing against ambiguity in the middle term. We hold that to ignore this difficulty is to ignore the chief source of error in actual reasoning; that all the most plausible error in thinking occurs through mistakenly connecting a given rule with a particular case; the mistake being conditioned by the need of using general terms as predicates; general terms, as such, being always *liable* to be used ambiguously.¹

In the chapter on "Novelty and Identity in Inference," however, this subject is indirectly touched upon. Mr. Rieber rightly sees that the modern conception of 'essence' is revolutionary from the point of view of formal logic, though he partly fails to understand the nature of the revolution intended. "The new theory," he says (p. 147), "recognises only one law, namely, the law that there shall be no law." A truer account would be that the pragmatist holds that trust in laws is generally useful, but is always liable to be pressed too far. But the pragmatist does not leave this dictum unexplained. He does not—as Mr. Rieber does—envisage the three abstract possibilities, 'All stability and no risk,' 'No stability and all risk,' and 'Some stability and some risk,' and then rest content to choose one of these three as his maxim. Instead of treating the matter in this cut-and-dried way he explains at length what the risk consists in—the liability of any rule to be *misapplied* in consequence of the unavoidable indefiniteness of the general terms without which no rule can be expressed. Like every one else he sees that without some trust in rules no reasoning can ever take place, and that our trust in rules is often justified by events. But he also sees that there is a source of error in reasoning which baffles all attempts to guard against it absolutely beforehand. The inevitable indefiniteness of the general term X becomes *ambiguity* wherever the distinction between AX and BX becomes for a given purpose important; if the ambiguity remains unnoticed, error results, while if it is noticed the reasoning is checked until the ambiguity is removed. Instead therefore of being content with 'no stability and all risk' the pragmatist (if forced to put his meaning in a nutshell) would incline to express it in some such form as 'no perfect stability except by reference to limited

¹ Readers who are not already aware of this criticism will find it more fully expressed in Dr. Schiller's *Formal Logic*, chap. xvi., § 6, or in my books: *Use of Words in Reasoning*, § 13; *Application of Logic*, § 11; *Elementary Logic*, §§ 31, 32.

purposes'. It is in the conception of truth as relative to purpose that the chief revolutionary doctrine of pragmatism consists.

Mr. Rieber fails also to understand our criticism of the Laws of Thought. He is content to repeat (p. 150) the old plea that "every argument against any one of these three Laws always pre-supposes one or all of them". What this plea overlooks is the pragmatist contention that all criticism of a law is criticism of that law *as applied* in some particular manner. Thus we find nothing false in (*e.g.*), the Law of Identity taken apart from all its applications; the objection made is that the 'Law,' so taken, is meaningless. It is a mere phrase, and not a law at all. But taken in any way that does give it a meaning, what the Law (applied) says, is that some particular thing which happens to be called A really deserves that name as predicate. Now Mr. Rieber himself understands (p. 147) that there is no predication without risk. And all that we say about the Laws of Thought is that, in so far as a meaning is given to them, they involve predications and so do not escape this liability. Whenever they are *used* they are liable to be used wrongly. Where, then, is the 'presupposition' that the formal logician talks of? The special thing that the pragmatist does *not* presuppose is that there is any intelligible and respectable Law of Identity as distinct from particular predications. In the generalised form 'everything that is called A really deserves the name,' the Law would not appeal to anybody. But the pragmatist, like other people, is willing to take risks of error in using predicates. The difference is that he is also ready at any time to admit the existence of the risk. It almost looks as if Mr. Rieber here confused risk of error with actual error, and supposed that because an assertor, as such, does not admit that what he calls A is *not* A, therefore he cannot admit that it *may* be wrongly so-called.

Another curious mistake is the statement (p. 23) that "Schiller, Sidgwick, and Mercier have unhesitatingly declared, not only that all truth works, but also that all that works is true". Readers of *MIND* may remember that this point was raised against Dr. Schiller by Miss Stebbing in N.S. No. 83, and that in the next No. Dr. Schiller unhesitatingly declines to endorse her account of his view. As for myself, I find short phrases like "all that works is true" too ambiguous to be recommended. If we take "works" as equivalent to "serves a purpose," then we still have to distinguish between what serves one purpose and what serves another. While it may be safe to say that what does *not* work is thereby proved false, or that what serves a given purpose is *so far* true, it certainly will not do to say that what serves a given purpose, and is therefore so far true, is sure to serve any other purpose that can be suggested.¹

But though Mr. Rieber thus fails to understand the latest logical criticism, he has in fact arrived at some of its conclusions by an independent path, and has made some notable advances beyond

¹ See also *MIND*, No. 89, p. 100.

the traditional logic as usually taught. These are chiefly due to his readiness on occasion to break down the artificial barrier between logic and psychology. He has freed himself entirely from the view that concept, judgment, and inference have any real independence of each other. He understands that all judgment is the answer to a previous *question*, that (p. 67) "one does not judge unless one feels the actual constraint of a doubt," that (p. 90) inference is at every step entangled with proof, and that (p. 127) "the thought-unit is the syllogism itself," the syllogism being here viewed as "a unity of correlated elements existing intrinsically in correlation".

There are in particular two pragmatist doctrines which might help Mr. Rieber to make some further important advances. One of them is the doctrine that all recognisable truth is truth *for a purpose*. This would have helped him, for instance, in his chapter on "Novelty and Identity in Inference". He would have seen how the problem about the progress of knowledge is illumined and explained when, instead of being content to say "we do have perfect knowledge in part" we claim that we do get *sufficient* knowledge for this or that limited purpose. Mr. Rieber's own view, as expressed at the bottom of page 172, does not appear to conflict in any way with that of the pragmatists; only the latter is a little less vague and more suggestive of ways of testing the truth of particular judgments.¹ It would help him, further, to understand our view of the progress of knowledge. This refers merely to the way in which new purposes call for an extension of knowledge beyond what was sufficient to satisfy old ones. Improvement is, as he says, certainly not to be measured in terms of mere movement, but that does not imply that the only possible measurement of it is by comparing it with perfection. The pragmatist is content to say that a piece of knowledge which suffices for purpose A, but not for purpose B, is improved when it is so modified as to suffice for both of these purposes. And such improvement may go on indefinitely without reaching a condition in which it would provide for all the purposes that are possible.

A second point in which Mr. Rieber's views would benefit by a knowledge of recent criticism is in regard to ambiguity, and its remedy definition. He seems throughout to regard ambiguity as a defect belonging to a *word* taken apart from its use in a context. Such a view is probably traceable to the old assumption that a definition is better or worse according to its success in serving purposes *in general*. In his chapter on the "Nature of Inference," for example, the failure of certain attempts to find a perfectly satisfactory definition of this kind is given far more importance than it would have if it were clearly seen to be inevitable. The pragmatist view, on

¹ When Mr. Rieber, on the next page, contrasts his view with theirs he overlooks the fact that to them 'truth' means always 'truth for a purpose,' so that failure in working means nothing else than failure to serve such purpose.

the other hand, is that since ambiguity—as contrasted with mere indefiniteness—is a defect which belongs to the *assertion*, not to the word as such, a definition is successful or not in so far as it enables an audience to choose between two possible meanings in either of which the given assertion might be intended. Take the word ‘Inference’ for example. For certain purposes it is convenient to have two different words—say ‘inference’ and ‘judgment’—to mark the difference between a belief which is expressly supported by reasons and one which is not so. From this point of view a judgment is an advance beyond its reasons. There is, in this sense, ‘novelty’ in the conclusion. Still more obviously there are cases where a judgment passes through various stages of comparative richness of meaning as new facts come to light and modify it; here, too, each advance may be regarded as a novelty; that is to say, the process may be better understood if it is called one of inference rather than of mere judgment. But on the other hand there are certain purposes for which the connexion, rather than the distinction, between inference and judgment has importance. As noticed already, it is one of the strong points of Mr. Rieber’s book that he is aware of this fact and has followed it up in considerable detail. He sees that when our purpose is to understand as much as possible about the nature of thought, and its liability to error, we are driven to over-ride a number of abstract distinctions which are useful for other purposes. It is then no longer important to draw artificially sharp dividing lines between various stages, or between various aspects, of the process of arriving at a more or less reasoned judgment. It becomes important, rather, to show as Mr. Rieber does their artificiality, and the obstacles they put in the way of a fuller understanding. Just because of the value of Mr. Rieber’s own exploration of the thinking process it has seemed to me worth while to dwell at some length upon his failure to accept the help which he might have received from the pragmatists.

ALFRED SIDGWICK.

Some Suggestions in Ethics. By BERNARD BOSANQUET, D.C.L., LL.D. London: Macmillan & Co., 1918. Pp. viii, 248.

THIS is a small book, consisting of disconnected Essays on a variety of questions bearing upon Ethics; but it is essentially a more coherent whole and a more valuable contribution than many larger and more systematic works. Some of the problems dealt with are of almost purely theoretical interest; but all of them have some bearing either on particular practical difficulties in the conduct of life or on the general attitude that ought to be adopted towards life. All the subjects are treated with the usual subtlety and with even more than the usual felicity in illustration that we have learned to expect from the author. The value of the book lies mainly in its careful handling of detail, and it would not be

possible to do justice to it without somewhat elaborate discussion. We must content ourselves here with a few notes.

Among the more purely theoretical problems that are dealt with may be mentioned that of the possibility of defining value (chap. iii.). The comparison that has been made between the conception of Good and that of such a quality as Yellow is referred to, and it is urged that Good must be regarded as a category. I think this is a sound contention; but it must be admitted that many lists of categories from Aristotle to Kant have not given it a place. The question is a difficult one, and probably calls for a fuller discussion than it has yet received.

Most of the other problems have a more direct bearing on practice. Dr. Bosanquet does not claim, however, that philosophy can give us much help of a directly practical kind. 'I do not believe in casuistry,' he says in the Preface, 'as a guide to conduct.' The reason for this is given in one of the Essays (pp. 155-156). 'Casuistry, the application of general principles of good to moral conduct, is necessarily a source of fallacy and sophistry. The reason is, as we have seen, that it is impossible, apart from a complete creative construction, in terms of a unique complication of demands and materials, to determine which of the innumerable truths applicable to a concrete course of conduct is to be insisted on in a given case. . . . Though general advice may help to put the elements of the situation before you, no mind but your own can strike the decisive balance of values and resources and appropriateness to your scheme of life.' I am not sure that this is quite fair. Is not an onlooker sometimes a better judge than the actor? And are there not some general considerations that are apt to be overlooked by both? What Dr. Bosanquet urges seems to suggest a limitation to the function of casuistry, rather than its complete rejection. Would not similar objections apply to most of the special arts? To take an instance that is unpleasantly prominent at the moment, I suppose there are some general principles that apply to the conduct of war, and it is possible to explain some of the ways in which these principles have to be modified in special circumstances; yet it remains true that it is the business of a good General to consider for himself the actual situation with which he is confronted and the best means of dealing with it. It would be foolish on his part to be content with rules and precedents; and it would be foolish on the part of his critics to judge him simply by his observance of them; but it would surely be still more foolish to ignore them. The same seems to be true of poetry and painting and all other activities in which there is scope for originality. There are, no doubt, points of difference. It is, in some respects, more difficult to determine what is right in the general conduct of life than in artistic achievement, because the latter (at least in the more purely practical arts) is mainly a question of skill, and can be more readily estimated by the immediate result. On the other hand, is it not rather more dangerous to seek

to be original in the general conduct of life than in a special art? It seems to me that there are good and bad kinds of casuistry. The bad kind rests on rules or commandments, and points to exceptions that have to be made in difficult cases. The admission of such exceptions tends to vitiate the rules, and so to destroy the system of morality with which they are connected. The good kind rests on principles, rather than on rules, and seeks to explain how the principles are to be applied in different cases. Whether this is to be called casuistry would seem to be a verbal question. It is, at any rate, an attempt to deal with difficult cases. Many of the discussions in this book seem to me to be excellent illustrations of casuistry in this sense. In the first chapter, for instance, there is a consideration of the question in what circumstances it is right to sacrifice one's own apparent good (*e.g.*, one's life) for the sake of others; and the conclusions that are reached are pretty definite. Similarly, the discussions about punishment in the eighth chapter lead to pretty definite results with regard to the conditions under which punishment may be rightly inflicted. It might perhaps be urged that this is a question of law, rather than of morality; but at least justice is recognised by Dr. Bosanquet as one of the virtues (p. 232).

Self-sacrifice is discussed in several places. Indeed, it may almost be said to be the main topic throughout. Goethe's 'Stirb und Werde' is specially emphasised in the seventh chapter. Goethe, however, gave the *Werden* at least an equal place with the *Sterben*. His insistence on self-development even led to his being described (no doubt unjustly) as an egoist; and he certainly based upon it a claim to personal immortality. Dr. Bosanquet is rather inclined to urge (pp. 84-85) that a man should be content to have the work of his life carried on by others. Without definitely rejecting the possibility of immortality, he is at least very critical with regard to it. He quotes (p. 188) the reference of Browning to

That sad, obscure, sequestered state,
Where God unmakes but to remake the soul
He else had made in vain, which must not be;

and remarks that 'it would seem the soul remade must be a new being'. One may ask whether he is quite faithful here to his own conception of identity in difference. Are we not all, to some extent, new beings at different stages in our lives? In general, while it would be untrue to say that Dr. Bosanquet treats sacrifice as an end in itself, he at least regards the gain that is achieved by it as being won in the life of humanity and the universe, rather than in that of the individual. His attitude may be compared with that expressed in the famous saying of Spinoza (a favourite one with Goethe) that he who loves God does not desire that God should love him in return. An obvious retort to this is that, if God did not love him in return, he would be better than God. A loving worm, according to Browning, would be diviner than a loveless

God. At any rate, it may be doubted whether many, even among the greatest saints, have been free from the desire to which Spinoza referred. One may recall the cry of Christ—'My God! My God! Why hast Thou forsaken Me?' I understand Dr. Bosanquet's contention to be that the results that follow from the lives of the saints are a sufficient recompense even for their supreme agonies and apparent failures. They rest from their labours, and their works follow them; and this is enough. Perhaps it is; but it is certainly difficult to repress the human desire that both they and others should at least *know* that their works follow. That they should go out for ever in darkness, is hard to reconcile with a perfect universe. However, I do not seek to press objections, but only to call attention to the interesting problems that are raised, and to suggest possible doubts.

There are certainly few books that contain so much that is interesting and instructive in so short a space.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

VII.—NEW BOOKS.

Platonism. By PAUL ELMORE MORE. Princeton University Press, 1917. Pp. ix, 307.

This is a difficult book to review, and, for reasons which will appear, it is not quite easy for me to be fair to it. I must, however, try my best; for I cannot be taken as acquiescing in the account which the writer gives of my views. In the first place, it must be said that Mr. More takes Platonism seriously, and that he has tried to give a personal interpretation of it instead of serving up the old formulas afresh. These are great merits. In the second place it must be said that he writes well and is always interesting, even when he appears to be wrong. On the other hand, he is too apt to dispose of difficulties by a mere *ipse dixit*, and he has not a very firm grasp of the history of Greek thought. It makes a bad impression, for instance, when we find on page 5 that he regards the ascetic Pyrrho as a hedonist. We know that Pyrrho looked upon virtue not only as the highest, but as the only good, and that his scepticism consisted mainly in his view that everything else, pleasure included, was indifferent. Such things are not negligible; for we are told in the *Preface* that the aim of this volume is "to lay the foundation for a series of studies on the origin and early environment of Christianity, and on such more modern movements as the revival of philosophic religion in the seventeenth century and of romanticism in the eighteenth". These are great themes, and Mr. More has certain qualifications for dealing with them; but it is certain that he will not do so adequately till he has learnt to find more in Neoplatonism than "theosophical speculation," and till he sees the inappropriateness of calling Plotinus and Proclus "the barbarians of Alexandria".¹

The Socrates of this work is not by any means the mere lay figure to which we have been accustomed, but a real human being. In the main, Mr. More frankly identifies the "historical" and the Platonic Socrates, and he sees (p. 254) that the meeting of the young Socrates with Parmenides and Zeno must be regarded "not only as a fact but as one to which Socrates was fond of alluding". He also distinguishes clearly between the "sceptical" or "rationalist" side of Socratic thought and the "mystical" or "intuitive," and he endeavours to do justice to both of them. That being so, it is difficult to see how he came to credit Prof. Taylor and myself with the view that Socrates was a "pure mystic," and that all the rationalism in the dialogues comes from Plato (pp. 11, 12). I am sure that Prof. Taylor has never said anything of the sort, and I

¹ On page 279 we read that "There (*i.e.*, at Alexandria) its chief exponent was Plotinus," from which it appears that Mr. More really thinks that Plotinus taught at Alexandria. He was perhaps born in Egypt, and he studied in his younger days at Alexandria, but he taught at Rome, and it was there that he developed his philosophical system. Proclus taught at Athens and had nothing to do with Alexandria.

know that I have said just the opposite. I have preferred, indeed, to use the Greek terms "enthusiasm" and "irony" for the two elements in the character of Socrates,¹ and I have protested against any account which ignores either of them. I have also pointed out that, however much Socrates had been influenced by the religious movement of his youth, and however fully he may have possessed the mystical temperament, his attitude towards particular Orphic or Pythagorean beliefs and practices is always one of kindly but humorous aloofness.² The "rationalist" always has the last word. In fact it is Mr. More who attaches an exaggerated importance to one feature of the "mysticism" of Socrates, the "divine sign" or "voice," and, as this is closely bound up with what I take to be the main contention of his book, it will be necessary to say something about it.

To those who realise the influence of Pythagoreanism on Socrates the "sign" presents no great difficulty, and the humorous way in which Socrates sometimes speaks of it is quite in keeping with his general attitude to such things. We are clearly bound to accept, as Mr. More does, the explicit statement of the *Apology* that it only gave negative advice. It never told Socrates to do anything. This, however, is hardly sufficient justification for the contention that, to the true Platonist, spiritual intuition always means inhibition. It will be best to give this remarkable doctrine in the writer's own words. He says (p. 272):—

To the true Platonist the divine spirit, though it may be called, and is, the hidden source of beauty and order and joy, yet always, when it speaks directly in the human breast, makes itself heard as an inhibition: like the guide of Socrates, it never in its own proper voice commands to do, but only to refrain.

Now this implies that the "divine sign" was the guide of Socrates in questions of right and wrong, and that it is to be identified with the spiritual intuition which enabled him to transcend his scepticism. That is a view which can be refuted from the *Apology* itself. There we are told that the "sign" constantly came to him on quite trivial occasions (*πάνν ἐπὶ σμικροῖς*) and opposed his doing something he was about to do. A good example of this is found in the *Euthydemus* (272c), where Socrates was about to leave the company and the divine sign opposed him, so that he sat down again. Nor is there a single case where it restrains Socrates from action on grounds of what Mr. More calls morality; it has to do solely with the results of acts in themselves indifferent, and it is justified solely on prudential grounds. The passage where Socrates tells his judges that it was the "sign" which made him abstain from political life is no exception; for he immediately goes on to say that the "sign" was quite right in its opposition, since, if he had gone in for politics, he would long since have been put to death (*Apol.*, 31d). In fact, Plato agrees with Xenophon at least in this, that the "divine sign" was a kind of divination (*μαντική*) which gave premonitions of undesirable results. It has nothing to do with right or wrong, but only with such matters as we might decide by tossing up. Of course it is impossible to believe it was really the "sign" that kept Socrates out of politics. That is only the high irony of the speech. We are not told that it was this mysterious voice that warned him to take no part in the arrest of Leon of Salamis or to refuse to put an illegal motion to the vote at the trial of the

¹ *Greek Philosophy*, Part I., §§ 101, 102.

² See especially my edition of the *Phædo*, Introd., p. lv. 59, and the notes there referred to.

generals. These were abstentions, indeed, but not of the kind for which Socrates required any mysterious sanction. On the other hand, he insists with complete seriousness that he had received certain very positive commands indeed from "the god" (or "God," as his hearers might choose to understand the words). It was "the god" and not the "divine sign" that bade Socrates neglect his private affairs and devote his whole life to the conversion of his fellow-citizens by getting them to "care for their souls," and he knew that it would be wrong to disobey this command, even if it were to cost him his life, as it did. He represents himself as a soldier of God, and military commands are not solely or mainly inhibitory. The words *ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ προτέτακται πράττειν* (*Apol.* 33c) are enough in themselves to refute Mr. More's view, and it would be easy to add to them. It needed no mysterious voice to tell Socrates what was right for him to do, and the inhibitory sign is a half-belief of which he does not speak quite seriously. It had nothing to do with the knowledge which is also goodness because it is knowledge of what is good for man's soul. No doubt Socrates thought there might be something in it, and it generally, so he tells us, turned out right, but it was in no sense the guide of his life.

I have dwelt on this because I believe it goes to the root of the matter, but I would not leave the impression that there is nothing to be learnt from what Mr. More says of Socrates. On the contrary, much of what he writes is true and well put. He has also some instructive things to say of the later dialogues, and he rightly insists on the importance of the *Laws*. I cannot, however, make out what he supposes my view of the second part of the *Parmenides* to be. He himself maintains that all the arguments are intended to lead to an *impasse*. That is just what I have said, though Mr. More does not mention the fact. I had even suggested that Zeno's account of the purpose of his own arguments was intended as a hint of the way we are to take the latter part of the dialogue. Mr. More was not bound in any way to mention this, except that he falls foul of me, in a passage which I do not understand, for having turned a negative into a positive conclusion, a thing I had certainly no intention of doing and which I cannot see that I have done. Mr. More's own interpretation does not appear to differ fundamentally from mine, and I have surely left no one any excuse for supposing that I regard the arguments otherwise than as reductions to the absurd.¹

Mr. More will have it that there was no Platonic philosophy beyond that contained in the dialogues. If that is so, Plato must have differed from most other thinkers. It is surely very unusual for a man to find expression for his ripest thoughts in his writings, and that will be specially true of one who had learnt from Socrates to lay such stress on the living word. In such cases we expect to hear a good deal from the philosopher's pupils which we look for in vain in his published works. Now Mr. More makes no attempt to explain what Aristotle says about Plato. To be sure, Aristotle's criticisms are a trouble to all of us, and he would be a bold man who would say that he fully understood them. No doubt it is pretty clear that Aristotle either could not or would not understand certain parts of Plato's teaching, but he had been a member of the Academy for twenty years, and when he tells us distinctly that Plato taught certain things which are certainly not to be found in his dialogues, are we to disbelieve him? There were scores of people living

¹ Mr. More originally published this criticism in the *Philosophical Review* (xxv., 135 sq.). I did not reply, because I thought he had made a slip, as we all do sometimes. However he has now reprinted it *verbatim*.

who could have contradicted him if he had invented these things, but as a matter of fact he is confirmed on one of the most important points by another member of the Academy, Hermodorus. In general, I should say that Mr. More's treatment of such questions is seriously weakened by his failure to make clear to himself the nature of the Academy and the Lyceum and the relation between them. For instance, he actually thinks well of Teichmüller's madcap suggestion that certain passages in the *Laws* are a reply to Aristotle's *Ethics*. Surely it is certain that the course of lectures for which the *Ethics* formed a basis cannot have been delivered till after Plato's death, and as good as certain that it was not published till after the death of Aristotle himself. On the other hand, Mr. More will have nothing to say to the *Epistles*; but, after all, the *Epistles* exist, and, if we are going to dismiss them as forgeries, we are bound to give some plausible account of how they came to be and when. Prof. Shorey once spoke of a "Philonic or neo-Platonic tendency" in one of the *Epistles*,¹ but that was an inadvertence, seeing that Cicero had read the *Epistles*, which means that they existed long before there were any Neoplatonists and even before Philo. In fact those who have argued recently against the genuineness of the *Epistles* have mostly been forced to admit that they must have been written by a contemporary of Plato himself, and this seems a very difficult thesis to maintain. The main criticism I would make, however, is that a work on Platonism, especially if it is to be a foundation for a series of studies on its influence in later days, must itself be founded in a clearer view of the historical conditions in which Platonism arose and in which it was handed down to succeeding generations. Apart from that, it will be built on the sand.

JOHN BURNET.

Studies in the History of Ideas. Edited by the Department of Philosophy of Columbia University. Vol. I. New York: Columbia University Press, 1918. Pp. 272.

It is, of course, a common-place that to appreciate any doctrine whatsoever, one needs first of all to determine as precisely as possible what it meant to its originator. And to do this, we need, as the editors of the present volume say in their *Prefatory Note*, to exercise "historical imagination". Even in pure mathematics the work of any one great man can hardly be understood without some such acquaintance with his historical *milieu*, and in philosophy, where more than anywhere else formulæ seem capable of almost unlimited variation in their meaning, such knowledge is absolutely indispensable. The task of the contributors to this volume is thus a very important one, most important, perhaps, in a country like the United States when the sense of historical continuity with the whole of past civilisation is perhaps inevitably less vivid than among the leading peoples of Europe. In the main the volume is therefore to be highly commended, even where the essayists do not seem to be saying anything particularly novel. Even where one of the writers is explaining what a specialist student will probably know already, it is an advantage to have historical truths about philosophical ideas summarised briefly and expressed in a style likely to appeal to the ordinary educated man of good intelligence. Of course it would not be denied that the value of the exercise of imagination commended by the editors depends upon the qualification expressed by the adjective "historical".

¹ *Classical Philology*, x. (1915), p. 87.

Three of the essays, *Appearance and Reality in Greek Philosophy*, by M. T. McClure, *The Meaning of φῦσις in Early Greek Philosophy*, by W. Veazie, and *An Impression of Greek Political Philosophy*, by W. T. Bush, deal with Greek thought. The first two of these do not seem to me to have any very great value. Mr. McClure's main thesis—one which no one is called on to dispute—is that what a philosopher means by "appearance" is commonly that part of reality in which he feels no special interest. Now, it is argued, in Greek thought there are three main lines of interest, the scientific, the mystical, and the humanist. We must therefore expect to find that a given Greek philosopher will decide what is to be degraded to the level of "appearance" according to his own "temperamental" interest in science, mysticism, or humanism. Democritus regards sense-qualities as only "appearance," because he is before all things a man of science, Plato treats the sensible as "appearance," because he is interested in mysticism and in conduct, and is indifferent to science, and so on. There is truth in such a view, but the great difficulty which the essayist overlooks, is that the most eminent philosophers are so rarely representative of a single pure "type". Mr. McClure is reduced to the absurdity of denying the importance of the scientific interest in the author of the *Timæus*, and asserting more than once that Greek science "culminates" in Democritus. One wonders whether he has heard of Archimedes or knows that Democritus—a younger contemporary of Socrates—taught that the earth is flat. Mr. Veazie writes briefly on the *Meaning of φῦσις in Early Greek Philosophy*. His object is to controvert Burnet's assertion that φῦσις in the early men of science means "primary body," and to argue that φῦσις is "the inner nature or essence of things, their potency, that in them which has the power of motion in itself". The very words seem to be anachronistic; they presuppose Aristotelianism. The author has the temerity to accuse Burnet of "misquoting" Aristotle, *Met.*, 1014b, 16, on the strength of his own mistranslation of the passage. ἐπεκτείνεω, used of a vowel, does not of course mean to "accent" it, but to "produce it," "make it long" as Burnet renders. More interesting and full of good observations is Mr. Bush's impressionist sketch of Greek political philosophy. He is abundantly warranted in asserting that civic faction was the curse of the Greek communities, and that the Platonic-Aristotelian doctrine is meant to provide a cure for the evil. He might have strengthened his case by a fuller consideration of the economics of the *Republic*. But it is hardly historical to look for the bribe-taking kings of Hesiod in the history of Attica or to assert that "Plato's time" was one of violent party strife in Athens. If "Plato's time" means the period in which Plato wrote his best-known works, it was one of quiet and order, the age of Eubulus. I cannot think why Mr. Bush refuses to admit that Solon was the real founder of Athenian democracy. The strength of the democracy lay precisely in the power of the popular dicasteria, and these were Solon's distinctive creation. And, with all respect to Prof. Santayana, the statement that "Plato had no physics" is pure nonsense.

Mr. Coss writes a brief but sufficient note on Francis Bacon's recognition of the need for a systematic History of Philosophy. There are no less than three essays dealing with Hobbes. Prof. Dewey's paper on *The Motivation of Hobbes's Political Philosophy* is exceedingly opportune. If he should ever meet with a little brochure by the present writer on *Hobbes*, he will find that he is not alone in insisting on the points that Hobbes meant to represent the moral law as arbitrary, and that his championship of autocracy is a secondary matter, due to the political circumstances of his age, as compared with his primary object, the secular-

isation of political philosophy. Prof. Dewey has illustrated these points admirably by showing precisely what were the objections raised by Hobbes's most intelligent contemporary critics, such as Harrington and Eachard. Mr. Lord's paper on Hobbes's *Attempt to Base Ethics on Psychology*, and Mr. Balz's essay on *The Psychology of Ideas in Hobbes*, especially the latter, strike me as sound and valuable work.

Mr. R. B. Owen writes on *Truth and Error in Descartes*. The one point to which he is, I think, hardly alive is the important one that the view of intelligence or understanding as intrinsically infallible, which leads Descartes to find the source of all intellectual error in the misdirection of the will, is no Cartesian novelty, but a standing Scholastic doctrine, derived ultimately from Greek philosophy. Mr. Owen may find the same view constantly urged to-day by Neo-Thomists like the able writers of the *Rivista Neo-Scholastica* against the agnosticism and phenomenalism of Positivists and Neo-Kantians. Its ultimate source is the Platonic-Aristotelian doctrine that all things have a tendency towards their own specific good. The good of the understanding is truth, therefore the understanding naturally tends towards truth. It is as much a Thomistic as a Cartesian inference that error only arises when this tendency is opposed from without. Mr. Cooley, in his paper on *Spinoza's Pantheistic Argument* is more awake to the impossibility of understanding the seventeenth-century philosophers without reference to the Neo-Platonic doctrines they inherited from Christian and Jewish Scholasticism. But I doubt if he is sufficiently acquainted with Neo-Platonism itself. If he were, he would hardly call it a *ἐν και παν* doctrine. (The peculiar accentuation is Mr. Cooley's, not mine.) The One, according to Plotinus and Proclus, is *just* the One; it is emphatically not *παν*. Like Plato himself, the Neo-Platonists were quite emphatically Theists. In fact, the Forms become with them quite subsidiary to God. The Scholastic doctrine of God, so far as it is not based on appeals to revelation, is Proclus pure and simple. There are other points on which I do not find it quite easy to follow Mr. Cooley. Thus the fallacy of illicit major with which he charges Spinoza on page 178 is, I think, a creation of his own. Spinoza's premiss is not "everything that can be limited by another thing of the same nature is finite," but everything that is finite can be limited, etc." Spinoza is formally entitled to this simple conversion of his definition just because it is a *definition*.

The reasoning of Kant's first "Antinomy," referred to on page 179, is not specifically "Neo-Platonic". It is Eleatic, and goes back to Melissus of Samos. Another thing I do not understand is the statement on the same page that "Newton's discovery of universal gravitation" somehow shows that the universe is limited not from without but by an internal necessity. If we are to be pedantically accurate, we must remember that Newton does not assert the *universality* of gravitation, but only its existence *usque ad orbem Saturni*. Even if we extend it throughout all space, it is not clear how Mr. Cooley's corollary can be deduced. He seems to be regarding gravity, in a very un-Newtonian fashion, as a *qualitas occulta*. Prof. Woodbridge writes at length on Berkeley's *Realism* as "the controlling motive in his philosophy". His essay strikes me as particularly admirable, and as definitely establishing its main contention that the influence of Locke on Berkeley has been generally both misconceived and over-rated. I think Prof. Woodbridge fully makes out his point that Berkeley's real object is to vindicate naïve realism against the "mathematical philosophers," and that Locke only comes into the argument because his account of our "ideas" lends some support to the "mathematicians" who substitute a purely geometrical "real world" for that in

which the plain man believes. And I am equally in sympathy with the penetrating observation that Berkeley's criticism is that of a man keenly interested in mathematics, but of a definitely unmathematical mind. The whole essay is a valuable contribution to the study of one of the most misunderstood of philosophers. Mr. A. Leroy Jones has a short note on some coincidences between Thomas Brown's doctrine of beauty and the *Æsthetics* of Prof. Santayana. The volume closes with two essays concerned with logical questions, *The Antinomy and Its Implications for Logical Theory*, by W. P. Montague, and *Old Problems with New Faces in Recent Logic*, by H. T. Costello. Both offer matter for profitable reflection, and both suggest questions upon which I should be glad to dwell in a few words, but for reasons of space.

A. E. TAYLOR.

The Economic Anti-Christ: A Study in Social Polity. By W. BLISSARD, M.A., Rector of Bishopsbourne, in the Diocese of Canterbury, author of *The Ethic of Usury and Interest*, etc. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.

The Economic Anti-Christ is for Mr. Blissard that system of "Economic Militarism" by which this country is dominated just as Germany is by military Militarism. The book has a philosophical character in so far as it deals with large questions in a large way. It bases the Ethic which it recommends, and its exposure of the false Ethic commonly accepted by modern Society upon a principle. It contains some fine statements of the fundamental principle of Christian Ethics and some fine interpretations of Christian Theology in terms of modern thought. The writer, I note, frankly gives up the popular interpretations of divine Omnipotence (to which he quite rightly attributes some of the social apathy of the religious world). His Theodicy, however, turns entirely upon the doctrine of Free-will in the sense of extreme Indeterminism. But the book contains little theoretical discussion, whether metaphysical, ethical or economic. In the main it is a practical appeal—an appeal especially to the Church—to recognise that what is wrong with itself, and with the world which it hopes to save, is not so much individual wrong-doing as a fundamentally unjust social order. The Anti-Christ is in fact Capitalism, and the book is an appeal to the Church not to put its strength into denouncing particular sins such as drunkenness and sexual immorality, but to recognise that "the real national sin is that of faulty organisation," to use its influence to get it altered, and as a step thereto to set its own economic house in order.

Considered from a practical point of view the book is impressive. I for one should not be disposed to dispute Mr. Blissard's general ethical principles, or his condemnation of the system under which the owners of capital absorb so large a part of the national income which they, *qua* capitalists, and in most cases hereditary capitalists, have contributed nothing to earn. Yet, even considered as a practical appeal, the book loses by its failure to recognise the other side of the question. Mr. Blissard falls into the common socialistic fallacy of dividing society into two sharply opposed sections—the exploiters and the exploited, the oppressing and the oppressed, the idle and the workers. It is quite true that the capitalist, if he has enough capital, need not do any work, but it is a mistake to talk as if the great majority of those who own some capital, habitually did no work, or, on the other hand, to ignore the fact that vast masses of capital are in part owned by men who are individually by no means rich or by societies of men who are in every sense of the

word "working-men". It is a mistake not to recognise what, under the existing social order, are the functions actually performed by capital and the capitalist. It is true that the tasks of management, of the entrepreneur, of the "captain of industry," are separable from the actual possession of capital: the capitalist may personally have contributed nothing to these things beyond what is implied in placing his capital in (from his point of view) the right hands. But it is equally true that there is normally a connexion between the two things; that the capitalistic system has certain economic social advantages, that it encourages industry and enterprise, that it places on the whole the management of industry in capable hands, and that in so far as it is socially advantageous, it has a relative justification. Unless these facts are duly recognised, it is not likely that the difficulties of replacing the system by one which shall be juster and more socially beneficial will be duly recognised and grappled with. Even on the ethical side it should not be assumed that the possession of property is itself a sin, or that it is almost certain to convert the possessor into a sinner in other ways. I have always, indeed, thought that the justification of Property by its effects on character which one meets with in such writers as Prof. Bosanquet too often ignore the bad moral effects of large individual wealth. There are passages in this book which might be commended to the attention of such writers: on the other hand, Mr. Blissard might learn something from Mr. Bosanquet and his school in spite of their leaning to the 'Whatever is, is right' theory of the Universe. Mr. Blissard is so possessed with a fine fury against capitalism that he seems disposed to attribute all the evil of the world to its influence. He writes of the well-to-do classes as if they were habitually wicked, of the working-classes as if they were all saints, or would be so but for the system. Feminism, against which the author has a particular animus, and the restriction of families (the author does not explain whether he means that every mother is bound to have a maximum family) are spoken of as entirely due to the sense of unconditioned will produced, especially in women, by the power of living without labour. All other social evils are traced to the same source.

All through the book Mr. Blissard treats the capitalist evil as one which is worse in this country than anywhere else in Europe, and worse than it has ever been. The former statement is at least questionable: the second is surely untrue. He speaks as though the capitalist was in undisputed possession: as if nothing had been done to dispute and limit his sway, and even to introduce considerable instalments of Collectivism. There is no recognition of the large extent to which by Trade-Union action, by legislation and perhaps (I fear not to a very large extent) by the improvement of public opinion, the evils he deplores have been mitigated. There is one grudging reference to the Factory Acts, but we hear nothing about the Wages Boards, the compulsory Insurance Acts, the death duties, the increased taxation of wealth, the diffusion of education, and the like. Sometimes the writer's prepossessions make him positively blind to the most obvious economic facts. Thus, in considering the economic effects of the war, he enlarges upon the iniquities of profiteering, and quite correctly notes the effect of the war-loans in enormously increasing the numbers of the Capitalist class and the burden of the annual drain upon the wealth earned by the national labour. He forgets (what has been pointed out by Mr. Sydney Webb and others) that the rise in prices and the fall in the purchasing power of money will considerably lighten the real burden; and that it is practically certain, no matter what party may command a majority after the war, that the taxation which is to pay the interest and reduce the debt will be borne much more by the capital-owning, than by the wage-earning, classes.

The failure to see how largely the war is bringing about a development precisely in the direction which the author desires to move is the more remarkable inasmuch as, when we come to the few pages devoted to the question of remedies or future social policy, he has nothing to recommend but further instalments of quite moderate and reasonable evolutionary Socialism. The tone of the book had almost prepared us for something like Bolshevism. There is a really prophetic quality about the author's writing, but even in a prophet the tone of unrelieved gloom and denunciation is rather wearisome, and does not always forward the case which he has at heart. It is a pity that he should not sometimes have inspired himself by the study of the later Isaiah as well as of Jeremiah.

Since the review of this book was in type, I have heard with great regret of its esteemed author's death.

H. RASHDALL.

The Neoplatonists. By THOMAS WHITTAKER. Second edition. Cambridge. Pp. xv, 318.

The main thesis of this interesting and important book, the first edition of which has been out of print for some years, may be stated as follows. Philosophy was the living centre of culture in the Græco-Roman world, as it has never been in modern Europe. As long as the classical type of civilisation remained, philosophy was its champion and custodian. During the long period of decay, while the classical tradition was being submerged, first by the establishment of military monarchies of an increasingly Oriental type, and then by Asiatic religions and the inroads of northern barbarians, the philosophers of the empire were the defenders, the confessors, and occasionally the martyrs of the old ideas. And for nearly three centuries before Justinian, philosophy meant the syncretistic Platonism systematised by Plotinus, the one great genius of the dismal third century. The conservatives were beaten, but their defeat was not final, and was in fact more apparent than real. 'The fire yet burns on the altars of Plotinus,' as Eunapius said; and it has never been extinguished. Through several streams the fertilising flood of Greek philosophy poured into the thought of the middle ages. Through Augustine, a close student of the Platonists (whom he doubtless read only in translations), Greek philosophy became the basis of scientific theology in western Catholicism. The Pseudo-Dionysius conveyed the speculations of Proclus to Dante. The Cappadocian Fathers were steeped in Plotinus, and had the same influence upon eastern theology that Augustine had in the west. The Arabs mixed Neoplatonic treatises with their Aristotle, and through them another rivulet of Hellenism penetrated to the Schoolmen. The lineage of Christian mysticism can be traced back in a straight line through Dionysius to Plotinus and Proclus. But Mr. Whittaker, who is no friend to Christian dogmatic theology, is more disposed to emphasise the instructive and enthusiastic return to Platonism which accompanied the emancipation of the human mind from the fetters of consecrated tradition, at the renaissance. After a suspension of a thousand years, he says, men could take up the Greek problems of philosophy and science exactly where they had been dropped when Justinian closed the schools of Athens. Modern philosophy, which owes little to the middle ages, may therefore be considered the immediate successor of Neoplatonism, as indeed the German historians of modern thought acknowledge when they devote their first chapters to Eckhart and Jacob Böhme. From these speculative mystics the descent is

unbroken to the great German idealists of a hundred years ago. Mr. Whittaker also reminds us of the noble catena of Platonism in English poetry ever since the renaissance, from Spenser to Shelley, or, as he might have added, to Rupert Brooke.

Mr. Whittaker holds that Greek philosophy lost the battle against Christianity partly because it would not adapt itself to the actual movement of world-politics. Its sympathies were obstinately republican. Marcus Aurelius made heroes of Cato and Brutus; and even Julian refused to be called *δεσπότης*. The Christians, on the other hand, were monarchists on principle, and were eager to make a concordat with an emperor who was little better than a sultan. There were, of course, other and more important factors in the triumph of Christianity. But the Neoplatonists themselves regarded the struggle, much as Mr. Whittaker does, as a phase of the conflict between Hellenism and 'barbarism,' and especially Asiatic barbarism. They were not wrong in thinking that Europe was losing its pride of place. For over a thousand years, till the English conquests in India, Europe made no impression upon Asia, and was thrice nearly overwhelmed in Asiatic invasions by the Huns, the Arabs, and the Turks. At present, the European type of polity seems to have established its supremacy, and its 'yet living rival—the continuation of Christian theocracy in its Byzantine form,' has collapsed in hideous anarchy since Mr. Whittaker's first edition.

Mr. Whittaker finds that the chief influence of Neoplatonism upon Christianity was in combating the supernaturalistic dualism—materialism combined with supernaturalism—which we find in writers like Tertullian, and in very many Christian theologians even now; and in substituting for it the spiritual or idealistic view of the world which was developed quite clearly for the first time by Plotinus. The truth is that these two types of religious thought have subsisted side by side in Christianity almost from the first, and are still the cause of sharp conflicts and deep divisions in the Church.

The metaphysical section of this book is short, but very sound. Mr. Whittaker sweeps aside the criticisms usually brought against Plotinus by those who have not read him—that his philosophy is an extreme form of dualism; that he despises the world; that he discredits reason in favour of ecstasy; and so forth. He has the courage to avow his deliberate conviction that the 'idealistic ontology of the Neoplatonists would, if accepted, clear up more things than the most ambitious of modern systems'. With this may be compared the prediction of Ernst Troeltsch, that since 'the sharper stress of the scientific and philosophical spirit in modern times has made the blend of Neoplatonism and New Testament Christianity the only possible solution of the problem, I do not doubt that the synthesis of Neoplatonism and Christianity will once more be dominant in modern thought'. Mr. Whittaker would prefer Plotinus without the 'blend'; but such utterances may be taken to indicate that this important chapter in the history of philosophy is likely to receive a decent amount of attention at last.

My only divergence from Mr. Whittaker in his chapters about the philosophy of Plotinus is on the subject of free-will. His statement that Plotinus is 'without the least hesitation a determinist' seems to me untenable. See the passages about human freedom in *Ennead* 4, 8, 5; 3, 2, 4; and 3, 2, 10.

Possessors of the first edition will find it worth while to buy the second, for the sake of the new and lengthy appendix on Proclus, which is excellent.

W. R. INGE.

The Gate of Remembrance, the Story of the Psychological Experiment which Resulted in the Discovery of the Edgar Chapel at Glastonbury.
By FREDERICK BOND, F.R.I.B.A., Director of Excavations at Glastonbury Abbey. Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, 1918. Pp. x, 176.

Apart from 'dowsing,' which is a well-established business, authentic cases of additions to human knowledge made by other than normal methods, like the 'dreams' which revealed to Prof. Jastrow the inscription on the Babylonian cylinder which had been cut up into a signet ring, and to Prof. Verner the philological 'law' which bears his name and made his fortune, are few and far between, and it is proportionately important that they should be adequately recorded, and considered by critics with an open mind. They are also capable of being made 'good copy'; but this often militates against their being recorded in a way that is scientifically instructive rather than literarily attractive, and Mr. Bond has not altogether resisted this temptation. But his reward has been that a second edition of his book has speedily been called for, and this will give him an opportunity of making his story more complete on the scientific side. It is to be hoped that his second edition will give more information about the automatic script on which his story rests, about the automatists and the sort and amount of their knowledge, and at least one complete record of a sitting which was productive of evidential matter. So much a psychologist may fairly demand: it would be desirable, too, to have some illustrations of the variations in the script mentioned on page 67. As it stands the book only gives us selections, extracted for their bearing on the architectural and archaeological problems for the solution of which automatism was resorted to, together with a certain amount of philosophic speculation (by Mr. Bond and the script) to 'explain' what happened.

Meantime Mr. Bond's story runs, briefly, thus. When the Somerset Archaeological Society determined, in 1907, to excavate the ruins of Glastonbury, one of the first problems was to discover the locality and size of the Chapel of St. Edgar, which had been attached to the great Abbey Church. Mr. Bond and his friend 'J. A.'—who may be regarded as the automatist in the case, though Mr. Bond used to touch his hand while it was writing—made a preliminary study of the extant literature about Glastonbury, from which it appeared that the Edgar Chapel was probably quite a small affair which extended the length of the Church only by a dozen feet. On this view, the total length of 580 feet ascribed to the Church had, it is true, to be regarded as an exaggeration; but they could find no warrant for any other. The automatic script, however, asserted that the Edgar Chapel was 30 yards long, and this information, together with many other details, was found to be accurately true, when the excavations were made. It was not until long afterwards, in 1911, that an 18th century manuscript plan of the ruins was found to estimate the length of the Edgar Chapel at 87 feet (p. 62). Subsequently the script produced much detailed, and even more improbable, information about the Loretto Chapel, and as this has not yet been excavated, Mr. Bond has by publishing it given hostages to fortune. In addition to this guarantee of good faith he prints a letter from Mr. Everard Fielding of the S.P.R., testifying that the predictions of the script were made prior to the excavations.

To reject so well authenticated a tale it is evident that the sceptic will have to rely in the first instance on the subconscious knowledge of the automatists. If this fails him, he can try Mr. Bond's theory (taken from a hint of James's) of a 'cosmic record' of the past, which the automatism

taps (pp. 19, 39, etc.). Still it has to be noticed that in their *form* (as so often) these messages are frankly spiritistic; they always professed to come from the monks who had lived at Glastonbury during the Middle Ages. Many of them indeed are unusually vivid and plausible impersonations, though they are not free from errors and infections traceable to the minds of the automatists, or perhaps only to mistakes in decipherment. The spiritist interpretation, however, suffers too much from bias, which, whether hostile or favourable, will not stoop to consider what it may be possible to mean by 'spirit'. Similarly the 'cosmic reservoir' is nothing as yet, scientifically speaking, but an *asylum ignorantie*, even if we abstain from hastily evoking the Absolute to fill it; while, the 'subconscious' also is an *ἀργὸς λόγος*, which does nothing to explain how it is that points could be noted and inferences correctly drawn, which escaped the conscious mind. Meanwhile there are the super-normal facts; not as numerous nor as certain as they might be made if only psychology would seriously concern itself with them, and philosophy would cease to content itself with a merely verbal and *a priori* notion of soul; but still more certain than any of the theories which are invoked as their 'explanation'.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

Nietzsche, the Thinker: A Study. By WILLIAM MACKINTIRE SALTER.
New York: Henry Holt & Co. Pp. x, 539.

Mr. Salter may be congratulated on having produced the most elaborate and careful and best 'documented' study of Nietzsche in the English language, which is specially to be recommended to all who are at present tempted to let off 'poison gas' on the subject of Nietzsche, to regard him as a typical German philosopher, and to talk extravagantly about the 'Euro-Nietzschian War' (*sic*). Its aim is both apologetic and instructive. For Mr. Salter appears to think that the hostility to Nietzsche is intellectual in its origin and ascribable to sheer ignorance of his work. "Criticism of Nietzsche is rife, understanding rare," and he will be content if he can make it "a little more intelligent" (Preface). So he is very thorough and patient in quoting, referring, explaining—or perhaps (sometimes) explaining away—his author, in the hope that his sobriety and studious moderation of statement may convince the American public that Nietzsche is not after all wholly unworthy of the notice of the democratic man. This method of apologetic is no doubt effective in its way, and should go far to silence the ignorant critic. But its very virtues may render it less effective in winning disciples for Nietzsche. It is not a young man's book, but a mature and scholarly performance. For the young, however, the spell of Nietzsche lies largely in his picturesque extravagance, and his doctrine is often adopted *pour épater les bourgeois*. His strength lies in this, and in his literary quality; not in any systematic coherence of his thought or originality of his philosophic opinions, and the effect of Mr. Salter's treatment is rather to water down his hero. It is part of his method that he should be chary of criticisms and comparisons; and though it is no doubt best to explain Nietzsche by himself, he often leaves unsatisfied our curiosity about the logical affinities of Nietzsche's thought. For example, he quotes extensively for Nietzsche's theory of truth, and admits its connexion with pragmatism; but excuses himself from determining "how far a view of this sort resembles Pragmatism, I leave to those better acquainted with the latter to say" (p. 496). From the brother-in-law of William James this sounds queer; and he might at least have referred to the explicit discussion of this very

question in my *Quarterly Review* article (Jan., 1913), which he quotes (pp. 513, 514) on far less important points. In spite, however, of these defects of his qualities Mr. Salter has indisputably given us a most valuable study of a writer whose stimulus will always be felt by every moralist who aims at anything beyond a statement of the traditional platitudes.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

The Dawn of Mind. By MARGARET DRUMMOND. London: Edward Arnold, 1918. Pp. vii, 176. Price 3s. 6d. net.

The author has produced an "introduction to child psychology" which will be welcomed by students. The book contains much information that is of value to parents and to all who are interested in modern methods of educating young children. It opens with an outline sketch of the nervous system. This is very slight in itself, but it may serve to indicate the importance of a knowledge of nervous conditions in studying mental development. Early consciousness is dealt with under the headings "absorption" and "expression". The former recounts the sensational experiences of the first year, the latter, the actions and emotions through which the baby brings himself into relation with his world. One could wish that the chapter which follows, dealing with the development of the fundamental concepts, form, colour, number, time, and space, were fuller. This is a topic on which information is badly needed. It would be a gain if in a later edition this chapter could be expanded at the expense of the one on "the unlucky baby". Admirable as may be the practical advice given under this title, the chapter as it stands interrupts the sequence of ideas, and would be better placed as an appendix or incorporated in the "Conclusion". "Memory, Imagination and Play" affords interesting material. Without being dogmatic the account given of these processes is very suggestive to the teacher. The same can be said of the chapters on reason and on language. The illustrations which have been brought together may not always justify the construction of a theory, but they cannot fail to interest the reader and help him in the study of child psychology.

BEATRICE EDGELL.

Essays in Scientific Synthesis. By EUGENIO RIGNANO. Translated by W. J. GREENSTREET. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.; Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1918. Pp. 254. Price 7s. 6d. net.

This able and well-translated work consists of eight essays written with the same object and in the same spirit in various scientific periodicals and united in a volume published at Paris in 1912. M. Rignano understands by a "theorist" one who studies the logical structure of the methods used and the results arrived at by specialists. Such a function is that so successfully performed by mathematicians in physics, and here M. Rignano undertakes the task "of demonstrating the utility in the biological, psychological, and sociological field of the theorist, who, without having specialised in any particular branch or sub-division of science, may nevertheless bring into those spheres that synthetic and unifying vision which is brought by the theorist-mathematician, with so much success, into the physico-chemical field of science" (p. 5). The chapters are on "The Rôle of the Theorist in the Science of Biology and Socio-

logy," "The Synthetic Value of the Evolution Theory," "Biological Memory in Energetics," "On the Mnemic Origin and Nature of the Affective Tendencies," "What is Consciousness?" "The Religious Phenomenon," "Historic Materialism," and "Socialism". M. Rignano's book, besides being original and suggestive, is based on a thorough knowledge of an extensive literature, and the translation is as excellent a piece of work as a good translation should be.

J.

École Pratique des Hautes Études, Section des Sciences Religieuses.
Annuaire, 1917-1918. *Hypostases Plotiniennes et Trinité Chrétienne*.
By A. PICAVET. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1917. Pp. 89.

M. Picavet's essay, which is written with his usual erudition and sound judgment, should be particularly welcome to the increasing number of serious students of Neo-Platonism. He rightly insists on the point that, in spite of the domination of Aristotelian logic in the Middle Ages, the metaphysical foundations of scholastic philosophy were always Neo-Platonic. In fact the way was prepared for the reception of Aristotle by the synthesis, already effected by Plotinus, of Plato with Aristotle. The essay traces the history of the influence of Plotinus on the development of Christian theology and philosophy from its earliest beginnings. The source of this influence was twofold. On the one hand, there was much in common between the Plotinian and the Christian ideals of life. Christians were spontaneously attracted to Plotinus because they found in his philosophy a reasoned exposition and defence of the ideal of life which they shared with him. On the other, there had from the first been two opposing parties in the Church, those who were in revolt against the whole Hellenic tradition and those who regarded it as a rightful heritage to be preserved and completed by the help of the Christian revelation. The second party, to whose triumph we owe the elaboration of theology, naturally felt free to borrow directly from the philosophy of the Neo-Platonists, the more as they mostly accepted the theory that Plato and the other great Greek thinkers had been themselves directly or indirectly indebted to the Hebrew Scriptures. M. Picavet shows by many examples how early the tendency to interpret Scripture by the aid of Neo-Platonic doctrine makes itself felt. There are one or two points on which a passing remark might be made. On page 6, M. Picavet quotes the well-known, "What else is Plato but a Moses speaking Attic?" without mentioning the fact, which of course he knows, that the author of the remark was neither Jew nor Christian, but the Neo-Pythagorean Numenius. I should like to take the opportunity of making a conjecture as to its point. It has often been said that Numenius was thinking of the cosmology of the *Timæus* and comparing it with the opening chapter of *Genesis*; more recently Prof. Burnet has suggested that what he had in view was resemblances between the "law of Holiness," and some of the early Attic law retained in the *Laws*. Is it not more probable that Numenius was thinking of the striking parallel between the "preambles to laws" in Plato (especially the great preamble to the whole legislation which fills the fifth book) of the *Laws* and the impressive rhetoric of *Deuteronomy*?

[The writer of this notice regrets that its concluding lines appear to have been lost in the Press and that he is unable to reproduce them from memory.]

A. E. TAYLOR.

Received also :—

- D. H. Th. Vollenhoven, *De Wijsbegeerte der Wijskunde van Theïstisch Standpunt*, Amsterdam, Van Soest, 1918, pp. xv, 444.
- Prof. James Ward, *Psychological Principles*, Cambridge University Press, 1918, pp. xiv, 478.
- Prof. L. T. Hobhouse, *The Metaphysical Theory of the State*, London, George Allen & Unwin; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1918, pp. 156.
- H. J. W. Hetherington and J. H. Muirhead, *Social Purpose*, London, George Allen & Unwin; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1918, pp. 317.
- Prof. W. R. Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, The Gifford Lectures at Aberdeen, 1914-15, Cambridge University Press, 1918, pp. xix, 534.
- C. A. Strong, *The Origin of Consciousness: An Attempt to Conceive the Mind as a Product of Evolution*, Macmillan & Co., 1918, pp. viii, 330.
- C. G. Jung and Others, translated M. D. Eder, *Studies in Word Association*, London, William Heinemann, 1918, pp. ix, 575.
- Right Rev. J. E. Mercer, *The Problem of Creation*, London, Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1917, pp. xiii, 325.
- J. S. Mackenzie, *Outlines of Social Philosophy*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1918, pp. 280.
- Ernest Barker, *Greek Political Theory: Plato and his Predecessors*, London, Methuen & Co., 1918, pp. xiii, 408.
- Aylmer Maude, *Leo Tolstoy*, London, Methuen & Co., 1918, pp. xi, 331.
- Clement Webb, *In Time of War*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1918, pp. 105.
- F. C. Constable, *Telergy*, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1918, pp. 113.
- H. N. G. Newlyn, *The Relation between the Mystical and the Sensible Worlds*, London, G. Allen & Co., 1918, pp. 128.

VIII.—PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. xxvii., No. 1. **W. H. Scott.** 'Consciousness and Self-Consciousness.' [Consciousness is not a relation (McGilvary, Woodbridge, etc.), but rather awareness: awareness of the object by the conscious self. Self-consciousness (as against James, Ward, etc.) is a state in which I am both subject and object and am conscious of myself as being both, while yet in the unity of my consciousness I am one undivided and indivisible self.] **A. K. Rogers.** 'Pragmatism *versus* Dualism.' [Certain pragmatic meanings have dualistic alternatives which are not intrinsically absurd. Knowledge means not only problem-solving but also static reference to objects. Consciousness is not only a 'knowledge' term, but may also imply a quality of 'awareness'. Experience means for the pragmatist either reality (in which case it says nothing) or else something psychological. Dewey, to avoid subjectivism, has left 'functional' psychology for 'behaviourism,' but the ambiguous term 'activity' cannot save his consistency.] **L. T. Troland.** 'Paraphysical Monism.' [Outlines a metaphysics on the lines drawn by Clifford; the substance of the universe is akin to consciousness, and the physical world is a conscious construct. Works out in some detail the functional parallel, static and dynamic, between the subjective or physical, and the objective or paraphysical or conscious.] Discussion. **W. M. Urban** and **J. E. Creighton.** 'Beyond Realism and Idealism *versus* Two Types of Idealism.' [If one accept all the values of realism (refusing false interpretation) and all the true values of idealism (eschewing mentalism) has one not transcended realism and idealism? No; because there is between the two a real difference of philosophical aim and method.] Reviews of Books. Notices of New Books. Summaries of Articles. Notes.—Vol. xxvii., No. 2. **A. W. Moore.** 'The Opportunity of Philosophy.' [Urges the democratisation of values: the adoption toward social, political, religious values of the same experimental attitude, their subjection to the same test of international scrutiny and criticism, which we demand in scientific procedure.] **W. K. Wright.** 'The Relation of the Psychology of Religion to the Philosophy of Religion.' [Programmatic statement of the differences between philosophy and science, and of the profit to philosophy and psychology of religion accruing from discrimination and co-operation; indication of problems.] **R. W. Sellars.** 'An Approach to the Mind-Body Problem.' [The organism as such is the sole and proper subject of reference of all knowledge about it gained by observation and experiment, and consciousness is not alien to the organism. Rather is consciousness immanent, sustaining to the brain an internal and unique relation of real causality; and the function of consciousness is to guide and assist integration.] **E. E. Spaulding.** 'Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association; the 17th Annual Meeting, Princeton University, December 27 and 28, 1917.' Reviews of Books. Notices of New Books. Summaries of Articles. Notes.

PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. Vol. xxv., No. 1. **R. B. Perry.** 'Docility and Purposiveness.' [The docile organism has two springs of action: a selective, dominant, deep-seated, general and sustained propensity, which accounts for 'trying' and prescribes when this shall cease; and tentative, subordinate, superficial, transient and specific propensities, which are rendered hyperexcitable by the former, but are ordinarily released by sense-stimuli. The selected or 'eligible' propensity confirms, facilitates, and amplifies the selective.] **J. J. B. Morgan.** 'The Perception of Force.' [Dynamometric experiments confirm the view (Woodworth) that the perception of force depends on a number of partially correlated factors. For most subjects extent is a dominant factor, and time seems also to be important. Other and less closely correlated factors appear when the subject is prevented from using extent and time.] **A. P. Weiss.** 'The Tone Intensity Reaction.' [Experiments upon discrimination of intensities (pure tone of 256 vs.; six standard intensities; combination of paired comparisons with right and wrong cases). A theoretical discussion (based on Meyer's theory) resolves the reaction into two types of response: the serial and the comparison reactions.] Discussion. **R. V. Blair.** 'Thurstone's Method of Study of the Learning Curve.' [We cannot get correct values for the constants of the learning-curve, by the use of an equation, unless we know the true zero-point for practice.]—Vol. xxv., No. 2. **R. M. Yerkes.** 'Psychology in Relation to the War.' [Outlines the work of psychologists, with especial reference to the examination of recruits for elimination of the unfit, but with mention also of selection of personnel, problems of aviation, re-education, recreation, problems of vision and audition.] **H. C. Link.** 'An Experiment in Employment Psychology.' [First report on tests applied to inspectors and gaugers of shells.] **H. B. Reed.** 'Associative Aids: i. Their Relation to Learning, Retention and Other Associations.' [The relation of rate of learning to rate of forgetting depends on the character of the measure (the method of saving is misleading), the character of the learning (presence or absence of aids) and the character of the material. The aids (especially order and position, patterns, predication and rhythm) are responsible for only about 7 per cent., other reproductive tendencies (especially perseverance, contiguity, sensory similarity) for 93 per cent. of the errors in learning.] **S. Froeberg.** 'Simultaneous versus Successive Association.' [Repetition and extension of Wohlgemuth's experiments. Simultaneity is not necessary for association; an association may be formed between two experiences when the first has already passed out of consciousness at the moment of appearance of the second.] Discussion. **M. S. Case, J. E. Creighton, and M. W. Catkins.** 'Miss Calkins's Case of Self against Soul.' [(1) Plato has no separate metaphysical conception of the soul. (2) The self as universal subject cannot be known as object. (3) In psychological regard the self is properly called an object.]

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. Vol. xxix., No. 1. **I. G. Campbell.** 'Manaism: a Study in the Psychology of Religion.' [Animism is the reading into things of the personal self, manaism the reading into things of the social self; the two concepts are complementary, and apparent priority of the one is merely emphasis due to circumstances. Mana experienced and ejected into an object is the basis of religion; mana experienced and stressed as part of the self gives rise to magic.] **A. Schinz.** 'French Origins of American Transcendentalism.' [Argues, following Girard, that the principal influence upon American philosophy before 1840 was French, and came by way of Mde. de Staël, Constant, de Gérando, Cousin, Jouffroy.] **W. D. Wallis.** 'Ethical Aspects of

Chilkat Culture.' [Notes, based on native information, on tribal organization, slaves, family, education, position of women, disposal of dead, etc.] **M. E. Goudge.** 'A Qualitative and Quantitative Study of Weber's Illusion.' [Weber's illusion is found on twenty-four out of forty-two regions tested, and has the same form for all normal observers. It is conditioned primarily upon cutaneous sensitivity and continuous movement of the two-point stimulus. Equivalence-ratios, determined at points of change, correlate with reports of the illusory perception.] **G. J. Rich.** 'A Checking Table for the Method of Constant Stimuli.' **K. M. Dallenbach.** 'Dr. Morgan on the Measurement of Attention.' Book Notes. Vol. xxix., No. 2. **E. E. Cassel and K. M. Dallenbach.** 'The Effect of Auditory Distraction upon the Sensory Reaction.' [A distractor may inhibit and lengthen reaction, or facilitate and shorten, or become habitual and have no effect. The result depends upon the temporal relations of the distractor and upon the conscious attitude of the reactor during distraction.] **G. S. Hall.** 'A Medium in the Bud.' [Account of incipient mediumship, at first attributed to an outgrowth of adolescent imagery representing a defensive reaction upon unfavourable home-surroundings, but later found to have a definitely erotic basis.] **P. Blanchard.** 'A Psycho-analytic Study of Auguste Comte.' [Comte is essentially an introvert; but three times his unconscious emotional life (Oedipus complex) came to the surface. In the final crisis, the extrovertive functions were so reinforced as to remain in power (shown by Comte's exaggeration of the affective element and by his religious doctrines).] **M. Luckiesh.** 'On "Retiring" and "Advancing" Colours.' [In general, blue retires and red advances. The different refractive indices of the eye-media for radiant energy may be in part responsible.] **E. C. Tolman and I. Johnson.** 'A Note on Association-time and Feeling.' [Names of simple sense-qualities, if unpleasant, lengthen reaction-times as much as words of deeper emotional significance. Women are more susceptible than men; and with women, pleasant stimulus-words may perhaps shorten the association-times.] **M. Schoen.** 'Prolonged Infancy, its Causes and its Significance: Some Notes on Mr. Fiske's Theory.' [As intelligence replaced prowess, and as the environment became accordingly simplified, the young found less and less need for immediate alertness, and infancy was accordingly prolonged.] **E. E. Cassel and K. M. Dallenbach.** 'An Objective Measure of Attributive Clearness.' [Both rate and degree of precision of the simple sensory reaction are reliable means of determining degree of clearness.] **S. C. Pepper.** 'What is Introspection?' [Critique of Titchener. Introspective method recognises no innate fitness of data; objective method, a later growth, insists on the natural superiority of vision.] **C. A. Ruckmich.** 'A Bibliography of Rhythm: Second Supplementary List.' **E. B. Titchener and E. G. Boring.** 'Minor Studies from the Psychological Laboratory of Cornell University.' **H. D. Williams.** 'XL. On the Calculation of an Associative Limen.' [Argues tentatively that the mnemonometric function is the *phi-gamma*, and that the effective condition of association varies with the logarithm of the number of repetitions.] **M. Kincaid.** 'XLI. An Analysis of the Psychometric Function for the Two-point Limen with Respect to the Paradoxical Error.' [The occurrence of the paradoxical error may indicate the presence of two antagonistic functions. If the normal function is the *phi-gamma*, the residual values constituting the second, dispositional or impressional function, may be obtained by mathematical analysis.] Book Notes. Vol. xxix., No. 3. **P. T. Young.** 'An Experimental Study of Mixed Feelings.' [Mixed feelings are reported rarely (71 in 2212 reports) and often doubtfully; there are also very large individual differences. The

report involves a confusion between the 'meaning' of pleasant or unpleasant (ascribed to an object) and effective experience proper. The meaning-error is favoured by intellectualisation, unpleasant mood, lack of psychological training, suggestion, and habituation to a form of report. Normal experiences which resemble mixed feelings are alternation, affective doubt, interruption of an established mood, awareness of affective object breaking in on a contrary affective disposition.]

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, xv., 1. **C. A. Strong.** 'Fate and Free Will.' [To show that determination does not entail fatalism.] **A. K. Rogers.** 'The Philosophy of Loyalty.' [A searching criticism of Royce, showing that if 'loyalty' is not to be a purely formal principle, settling no "questions of conscience and of conflict," it has to be interpreted as mere conformity to established social conventions for the improvement and reform of which it can make no provision. Nor can we do without some further independent standard of 'good' in order to condemn loyalty to a *bad* cause. It is shown finally that the ethical value in Royce's formula is better expressed by demanding absorption in interesting and satisfying *work*, which would naturally entail both self-expression and self-satisfaction.] xv., 2. **J. Dewey.** 'Concerning Alleged Immediate Knowledge of Mind.' [Criticises the 'naïve introspectionism' of supposing that "personal events have a nature or meaning which is one with their happening" so that a man cannot be unaware of his motives.] **C. E. Ayres.** 'The Epistemological Significance of Social Psychology.' ["Social psychology most certainly is not limited to the study of the more elementary expressions of the social nature of mind . . . the new epistemology—social-psychology—is already in process of becoming our chief instrument of control over social evolution."] **J. E. Downey.** 'The Proof Reader's Illusion and General Intelligence.' [It "correlates with general intelligence to a considerable degree," on the basis of experiments with a class in psychology.] xv., 3. **H. T. Costello.** 'Hypotheses and Instrumental Logicians.' [Asks Dewey to be more explicit in his account of the function of hypotheses, to distinguish between hypotheses which are verified directly and indirectly, to remember "the immense importance of understanding comparison," and "the social aspect of thinking," *i.e.*, understanding language and communicating, and to bring out "the strategic importance of the great laws of science".] **G. A. Tawney.** 'Vox populi, Vox Dei.' [It "remains a false doctrine, until people is equated with humanity".] **E. S. Brightman.** 'Some Remarks on "Two Common Fallacies on the Logic of Religion".' [Cf. W. R. Wells in xiv., 24. Criticises the assumptions that religious beliefs are unverifiable, and that because mystical experience is from 'below' it cannot be influenced from 'above'.] **J. S. Moore.** 'The Validity of Religious Belief.' [Also a criticism of Wells's paper—for identifying empirical verification with verification in terms of sense-experience.] xv., 4. **W. T. Bush.** 'Value and Causality.' [Instrumentalism tends to make 'value' a synonym for 'use'; but there are also intrinsic values which are 'good' without being 'good for,' and these should not be overlooked.] **A. I. Gates.** Report on the Twenty-sixth Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association. xv., 5. **T. de Laguna.** 'On the Distinction between Primary and Secondary Qualities.' [Under the influence of Berkeley the reaction against this distinction has gone too far. Admitting that "things, their secondary qualities and a fortiori their primary qualities, are fictions," that "the empirical demonstration of what is or is not given in experience" is difficult or even impossible and that "the very distinction be-

tween the given and the inferred or constructed" may not be altogether valid, we must remember that "all physical and chemical *measurements* are in mechanical terms, whether or not physics and chemistry are ultimately reducible to mechanics". Hence "objective colours, tones, etc., are measurable only in terms of the primary qualities so-called".]

D. W. Pratt. 'Concerning the Nature of Philosophy.' ["Philosophy is identical with science itself"—in general, in which form no science possesses it. "Thus any science is fundamentally scientific only when it is philosophical."] xv., 6. **W. T. Bush.** 'An Apology for Tradition.'

[A meditation on German philosophy à propos of Boutroux's 'Philosophy and War'.]

D. T. Howard. 'The Pragmatic Method.' [à propos of Dewey's essay in *Creative Intelligence*. It is objected that "pragmatism cannot do full justice to the mental and spiritual life of man" because it is restricted to the methods of biology.] **E. C. Parsons.** 'Ceremonial Impatience.'

[An anthropological study of rites intended to accelerate some desired event, ending up with an application to some of the catch-words of modern politics.] xv., 7. **B. H. Bode.** 'Why do Philosophical Problems Persist?'

[A review of Miss Calkins's *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy*—which answers 'because they need to be re-defined from generation to generation'.] Report on the 17th Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association by I. Edman, W. Fite, H. Parkhurst. xv., 8. **A. G. A. Balz.** 'Dualism and Early Modern Philosophy,' I.

[To show, historically, that modern philosophy inherited a dualistic psychology which it has never been able to shake off. The present article is largely concerned with Thomas Aquinas's version of the Aristotelian dualism.] xv., 9. **A. G. A. Balz.** 'Dualism and Early Modern Philosophy,' II.

[Concludes that "when we feel compelled to prove the existence of an external world, while the scientist and the man in the street alike assume its existence . . . we cannot resist the conclusion that there is something artificial and spurious in the problems generated by the dual view of existence".] **H. Cary.** 'Estimation of Centidiurnal Periods of Time: an Experimental Investigation of the Time Sense.'

[A humorous account, in technical jargon, of the way the speakers at the 1917 Meeting of the American Psychological Association exceeded their allotted time. *E.g.*, one conclusion drawn is that "accurate appreciation of time diminishes directly with age and psychological training and inversely with the intelligence quotient I.Q.".] xv., 10. **J. Dewey.** 'The Objects of Valuation.'

[In reply to R. B. Perry and W. T. Bush, endeavours to make clear (1) that "propositions about values already given as values" are not the valuations described as 'practical judgments,' (2) that the *prizing* of a recognised value is to be distinguished from "the cognitive act of valuation" which determines a value, and (3) that there are constantly occasions for *doubting* apparent or alleged values, and that these lead to revaluations and real value-judgments.] **H. R. Marshall.** 'Behaviour.'

[Contends that to abstract from consciousness in accounting for human actions is to despair of psychology.] **C. J. Keyser.** 'Doctrinal Functions.'

[Starts from Russell's notion of a propositional function which is neither true nor false until values have been assigned to its variables, and points out that values may always be given which make nonsense of the function and hence are to be called *inadmissible constants*. Admissible constants are divided into *verifiers* and *falsifiers*: the former "*satisfy* it and are called the *values* of its *variables*". Thus the values of a given function are the true propositions that are derivable from it by replacing its variables by admissible constants." Applying these distinctions to "the postulational method of founding and constructing mathematical sciences," it appears that as "any postulate-system contains one or more undefined terms and

at least one of these denotes an *element*," which gives it the appearance of having a definite subject-matter, the system will require interpretation. In this process "the rôle of the undefined terms is the rôle of variables"; hence "a postulate system is not a system of propositions, as it is commonly said to be, but it is a system of propositional functions". It should be called therefore a 'doctrinal function,' and it is shown that "the number of values of any doctrinal function is equal to any given transfinite cardinal number. It is a corollary that "Hilbert's Foundations of Geometry is not a geometry at all, nor is it any other doctrine; it is a doctrinal function having an infinitude of values, some of them geometric, some of them algebraic, some of them neither the one nor the other".] **E. B. McGilvary.** 'Error in Professor Holt's Realism.' [The doctrine that 'Error is contrariety or contradiction that has got into consciousness' combined with that that 'Nature is a seething chaos of contradictions,' should compel Holt to call an 'error' much that no one dreams of calling it, e.g., a disease.] xv., 11. **W. Riley.** 'Two types of Transcendentalism in America.' [To prove that "New England transcendentalism was evidently not made in Germany, nor France, nor Britain". It was "a native plant, fertilised indeed from abroad, but nevertheless rooted in the local soil".] **A. A. Merrill.** 'Free Will.' [If cause and effect means a succession in time which can be repeated, there can be free will because there is no (exact) repetition.] **R. H. Dotterer.** 'The Definition of Infinity.' [Criticises the 'new infinite' of Dedekind and Cantor as doubly ambiguous. (1) Two infinite series do not stand *merely* in a one-to-one correspondence, but also in an infinity of others. But *unless* they do, the new definitions of 'similarity' and 'equality' break down. (2) The 'new infinite' is only the old in disguise, for that also involved an inexhaustible series and the possibility of a one-to-one correspondence (or of any other). Hence it retains also the old difficulties. Only they are hidden away in its definition. Thus the infinite series of cardinal numbers cannot be called a 'system' or a 'totality' without assuming a realised infinite. If 'totality' is defined to mean *determinable* only, the 'new infinite' cannot claim existence any more than the old. Hence "it does not help in the solution of any of the problems of philosophy or theology".]

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. January, 1918. Vol. xxviii., No. 2. **A. K. Rogers.** 'The Principles of Distributive Justice.' [Discusses various principles for an equitable distribution of goods. Existing possession should be respected only in so far as general stability is expedient. "Equality," when strictly interpreted, is unfair, and proportioning of reward to effort is impracticable. "The right to possession of one's own produce" is unsatisfactory owing to the complications introduced by co-operation and to the element of luck in competition. The writer concludes that division cannot be based solely on a principle of abstract justice but is "a matter of expediency—of satisfying the various classes involved to a degree that will make them willing to co-operate for the best interests of all".] **Herbert L. Stewart.** 'The Alleged Prussianism of Thomas Carlyle.' [Carlyle taught not that Might is Right but that Right is Might or will become so eventually. This view also shown in his belief that great social convulsions have at bottom just demands. As to Carlyle's attacks on democracy, he would have an autocracy organised for social good not for war—the ideal of Prussian Militarism.] **Aldred H. Lloyd.** 'The Glory of Democracy—Poetry, Comedy, and Duty.' [The progress of democracy demands the type of vision implied in poetic imagination, and this involves humour; and vision and cheerfulness mean duty.] **Kia-Lok Yen.** 'The Bases of

Democracy in China.' [With a view to discovering how various Chinese institutions have favoured the organisation of a democratic government the author discusses the family, the "greater family," village organisation, the four class system (scholars, farmers, artisans and merchants), the mutual loan association, guilds and some political institutions. "The doctrine that government is for the people and by the people is as old as legendary China itself." Contact with the West has intensified the feeling of nationality.] **Wilbur M. Urban.** 'Tolstoy and the Russian Sphinx.' ["The mystery of Tolstoy and the mystery of Russia are one." The idea of the "simple peasant" is overdone; while we neglect, both as regards Tolstoy and Russia as a whole, that "temperamental nihilism which so often constitutes the Russian answer to the riddle of life".] **John M. Mecklin.** 'The Tyranny of the Average Man.' [A discussion of the evils and advantages of democracy, which involves a mental despotism. The average man is conventional, prejudiced, afraid of new ideas and lacking in imagination, but his moral judgments are sounder than those of his intellectual superiors.] **James Lindsay.** 'Ethical Christianity in Europe.' [Attempts to refute Bertrand Russell's assertion that the influence of Christianity has decayed rapidly in Europe during the last century, by showing the low level of morals and religion a century ago, and the deep if hidden influence of Christianity at the present day—an influence which cannot be measured by statistics.]

BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. Vol. ix., Part 1. December 1917. **Shepherd Dawson.** 'The Theory of Binocular Colour Mixture, II.' [A critical survey of the various theories of binocular colour mixture with a detailed exposition of the attention theory.] **M. E. Bickersteth.** 'The Application of Mental Tests to Children of various Ages.' [A very extensive research, dealing with 2500 school children. Specific mental abilities found to vary much more with different individuals of the same age than between the averages of individuals of different ages. Little correlation shown between motor ability and general mental ability. Only a low correlation between age and reasoning power as shown in the "analogies" test. Town children excelled in tests involving speed and in the reasoning test, country children being invariably superior in memory tests.] **Cicely U. Parsons.** Children's Interpretations of Ink Blots: A Study in Some Characteristics of Children's Imaginations.' [Blots apperceived as living beings more frequently than as inert objects. Boys of seven have ideas connected with landscape more frequently than is the case with girls.] **Ida B. Saxby.** 'Some Conditions Affecting Growth and Permanence of Desires.' [An extensive research with school children, some of whom were given special courses of training in observation, neatness, etc. Special exercises in "quick perception" did not result in any general improvement in "taking things in at a glance". Evidence is given as to the development of "ideals" of neatness, of being observant, etc., their influence by special exercises, their dependence on the teacher concerned and on suggestion by companions.]

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. Sept., 1917. **Ch. Dunan.** 'Pour le progrès de la métaphysique.' [Sharply distinguishes science, which uses understanding and deals with existence, from metaphysics, which uses reason and deals with being. The Greeks and hardly anyone since them understood this. (Good rhetoric and little else.)] **G. Morin.** 'L'individualisme du Code Civil.' [Deals with the work of recent French jurists, and especially M. Demogue, on the gradual breakdown of the individualism of the *Code Civil*. The political theory is traced to Grotius,

Rousseau, and Adam Smith; it is summed up by Kant in the two principles of the independence of individuals and their self-determination. The former principle conflicts with economic interdependence; the code regards all economic relations as contracts between independent individuals, but this has become a mere fiction with the development of natural and legal monopolies characteristic of large-scale production and distribution. The law tries to meet the new conditions by imposing rules on the monopolist or by allowing combinations among workmen and consumers. The latter were at first treated as voluntary contracts among their members, but it has been found necessary to legalise collective bargaining and to make such bargains obligatory on all members of the contracting groups. The Syndicalists want an 'individualism of groups,' but schemes for profit-sharing and for the establishment of consultative committees of workmen in factories point in a different direction. Trusts and cartels are still in theory forbidden by § 419 of the Code; in practice relaxations have constantly to be made in their favour on various and often inconsistent pretexts. Seeing the economic efficiency of large-scale production it were better to abolish § 419 and to deal with the dangers of monopoly either by a legal fixing of prices and conditions or by nationalisation. The attempt to force all economic relations into the mould of contracts should be frankly abandoned; it is better to compare the relations of a railway company and its travellers to those of a public authority, making regulations for the use of roads. The state must then see that the regulations made are reasonable. We must likewise recognise that the decisions of a majority in any association are binding on all its members; the sole duty of the law is to see that the decision has been regularly taken and that it does not infringe the public interest. (A valuable article.) **L. Rougier.** 'De la nécessité d'une réforme dans l'enseignement de la logique.' [The teaching of logic should be brought into line with modern knowledge. (1) The invalidity of subalternation and of syllogisms like Darapti should be recognised. (2) It should be shown that there are valid and valuable types of reasoning beside the syllogism and the usual immediate inferences. (3) There is no such thing as inductive reasoning, and the distinction between deductive and inductive science is not a happy one. (4) The distinction of analytic and synthetic is merely psychological. (5) Indefinables and indemonstrables are so only in relation to a given system; the ultimate system being the notions and primitive propositions of formal logic. (6) The traditional logic gives a most inadequate account of definition, neglecting definition by postulates. These defects hide the nature of pure and applied mathematics and give rise to apparent antinomies. (All quite true: but who will teach the examiners?).] **E. Cramussel.** 'Pour un enseignement philosophique nouveau.' [Recommends a limitation in the range of subjects studied, and that each professor should confine himself to subjects on which he is really an expert. ('Recalls the worst excesses of the French Revolution!').] **R. H.** 'Réflexions sur la guerre expiatriée.' [The war a conflict between opposite ethical theories, and inevitable and incapable of compromise. The evils of war may be regarded as just punishments on communities for actual sins or for culpable negligence. (Was Belgium more sinful than Holland?).]

"SCIENTIA" (RIVISTA DI SCIENZA). Series ii., Vol. xxiii., April, 1918. **G. Castelnuovo.** 'Questioni di metodo nel calcolo delle probabilità.' **Abel Rey.** 'La renaissance du cinétisme. I^{re} Partie: La réaction et l'échec du positivisme pur.' [After the defects of the ancient kinetism had been recognised, a state of thought arose, towards the end of the nineteenth century, which may be characterised by its opposition to

mechanism and by its pragmatic and utilitarian conception of scientific truth. Among physicists proper, this state of thought led to the use in thought of mechanical models; but with Mach, Kirchhoff, Hertz, and Duhem, for example, we see more pronounced philosophical tendencies (cf. the author's *La Théorie de la physique chez les physiciens contemporains*). Rise and fall of 'energetics' and renaissance of kinetism: physics again comes into contact with reality. A continuation of this article will show how the intuitive nature of science has led to the re-establishment of physical realism.] **Yves Delage**. 'Le rêve et la condition psychique du rêveur.' [Summary of his forthcoming *Psychologie de rêve*. There are three domains in the analysis of dreams, in each of which the psychism of the dreamer plays a different part: (1) the inanimate objects and the actors in the dream; (2) The play of the actors (including the dreamer); (3) The stream of thoughts and judgments on what goes on. Appendix of descriptions of two dreams.] **H. Westergaard**. 'L'économie politique ancienne et nouvelle.' **T. B. Napier**. 'The Effect on British Opinion of the Russian Revolution and the American Intervention.' Book Reviews. General Review. **F. Bottazzi**. 'Les problèmes modernes de la nutrition.' Review of Reviews. Chronicle. French translations of articles in Italian and English. Vol. xxiii., May, 1918. **Abel Rey**. 'La renaissance du cinétisme. IIème Partie: Le nouveau cinétisme et sa position philosophique.' [Nowadays it seems that all physicists agree that the criticisms of pure positivism have resulted in re-establishing contact between the physical and the real, although they do not all conceive the real in the same way. In this second part, there is a sketch of in what this re-establishment consists, and of its philosophical value and significance.] **Filippo Bottazzi**. 'Le attività fisiologiche fondamentali. Quarto Articolo: Il metabolismo materiale. Parte Iª: Definizioni. Tipi fondamentali e velocità delle reazioni metaboliche.' **Edmond Perrier**. 'L'origine des embranchements du règne animal. Ière Partie: Les variations d'attitude chez les animaux actuels.' **W. R. Scott**. 'Nationality and Cosmopolitanism.' **Ch. Guignebert**. 'La question de Pologne et la Papauté.' Critical note. **Eugenio Rignano**. 'La signification des rêves.' [On J. H. Coriat's book on *The Meaning of Dreams* (London, 1916), 'which gives an exposition of, and illustrates, in a clear and synthetic form, the theories of the psycho-analytic school. . . . If there is anything true and valuable in these theories, it is so disfigured by the one-sided and extravagant character of the applications that one feels tempted to reject the whole thing.'] Book Reviews. General Review. **G. Stefanini**. 'Les récents progrès des études paléogéographiques. Ière Partie: Les études de M. Schuchert.' Review of Reviews. Chronicle. French translations of articles in Italian and English. Vol. xxiii., June, 1918. **J. Rey Pastor**. 'La systématisation de la Géométrie au moyen de la théorie des groupes.' **Filippo Bottazzi**. 'Le attività fisiologiche fondamentali. Quarto Articolo: Il metabolismo materiale. Parte IIª: Metabolismo degli alimenti organici; teorie del metabolismo.' **Edmond Perrier**. 'L'origine des embranchements du règne animal. IIème Partie: Le rôle qu'y ont joué les attitudes.' **Sir W. J. Collins**. 'The Semeiology of the World-Wide War.' **Jovan Cvijić**. 'Unité ethnique et nationale des Yougoslaves.' Critical note. **Eugenio Rignano**. 'Psychologie et psychiatrie.' [On E. Tanzi and E. Lugano's *Trattato delle malattie mentali*, 2nd ed., Milano, 1914 and 1916.] Book Reviews. General Review. **G. Stefanini**. 'Les progrès récents des études paléogéographiques. IIème Partie: Les études paléobotaniques de M. Berry.' Review of Reviews. Chronicle. Index to vol. xxiii French translations of articles in Italian and English.

IX.—NOTES.

M. JULES LACHELIER.

It is with deep regret we have to record the death of M. Jules Lachelier, a veteran philosopher who possessed a place peculiarly his own in the affection and esteem of his colleagues and pupils. Born at Fontainebleau in 1832, he was educated first at Versailles, then at the Lycée Louis-le-Grand (Sainte-Barbe); next he was a student at the École normale. He was professor of Logic at Toulouse (1857-58), and then at Caen (1858-61). In 1864 he became a professor at the École normale where he taught philosophy for eleven years. He became Inspecteur de l'Académie de Paris in 1875, and Inspecteur Général de l'instruction publique in 1879. He was a member of the Institute, and "officier" of the Legion of Honour.

M. Lachelier published very little. There only remain two small volumes; the first contains his thesis for the doctorate in 1871,—"Du fondement de l'induction," an article entitled "Psychologie et Métaphysique," and "Notes sur le pari de Pascal"; the second is entitled "Études sur le syllogisme". He was above all a teacher,—"*son œuvre, ce sont ses élèves*". His method did not consist in serving up a ready-made philosophy, but in developing in his pupils the need and the power of thinking for themselves, and so he remained for them "the Master," however much their subsequent thought diverged from his.

The philosophy of M. Lachelier was largely inspired by Kant and Leibniz. It is sometimes (wrongly, I think) described as eclectic. It is only eclectic in the sense in which that term may be applied to any philosophy which is not uninformed of the past, and as a matter of history the influence of Ravaisson and Lachelier made a clear break with the school of Cousin. A brief statement of the chief positions maintained in M. Lachelier's thesis on Induction may give some idea of his views.

In the process of induction we somehow pass from the knowledge of facts to the knowledge of their laws. We know that the phenomena before our eyes are related in certain ways, but can we say that they must be related always and everywhere in the same way? And if we can, on what principle does our procedure rest? Laws are not a logical result of the mere enumeration of facts. For we extend to the future, laws which, on that supposition, only represent the sum of past facts. Again, on a single well-ascertained fact we establish a law which applies both to the past and the future. Further, each fact is contingent, while a law is the expression of a necessity. Induction cannot be based on the purely formal principle of identity which only allows us to say in one shape what we have already said in another. What is needed is a principle in some sense material, in order to add to the facts perceived the universality and necessity which are essential to laws.

M. Lachelier disapproved of Reid's formulation of the inductive principle: "In the order of nature that which will happen will probably resemble that which has happened in similar circumstances". On the contrary, it is quite certain that what has happened in certain conditions

will happen again when all these conditions are again conjoined. Unless something is certain nothing can be probable. In practice induction is always subject to error, but in respect of authority (*en droit*) it is infallible absolutely.

In the notion of laws of nature two principles are involved; in virtue of one, phenomena form series in which the existence of the antecedent determines that of the consequent; in virtue of the other, these series in turn form systems in which the idea of the whole determines the existence of the parts. Hence induction rests on the double principle of efficient and final causes. Knowledge does not begin with generalities and abstractions, its origin must be sought in one or more concrete and individual acts, in which thought constitutes itself by seizing reality immediately. Either science is a dream, or its principles are the expression of a fact, and that is the fact at once of existence and of thought, wherein the principle of induction must be found, and not in an original axiom.

What is the first step by which thought enters into relation with reality? M. Lachelier found in contemporary philosophy two conceptions of reality. (a) Reality consists entirely of phenomena, and all knowledge is, in the last analysis, sensation. (b) Reality is somehow shared between phenomena and certain entities inaccessible to our senses, and in this case knowledge begins at the same time by a sense-intuition of phenomena and a sort of intellectual intuition of these entities. Hence it is necessary to enquire whether the principle of induction can be demonstrated from experience, or from the intuition of things-in-themselves. In case of failure a third way must be sought.

Mill's is chosen as the empirical proof on the ground that nothing better can be done in the same way. It is rejected because it can only refer to the past, and so could only be universal and certain if there were no more facts to come and no more inductions to make. Nor is it the same thing to observe a phenomenon, and to judge that the same phenomenon will be reproduced in the same circumstances.

The upshot of Mill's system is to make science impossible. Because we have acquired the habit of associating in a certain order the images of our past sensations, does it follow that our future sensations must follow one another in the same order? "What empiricism calls our thought in opposition to nature is merely a collection of weakened impressions which outlive their own powers: and, to seek the secret of the future in what is only the empty image of the past, is to undertake to guess in a dream what must happen to us when awake" (p. 25).

The school of Cousin formulates the principle of induction by saying that there is order in nature, but fails to give a precise idea of this order. Metaphysics cannot be founded on "the principle of substance," and "the principle of cause," for if the knowledge of things-in-themselves is intuitive, it cannot assume the form of a principle, and if it is not, it has no objective value.

These two ways having failed, what is the third? Besides phenomena and entities, distinct alike from phenomena and thought, there only remains thought itself. In thought and its relation with phenomena, the foundation of induction must be sought. Our highest knowledge is neither sensation nor intellectual intuition, but reflexion. Such a view is the only possible one, the only one by which we can understand our ability to know *a priori* the objective conditions of the existence of phenomena, for the conditions of their existence are the very conditions of the possibility of thought.

The inductive principle implies both the serial sequence of phenomena and their union in a system or systems, and it is necessary to show that

without these thought is impossible. The conditions of the possibility of thought are two: (a) the existence of a subject which distinguishes itself from each of its sensations, otherwise sensations and phenomena would mingle, and there would be nothing that we could call either ourselves or our thought; (b) the unity of this subject amid the diversity of sensations simultaneous or successive.

The subject is not a substance nor an act of will, nor is its unity that of a thought reflected on itself. The essential difficulty is that thought can only exist if sensations are united in a subject distinct from them, while this distinctness itself seems to make the subject incapable of serving as the ground for such unity. From this difficulty M. Lachelier saw only one way of escape—to admit that the unity of the subject is not the unity of an act but of a form. The natural relations of our sensations one to another can only be those of the phenomena to which they correspond, and the problem of the unity of sensations in a single thought is the problem of the union of all phenomena in a single universe. Knowledge and existence can only be explained if they form in reality one thing.

All phenomena are movements, and everything in nature must be explained in mechanical terms "for the mechanism of nature is, in a world subject to the form of time and of space, the only possible expression of the determinism of thought" (p. 56).

Sounds and colours and secondary qualities in general are simple appearances which only exist in our senses. The perception of these qualities is the obscure perception of certain movements. Movement is the only real, because it is the only intelligible phenomenon.

If nature is a mechanism what becomes of the spontaneity of life and the liberty of human action? Is the harmony of functions in plants and animals the result of the general laws of movement or of an "agent spécial" distinct from the organism, and subject only to teleological laws? There is no ground for the latter assumption, it is very difficult, and ends by being a mechanism inside a soul. The actions of men are no exception to the universal mechanism. A liberty of indifference would be fatal all round; man is a moral mechanism determined by motives. The law of efficient causes, however, only relates each movement to a preceding one, and does not explain the co-ordination of several series of movements. The possibility of thought rests on the unity of its object, and this unity consists of the *liaison mécanique* of causes and effects. Why or how add a second unity to this?

The first unity is incomplete and superficial; it is not a unity of the things themselves, but of the series of places which they occupy in time, and the movement of thought which passes without interruption from one to the other. In short, it is a form; the content comes as sensation. Thought based on mere mechanism would only be an empty form, the abstract possibility of thought. "We must then find a means of making at the same time thought real and reality intelligible; and this means can only be a second unity which shall be to the matter of phenomena what the first is to their form, and which shall allow thought to seize by a single act the content of several sensations" (p. 77). Hence finality, by which alone this is possible, is the only complete explanation of thought and of nature. It is on the distinction of our faculties that the opposition of concrete and abstract, mechanism and finality rests. "Thought which could forget itself in order to lose—or rather, wholly find itself in things, would know no other law than harmony, no other light than beauty" (p. 86).

Finality is "the hidden spring of mechanism". "Every phenomenon, or, what amounts to the same thing, every movement is the product of a

spontaneity which directs itself towards an end; but a spontaneity which directs itself towards an end is a tendency, and a tendency which produces a movement is a force: every phenomenon is therefore the development and manifestation of a force" (pp. 87-88). M. Lachelier thus passes in his argument through *un idéalisme matérialiste* as a temporary stage to *un réalisme spiritualiste*, as the true philosophy of nature. He himself considered his philosophy to be a Kantian Idealism, and perhaps scarcely realised how far he had gone beyond the sources of his inspiration. Short as his works unfortunately are, they serve to reveal a perfect style, and a subtle clearness of thought hard to match, even in French philosophy.

ARTHUR ROBINSON.

NOTES ON ZENO'S ARGUMENTS ON MOTION.

THE following notes have to do with two points. The first is to call attention to an argument used by Mr. R. A. P. Rogers; the second is to bring out the force of some remarks attributed to the shade of Zeno on pages 52-55 of the number of *MIND* for January, 1916, and which do not seem to have been expressed clearly enough.

In 1910 Mr. R. A. P. Rogers published an interesting paper 'On Transfinite Numbers, and some Problems Relating to the Structure of Actual Space and Time' (*Hermathena*, vol. xv., 1910, pp. 397-415). The most original part of the paper begins on page 409 and is an argument for the compactness of both space and time from the possibility of what the author calls 'uninterrupted' motion at different velocities. 'Uninterrupted' motion of a particle is defined as 'the occupation in spatial order of different positions in different instants'. It follows that if the number of points in a spatial distance is finite, uninterrupted motion is possible with only one velocity, and this is the maximum velocity for any kind of motion. As Mr. Rogers remarked to me in a letter and in a note written in the margin of a copy of his above paper, this conclusion would be in agreement with the views of certain modern physicists that there is a maximum velocity, the velocity of light.

The argument that, if a space and time were composed of a finite number of elements, only one velocity would be possible was really that of Zeno's fourth argument, and was simplified by Mr. Russell on pages 134, 177, and 178 of his 'Lowell Lectures'. The object of the shade of Zeno at the end of the paper quoted above was to show that mere compactness does not allow us to refute Zeno's argument of the Arrow, whereas apparently Mr. Russell thought that compactness alone was necessary. In fact, even if space and time were composed of certain aggregates which are compact and either enumerable or of the same cardinal number as the continuum, but of a certain unclosed type described on page 53 of the paper, the Arrow-argument would hold quite rigidly and thus no motion would be possible.

The argument in the last section of the paper was simply to show that unaided common sense could easily agree to the logical impossibility of motion even in the apparently closed aggregate of points which we call space. We must, I think, admit the possibility that some of the motions which go on around us are, as a matter of fact, interrupted, and so we certainly cannot decide by logic whether space and time are compact and closed or not. But what logic enables us to do is to conclude that the possibility of uninterrupted motion implies not only the compactness of space and time, but also that they form continua.

The fallacious argument on page 54 makes use of, among other things, the

fact that a transfinite ordinal number (of the second class) of lengths may have a total length which is as small as we please. The only connexion which the transfinite cardinal and ordinal numbers have with *distances* seems to be this: Whereas we can always find a *finite* number such that that number of intervals *equal in length to one another* exceeds any given length, and no finite number of certain intervals (not all of equal length) can produce an interval whose total length is greater than an assigned length; it is always possible to find an ordinal of the second class such that that number of *any* given selection of intervals forms an interval of length greater than any assigned one, and thus the cardinal number Aleph-one of *any* intervals cannot be contained in any line however long.

PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN.

NOTE ON C. D. BROAD'S ARTICLE IN THE JULY "MIND".

Mr. Broad's very interesting article in the July MIND on "A General Notation for the Logic of Relations" attributes to me (for what reason I cannot guess) a number of notations employed in *Principia Mathematica*. As far as my memory serves me, all these were invented by Dr. Whitehead, who, in fact, is responsible for most of the notation in that work. My original notation, before he came to my assistance, may be found in Peano's *Revue de Mathématiques*, vols. vii. and viii.

BERTRAND RUSSELL.

MIND ASSOCIATION.

The following is the full list of the officers and members of the Association :—

OFFICERS.

President—PROF. H. WILDON CARR.

Vice-Presidents—PROFS. B. BOSANQUET, T. CASE, G. DAWES HICKS, F. B. JEVONS, J. H. MUIRHEAD, A. S. PRINGLE-PATTISON, C. READ, W. R. SORLEY, and J. WARD, DR. J. M. E. McTAGGART, and THE VERY REV. DR. HASTINGS RASHDALL.

Editor—PROF. G. F. STOUT.

Treasurer—DR. F. C. S. SCHILLER.

Secretary—MR. H. STURT.

Guarantors—THE RIGHT HON. A. J. BALFOUR, VISCOUNT HALDANE, and MRS. HENRY SIDGWICK.

MEMBERS.

ALEXANDER (Prof. S.), The University, Manchester.
ANDERSON (W.), Logic Department, The University, Glasgow.
BAILLIE (Prof. J. B.), King's College, Aberdeen.
BAIN (Mrs.), 32 High St., Banff, N.B. *Hon. Member.*
BAIN (J. A.), 37 Widdrington Terrace, North Shields.
BALFOUR (Rt. Hon. A. J.), Whittingehame, Prestonkirk, N.B.
BARKER (H.), The University, Edinburgh.
BENECKE (E. C.), 182 Denmark Hill, London, S.E.
BENETT (W.), Oatlands, Warborough, Wallingford.
BERKELEY (Capt. H.), 304 Woodstock Road, Oxford.
BLACKBURN (Dr. A. E.), Ashwick, Poole Road, Bournemouth, W.
BLUNT (H. W.), 183 Woodstock Road, Oxford.
BONAR (J.), The Mint, Ottawa, Canada.
BOSANQUET (Prof. B.), Heath Cottage, Oxshott, Surrey.
BOWMAN (Prof. A. A.), 77 Montgomerie St., Glasgow.
BRADLEY (F. H.), Merton College, Oxford.
BRAHAM (Rev. E. G.), 100 Church Road, Horfield, Bristol.
BREN (Rev. R.), 68 Wheellys Road, Edgbaston, Birmingham.
BRETT (Prof. G. S.), Trinity College, Toronto, Canada.
BROUGH (Prof. J.), Hampden House, London, N.W.
BRYANT (Mrs. S.), 12 Gayton Crescent, London, N.W.
BURNET (Prof. J.), The University, St. Andrews, N.B.
CAMERON (Rev. Dr. J. R.), Park Manse, Helensburgh, N.B.
CARPENTER (Rev. Dr. J. E.), 11 Marston Ferry Road, Oxford.
CARR (Prof. H. W.), 107 Church St., Chelsea, S.W. 3.
CASE (T.), Corpus Christi College, Oxford.

- CODDINGTON (F. J. O.), Training College, Sheffield.
 COIT (Dr. S.), 30 Hyde Park Gate, London, S.W.
 COLE (G. D. H.), Magdalen College, Oxford.
 COOK (S. A.), 26 Lensfield Road, Cambridge.
 COOKE (H. P.), Cleveland, Lyndwode Road, Cambridge.
 COOKE (Dr. R. B.), H.Q. 26 Bn. Canadian B.E.F., France.
 DAVIDSON (Prof. W. L.), 8 Queen's Gardens, Aberdeen.
 DESSOULAVY (Rev. Dr. C.), Pennybridge, Mayfield, Sussex.
 DIXON (Capt. E. T.), Racketts, Hythe, Hants.
 DOUGLAS (C. M.), Auchlochan, Lesmahagow, Lanarkshire.
 DUNLAP (Prof. K.), Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, U.S.A.
 EDGELL (Miss B.), 15 Lyon Road, Harrow.
 ELIOT (Sir C. N. E.), K.C.M.G., The University, Hong-Kong.
 FAIRBROTHER (W. H.), Trusley Cottage, Totland Bay, I.W.
 FAWCETT (E. D.), Craven Hill Hotel, Lancaster Gate, W.
 FIELD (G. C.), Courtlands, Westbourne Road, Edgbaston.
 FORSYTH (Prof. T. M.), Grey College, Bloemfontein, South Africa.
 FREMANTLE (H. E. S.), Cottesloe, P. O. Selborne, District Uitenhage
 Cape Colony.
 GALLAGHER (Rev. J.), Crowton Vicarage, Northwich.
 GALLOWAY (Principal G.), St. Mary's College, St. Andrews, N.B.
 GIBSON (Prof. J.), Bron Hwfa, Bangor, Wales.
 GIBSON (Prof. W. R. B.), The University, Melbourne, Australia.
 GOLDSBOROUGH (Dr. G. F.), Church Side, Herne Hill, S.E.
 GRANGER (Prof. F.), University College, Nottingham.
 HALDANE (Rt. Hon. Viscount), 23 Queen Anne's Gate, London, S.W.
 HAMPTON (Prof. H. V.), Gujarat College, Ahmedabad, India.
 HARDIE (R. P.), 13 Palmerston Road, Edinburgh.
 HETHERINGTON (Prof. H. T. W.), University College, Cardiff.
 HICKS (Prof. G. D.), 9 Cranmer Road, Cambridge.
 HOERNLÉ (Prof. R. F. A.), Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A.
 INGHAM (C. B.), Moira House, Eastbourne.
 JAMES (Rev. J. G.), Flowerdale, Potters Road, New Barnet.
 JEVONS (Dr. F. B.), Bishop Hatfield's Hall, Durham.
 JOACHIM (H. H.), Merton College, Oxford.
 JONES (Miss E. E. C.), Meldon, Weston-super-Mare.
 JONES (Prof. Sir H.), 1 The College, Glasgow.
 JONES (Rev. Dr. W. Tudor), 14 Clifton Park, Bristol.
 JOSEPH (H. W. B.), New College, Oxford.
 JOURDAIN (P. E. B.), Bourne, Basingbourne Road, Fleet, Hants.
 KEATINGE (Dr. M. W.), 40 St. Margaret's Road, Oxford.
 KELLET (Rev. O.), Stonyhurst College, Blackburn.
 KEYNES (Dr. J. N.), 6 Harvey Road, Cambridge.
 KIRKBY (Rev. Dr. P. J.), Saham Rectory, Watton, Norfolk.
 KNOX (Capt. H. V.), 3 Crick Road, Oxford.
 LAIRD (Prof. J.), Queen's University, Belfast.
 LATTA (Prof. R.), 4 The College, Glasgow.
 LIBRARIAN (The), Bedford College, Regent's Park, N.W.
 LINDSAY (A. D.), Balliol College, Oxford.

- LOVEDAY (Prof. T.), Armstrong College, Newcastle-on-Tyne.
MACHEN (A.), Edward House, 7 Lisson Grove, N.W. 1.
McDOUGALL (W.), 89 Banbury Rd., Oxford.
McINTYRE (Dr. J. L.), Abbotsville, Cults, Aberdeenshire.
McIVER (Prof. R. M.), The University, Toronto, Canada.
MACKENZIE (Prof. J. S.), 56 Bassett Road, North Kensington, W.
MACKENZIE (Dr. W. L.), 4 Clarendon Crescent, Edinburgh.
MACKINTOSH (Prof. H. R.), 81 Colinton Road, Edinburgh.
McTAGGART (Dr. J. M. E.), Trinity College, Cambridge.
MAIR (Prof. A.), 26 Parkfield Road, Liverpool.
MARETT (Dr. R. R.), Exeter College, Oxford.
MARRIOTT (Rev. S. J.), Netherton Vicarage, Dudley.
MARSHALL (Mrs. D. H.), Ovingdean Hall, Brighton.
MARSHALL (H. Rutgers), Century Assn., 7 West 43rd Street, New York.
MOBERLY (W. H.), Lincoln College, Oxford.
MOORE (Dr. G. E.), Trinity College, Cambridge.
MORRISON (D.), 23 South Street, St. Andrews, N.B.
MORRISON (Rev. Dr. W. D.), 38 Devonshire Place, London, W.
MUIRHEAD (Prof. J. H.), 1 York Road, Edgbaston, Birmingham.
MULLER (Dr. T. B.), Philippolis, Orange Free State, S. Africa.
MURRAY (J.), Christ Church, Oxford.
MYERS (Dr. C. S.), Great Shelford, Cambridge.
NUNN (Dr. T. P.), Day Training College, Southampton Row, W.C.
OAKELEY (Miss H. D.), Passmore Edwards Settlement, Tavistock Place, W.C.
OSGOOD (G. L.), Coombe Field, Godalming.
PATON (H. J.), Queen's College, Oxford.
PICKARD-CAMBRIDGE (W. A.), Magdalen College, Oxford.
POLLOCK (Sir F.), Bart., 21 Hyde Park Place, London, W.
PRICHARD (H. A.), Trinity College, Oxford.
PRINGLE-PATTISON (Prof. A. S.), The Haining, Selkirk, N.B.
QUICK (Rev. O. C.), Thelton, Kenley, Surrey.
RANADE (Prof. R. D.), Fergusson College, Poona, India.
RASHDALL (Very Rev. Dr. H.), The Deanery, Carlisle.
READ (Prof. C.), Psychological Laboratory, University College, W.C.
ROBIESON (M. W.), Queen's University, Belfast.
ROBINSON (Prof. A.), Observatory House, Durham.
ROGERS (R. A. P.), Trinity College, Dublin.
ROSS (Prof. G. R. T.), Government College, Rangoon, Burma.
ROSS (W. D.), Oriel College, Oxford.
RUSSELL (Hon. B.), Trinity College, Cambridge.
RUSSELL (L. J.), Brousterland, East Kilbride, Lanarkshire, N.B.
RYLE (Dr. R. J.), 15 Madeira Place, Brighton.
SANDAY (Rev. Canon), Christ Church, Oxford.
SCHILLER (Dr. F. C. S.), Corpus Christi College, Oxford.
SCOTT (J. W.), Acre Cottage, Clynder, Dumbartonshire.
SETH (Prof. J.), 20 Braid Avenue, Edinburgh.
SHAND (A. F.), 1 Edwardes Place, London, W.
SHEARMAN (Dr. A. T.), University College, London, W.C.

- SHELTON (F. D.), Bruce, Alberta, Canada.
 SHELTON (H. S.), 30 Quarry Road, Hastings.
 SHIELDS (Miss F. R.), 131 Kennington Road, London, S.E. 11.
 SIDGWICK (A.), Trewoofe Orchard, St. Buryan, Cornwall.
 SIDGWICK (Mrs. H.), 27 Grange Road, Cambridge. *Hon. Member.*
 SMITH (Prof. J. A.), Magdalen College, Oxford.
 SMITH (Prof. Norman) [Princeton University, N.J., U.S.A.], Montague Hotel, 2 Montague St., Russell Square, W.C. 1.
 SNELLMAN (J. W.), 8 Birgerjarlsgatan, Stockholm, Sweden.
 SORLEY (Prof. W. R.), St. Giles, Chesterton Lane, Cambridge.
 STEWART (Prof. H. L.), Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia.
 STEWART (Prof. J. A.), 14 Bradmore Road, Oxford.
 STOCKS (J. L.), St. John's College, Oxford.
 STOKES (Prof. G. J.), Queen's College, Cork.
 STOUT (Prof. G. F.), Craigard, St. Andrews, N.B. *Hon. Member.*
 STRONG (Prof. C. A.), c/o Crédit Lyonnais, 19 Boulevard des Italiens, Paris.
 STURT (H.), 5 Park Terrace, Oxford.
 SUGIMORI (Prof. K.), 1 Upper Belgrave Road, Clifton, Bristol.
 SUTCLIFFE (J. W.), 14 Clifton Road, Halifax, Yorks.
 TEMPLE (Rev. Dr. W.), 20 Melbury Road, Kensington, W. 14.
 THORBURN (W.), 2 Crick Road, Oxford.
 TITCHENER (Prof. E. B.), Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., U.S.A. *Hon. Member.*
 UNDERHILL (G. E.), Magdalen College, Oxford.
 WALLEY (J. T.), Chardleigh Green, Chard, Somerset.
 WARD (Prof. J.), 6 Selwyn Gardens, Cambridge.
 WARREN (Mrs. Fiske), 8 Mount Vernon Place, Boston, U.S.A.
 WATERLOW (S. P.), 3 Temple Gardens, London, E.C.
 WATT (W. A.), 183 St. Vincent Street, Glasgow.
 WEBB (C. C. J.), Magdalen College, Oxford.
 WIDGERY (Prof. A. G.), The College, Baroda, India.
 WILLIAMS (Rev. Dr. H. H.), St. Edmund Hall, Oxford.
 WILSON (S. F.), 2 Sherwood Street, Warsop, Mansfield, Notts.
 WOLF (Dr. A.), The Chums, Chesham Bois, Bucks.
 WOODS (Miss A.), St. Ives, Cross Path, Radlett, Herts.

Those who wish to join the Association should communicate with the Hon. Secretary, Mr. HENRY STURT, 5 Park Terrace, Oxford; or with the Hon. Treasurer, Dr. F. C. S. SCHILLER, Corpus Christi College, Oxford, to whom the yearly subscription of sixteen shillings should be paid. In return for this subscription members receive MIND gratis and post free, and are entitled to buy back-numbers both of the Old and the New Series at half price. Members resident in America can pay their subscription (\$4) into the account of the Hon. Treasurer (Dr. F. C. S. Schiller) at the Fifth Avenue Bank, 44th Street, New York.

